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CHAPTER 1
Examining Illiberal Trends and Anti-EU
Politics in East Central Europe
from aDomestic Perspective: State of Research
andOutline of the Book
Lisa H. Anders and Astrid Lorenz
1 Introduction
In East Central Europe (ECE), democracy and the rule of law are under
siege, most notably in Hungary and Poland and, to a lesser extent, also
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Elected majorities weakened the
judiciary, limited minority rights and curtailed activities of independent
media and several NGOs. As a result of these illiberal trends, some of
the former democratisation and Europeanisation frontrunners are now
regarded as prime examples of democratic backsliding. EU actors repeat-
edly demanded to uphold EU foundational principles as enshrined in
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). But the more they did
L. H. Anders (B) · A. Lorenz
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so, the more ECE governments reacted by accusing the EU of applying
ill-defined rule of law concepts, by insisting on national sovereignty stip-
ulated in Article 4(2) TEU and by emphasising the cultural differences
between Eastern and Western Europe.
Relations between Brussels on the one hand and Budapest, Warsaw,
Prague and Bratislava on the other hand further deteriorated during
the so-called refugee crisis. The Visegrád countries openly opposed
commonly agreed EU law, namely the refugee relocation scheme. When
EU actors demanded compliance, ECE politicians argued that they had
to defend their electorate. They fiercely refused to comply and comple-
mented their opposition with an increasingly harsh anti-EU rhetoric. As
a result, opposition against particular EU policies turned into general
EU criticism—a development we subsume under the keyword of anti-EU
politics.
As is also reflected in recent European case law, such problems and
conflicts undermine the EU’s legal system and previous integration
achievements. In 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) noted that European values and norms, particularly the funda-
mental right to an independent tribunal, can no longer be taken for
granted in all EU member states. Referring to a Polish national, the CJEU
ruled that judicial authorities in EU member states can now block the
execution of a European arrest warrant if they consider that the indepen-
dence of the judiciary in the issuing member state is no longer guaranteed
(CJEU 2018). In 2020, a German Higher Regional Court refused for
the first time to extradite a Polish suspect to his home country due to
“profound doubts about the future independence of the Polish judiciary”
(Bauomy 2020).
Illiberal trends and anti-EU politics have the potential to undermine
mutual trust among member states and to alter relations between the EU
and some of its member states permanently, as well as shattering estab-
lished theorising in EU studies. Hence, it is crucial to understand their
domestic causes, context conditions, processes and consequences. This
edited volume, therefore, aims to provide in-depth empirical knowledge
of the background of rule of law problems and the open defiance of EU
rules in ECE countries. To arrive at a more encompassing understanding
of these phenomena, it brings together researchers from different disci-
plines and with different theoretical perspectives on the illiberal trends
and anti-EU politics in ECE countries. It contains qualitative case studies,
comparative works and quantitative analyses of the societal, political and
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institutional processes. Together, the studies capture the different facets
of the illiberal trends and anti-EU politics which is urgently needed
for empirically informed theory-building. In doing so, they contribute
to deepening the much-needed area expertise concerning Eastern and
Central Europe (Dale et al. 2016) and help to explore if the differences
between the East and the West are as sharp as often claimed by politicians.
2 Illiberal Trends and the ECE
Countries’ Relations with Brussels
It seems that around the globe, illiberalism is on the rise (Levitsky and
Ziblatt 2018; Mounk 2018). Illiberalism can be defined as the rejection
of mechanisms and institutions to protect individual rights and freedoms
from those in power. In many Western democracies, the protection of
individual rights and freedoms preceded democratisation and later was
integrated into concepts of democracy (Zakaria 1997). Therefore, liberal
democracy—a combination of the constitutionalist and the electoral prin-
ciple—was long regarded as the standard model of democracy (Murphy
1993). However, these principles do not necessarily go hand in hand. As
Fareed Zakaria put in his seminal article on illiberalism: “Democracy is
flourishing; constitutional liberalism is not (…) Just as nations across the
world have become comfortable with many variations of capitalism, they
could well adopt and sustain varied forms of democracy” (1997, p. 23f).
What we see today is that even established democracies can fall short of
liberal norms.
Illiberal trends frequently manifest themselves along two dimensions:
first, the dismantling of the political institutions guaranteeing checks and
balances and minority rights. Often this happens “through a discontin-
uous series of incremental actions” (Waldner and Lust 2018, p. 95) when
democratically elected authorities start to “systematically weaken, anni-
hilate or capture internal checks on power” (Pech and Scheppele 2017,
p. 10). As in most of the cases they do so by legal means, the current
illiberal trends have also been described as “gradual setbacks under a legal
façade” (Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Secondly, the dismantling of
counter-majoritarian institutions is frequently accompanied by a contesta-
tion of liberal social and cultural norms, i.e. the rejection of pluralism and
an increasing mobilisation along the social-cultural axis of political contes-
tation (Havlík 2019; Vachudova 2019). Along these lines, Kaczyński and
Orbán promote their “cultural counter-revolution” (Krekó and Enyedi
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2018, p. 45) which centres around cultural conservatism, Christianity and
ethnic nationalism.
In all ECE countries, there are more or less manifest illiberal tendencies
undermining the EU’s foundational principles, though their particular
form and extent are far from being uniform. When the Fidesz—KDNP
party alliance won a two-thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament in
2010, it named the elections a “revolution at the ballot box”, mandating
the new government to overhaul the constitutional order of the country.
Since then, it has exploited its legislative dominance to undermine
the independence of the judiciary, curbed the media and increasingly
suppressed civil society actors (Bánkuti et al. 2012; Batory 2015; Priebus
2016; Scheppele 2013, 2015). As the Prime Minister explicitly stated in
2014, he aims to establish a new illiberal state (Orbán 2014) and he wants
to break with the “dogmas” that have been adopted by the West as this
will secure Christian values, cultural conservatism and a true Hungarian
way of governing.
The Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) had already started promoting
in the early 2000s the idea of a “new and virtuous Fourth Republic”
(Halmai 2017, p. 8). According to this idea, a radically new illiberal,
centralised system based on a particular “moral order” should help to
realise the aims of the “unfinished 1989 revolution” and overcome the
alleged pathologies of the existing system. To realise this goal, PiS—in
office since 2015—has weakened the Constitutional Tribunal and eroded
various political and individual rights, such as the right to assembly and
privacy (Sadurski 2018, 2019a).
Compared to these two cases, the Czech Republic currently under-
goes “a quieter politics of backsliding” (Hanley and Vachudova 2018,
p. 278; see also Lorenz 2020). Recent developments might nevertheless
be “just as consequential in the longer term” (Buštíková and Guasti 2019,
p. 322). The country’s party system had more or less collapsed when
Prime Minister Babiš—a technocratic populist—came to power with his
slogan to run the state like a firm (Babiš 2017, p. 128 ff.). To increase the
state’s “efficiency”, he suggested abolishing the senate and the regions,
to downsize the parliament, to reduce the number of ministries and to
strengthen the state’s influence on public media (Havlík 2019). To date,
however, there “has been no sustained, successful power grab” (Dawson
and Hanley 2019, p. 716).
In Slovakia, the populist governing party SMER has deployed illib-
eral means since 2006. It repeatedly articulated anti-minority and anti-EU
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positions while the judiciary “continued to experience troubling govern-
ment influence” (Freedom House 2018, see also Láštic 2019). Overall,
however, corruption seems a bigger problem than illiberalism (Freedom
House 2019). In 2018, the murder of a journalist and his fiancé caused
large-scale anti-corruption protests and public demands to break with the
established politicians. As a result, SMER leader Robert Fico resigned
as Prime Minister. In 2020, the party OL’aNO (Ordinary People and
Independent Personalities) won the national elections with an anti-crime
campaign, but the fragmented parliament makes it complicated to form a
coherent coalition and to find a clear political course.
The illiberal trends caused heated debates about the rule of law. Rela-
tions between Brussels and the Visegrád group—especially Budapest and
Warsaw—have become strained and much more complicated. EU actors
identified a “true rule of law crisis” (Reding 2013) and a “clear risk of
a serious breach of the rule of law” in the ECE countries (European
Commission 2019; Sargentini Report 2018), while many ECE politi-
cians insisted on the concept of constitutional pluralism and presented
themselves as “the true guardians of EU values” (Mos 2020, p. 13).
The second bone of contention is the asylum policy. The Visegrád
countries vehemently opposed the refugee relocation scheme, openly
defied European rules and court decisions in this policy field and, in doing
so, questioned the principle of precedence of EU law over national law.
Often politicians in these four countries justified their opposition with
their more or less open rejection of Islam (Gotev 2015; Orbán 2015).
Moreover, they actively engaged in anti-EU campaigns. The Hungarian
government launched a “Let’s Stop Brussels!” consultation in 2016
(Halmai 2016). The following year, it invested millions in billboards,
leaflets, TV commercials, and mass mailings to spread its anti-immigrant
appeals and to demonise Brussels (Krekó and Enyedi 2018, p. 45).
Similarly, Czech politicians criticised “the Brussels dictatorship”, echoing
the well-known phrase of the former “Moscow dictatorship” (Jelínková
2019). Also, the Polish government regularly railed against the EU’s
intrusion into national affairs. These developments caused heated debates
among EU member states about European burden-sharing, and ECE
countries were repeatedly accused of lacking solidarity.
It is puzzling how the people in ECE perceive the illiberal trends and
anti-EU politics. As Fig. 1 shows, in the last few years, trust in national
government has grown in most countries, especially in Hungary and
Poland, but remarkably in the Czech Republic as well. At the same time,
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Fig. 1 Trust in national government and in the EU, 2004–2019 (Source Euro-
barometer; Question wording: I would like to ask you a question about how
much trust you have in certain media and institutions. For each of the following
media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust
it. The [NATIONALITY] government; The European Union)
the public’s trust in the EU increased, although governments have inten-
sified their anti-EU rhetoric and disregard European law where it collides
with their domestic political agenda.
Past elections as well as opinion polls in Hungary have repeatedly
shown that a majority of the population supports the government’s
agenda.1 Despite Orbán’s decidedly critical stance towards “Brussels”
and the frequent clashes between Brussels and Budapest, Hungarians
also show high trust in the EU. The same holds for Poland, where the
1Of course, this has to be interpreted in light of the amendments of the electoral
system in the run-up to the parliamentary elections in 2014 (Krekó and Enyedi 2018,
p. 42; OSCE 2014) and the revision of the media law (Polyák 2015) resulting in the
dominance of pro-government media outlets (Freedom House 2020).
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governing PiS party could increase its vote share in the 2019 elections.
Irrespective of the recent standoffs between Brussels and Warsaw, Polish
people show high levels of trust in the EU. Czech people, in contrast,
show comparatively low levels of trust in the EU, while the Czech govern-
ment harshly criticised the relocation scheme but refrained from general
anti-EU politics. In Slovakia, the past government’s rhetoric and action
vis-à-vis the EU was volatile (Baboš and Malová 2018) and the people
are split in their trust in the EU, making Slovakia rank between Poland
and the Czech Republic. Obviously, the illiberal trends and anti-EU poli-
tics in ECE are not uniform and the interrelationship between domestic
politics and EU perceptions are not straightforward, calling for further
exploration.
3 Conflicts of a New Quality
Clearly, conflicts between the EU and its member states on certain policies
have existed ever since the Union and its predecessors were founded. EU
and ECE actors already struggled over liberal rights and policies before
what is now interpreted as an “illiberal turn”. In the pre-accession period,
the conflicts concerned ethnic minority rights, especially the rights of
the Roma minority. Policy conflicts on environmental standards, military
policy and the relations to Russia have also put strain on the relations
between the EU and the ECE countries. But in general, the Visegrád
countries were exceptionally good formal compliers (Dimitrova 2010;
Treib 2014). Dissatisfaction with EU norms resulted in shallow trans-
position and “dead letters” rather than in open and intentional EU rule
violation.
For various reasons, however, the recent disagreements between Brus-
sels and ECE capitals present conflicts of a new quality. Firstly, they
constitute very general polity disputes touching upon the meaning
of democracy and rule of law. Now, the member states do not just
bring diverging policy-preferences to the EU negotiation table but “also
demand to decouple EU membership from the values and the processes of
liberal democracy” (Vachudova 2019, p. 702). In this vein, the Hungarian
Minister of Justice recently stressed that the rule of law “lacks well-
defined rules”. She further demanded that the “Union shall respect the
national identities” and “not try to impose an artificial, one-size-fits-all
framework” (Varga 2019). Similarly, the former Fidesz MEP and Jean
Monnet Professor of Politics at the University College London, György
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Schöpflin (2015), argued that the rejection of liberal universalism does
not contradict the application of the rule of law. As has been underlined,
this disagreement about EU foundational values severely threatens the
EU’s core identity and has the potential to seriously endanger the Union’s
cohesion (Kelemen and Blauberger 2016, p. 321; Ovádek 2018, p. 495).
Secondly, these conflicts start to undermine existing modes of inte-
gration and Europeanisation. The refusal to take part in the relocation
scheme was not just an ordinary case of non-compliance caused by lacking
compliance capacities. ECE politicians generally criticised how decisions
had been made and self-confidently argued that they had to defend their
electorates’ interests and values against illegitimate interference from the
EU (Krastev 2017; Schlipphak and Treib 2016). Refusing to implement
commonly agreed European laws and even ignoring CJEU rulings, they
challenged—and still challenge—a central principle of European unifica-
tion, namely integration through law. On the one hand, this principle
requires national decision-makers to act as agents of Europeanisation.
They need to accept and implement EU law faithfully (Bieber and Maiani
2014; Manko 2017; Radaelli 2003). On the other hand, this principle also
entails the evolution of European law by case law of the Court of Justice
of the EU and national courts. Both principles are increasingly challenged
by ECE politicians. Especially as the European case law is regarded as
undemocratic because the European court and national courts are not
elected by the people.
Thirdly, the EU’s instruments against illiberal backsliding and open
non-compliance have proven more or less ineffective and prospects for
swift solutions of the current conflicts seem poor. In view of the institu-
tional reforms in Hungary and Poland, the European Commission first
reacted with diplomatic instruments, later with harsh criticism, several
infringement proceedings, the creation of a new Rule of law frame-
work and the activation of its means of last resort, the Article 7 TEU
procedure. Up until now, however, all these measures have not stopped
backsliding. On the contrary, new conflicts emerged. Recent cases in
point are the conflicts regarding the Polish law on the Supreme Court
(European Commission 2018), the Hungarian law on foreign-funded
NGOs (European Commission 2017) and the Hungarian laws that crim-
inalise activities in support of asylum seekers. Against this backdrop, the
European Parliament concluded that “the situation in both Poland and
Hungary has deteriorated since the triggering of Article 7” (European
Parliament 2020).
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Fourthly, the conflicts relating to the European asylum policy as well
as conflicts on the rule of law created new alliances. While not all ECE
governments were in direct trouble with the EU, many politicians are
nevertheless willing to support those opposing EU directives and foun-
dational principles. This is exemplified by the re-strengthening of the
Visegrád group and its collective insistence on EU member states’ right
“to carry out domestic reforms within their competences” (Visegrad
Group 2018). It is also reflected in the Hungarian and Polish govern-
ments’ announcements to torpedo the Article 7 proceedings by vetoing
any EU sanctions against these two member states. Due to these new
alliances, ECE countries are often perceived as a homogenous region.
Some scholars even identified the return of an East-West divide (Krastev
2017) as well as a “core-periphery divide” caused by the “ECE diver-
gence from EU mainstream” (Ágh 2018). Adding to this impression,
ECE politicians repeatedly stressed the cultural differences between the
East and the West.
Finally, as has been shown in the previous section, significant parts of
the ECE societies support both European integration and their govern-
ments. Many citizens, while generally welcoming European integration
and trusting EU institutions, can be mobilised by the idea of pursuing
an inherently national way of “doing things” instead of continuing the
former strategy of importing what seems to them to be Western Euro-
pean democracy and policy templates. Obviously, they support their
governments’ illiberal agendas.
4 State of Research
The illiberal trends and anti-EU politics came as a surprise not only for
politicians, but also for many EU and democratisation scholars. Most
of them deemed the EU’s 2004 eastern enlargement as a success story,
as particularly in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Czechia, Europeanisa-
tion and democratisation seemed to reinforce each other. The EU had
governed its enlargement by means of conditionality (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier 2004) and the candidate countries’ ruling elites were
more than willing to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria as they “overlapped
with their political and economic agendas” (Vachudova 2005, p. 78).
After their accession, ECE countries were quickly regarded as more or
less robust and consolidated democracies (see, for instance, reports by
Freedom House, Rupnik and Zielonka 2013, p. 3).
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Most democratisation and EU scholars expected ECE countries to be
immune to democratic backsliding (Merkel 2010), and they predom-
inantly attributed this to the EU’s conditionality policy (Dawson and
Hanley 2019, p. 711). Already prior to the EU accession, scholars had
expected EU membership to generate “powerful, broad-based and long-
term support for the establishment of democratic institutions because
it is irreversible, and sets in train a cumulative process of economic
and political integration that offers incentives and reassurances to a very
wide array of social forces” (Whitehead 1996, 19). This expectation
also guided actors in ECE countries, like Poland (Sadurski 2004). After
the EU enlargement in 2004, scholars agreed that EU conditionality
had a decisive “transformative power” (Grabbe 2006) and helped “post-
communist countries [to] consolidate their democracies” (Dimitrova and
Pridham 2004, p. 93 f). In the same vein, later publications highlighted
that a lock-in of pre-accession institutional changes would contribute to
their persistence even after accession when the EU’s sanctioning power
weakened (Sedelmeier 2012).
Surely enough, there were also critical voices. Early on, observers noted
low participation rates and a radicalisation of the remaining active elec-
torate in Eastern Europe. They warned not “to paint an overly optimistic
picture of the future that lies before the democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe” (Greskovits 2007, p. 46). Yet, such concerns were hardly
heard but “swept away by EU euphoria and over-optimism that EU
membership with all its ‘automatic’ effects would resolve the basic contra-
dictions between and within economic, political and social developments”
(Ágh 2016, p. 12).
Meanwhile, it became clear that the standard assumption of a more
or less linear Europeanisation and democratic consolidation was too
optimistic. It obviously needs revision. Political systems are still in
flux after 30 years of democratisation and Europeanisation before and
after the formal accession (cf. Guasti and Mansfeldová 2018). These
dynamics attracted the attention of various scholars. Broadly speaking, the
expanding body of literature on current developments in ECE falls into
three categories. First, case studies on backsliding dynamics in specific
countries. Secondly, preliminary works on the potential causes of back-
sliding. Thirdly, contributions discussing possible remedies against illiberal
backsliding.
Numerous case studies trace the institutional reforms dismantling the
rule of law in ECE countries (Batory 2015; Jaremba 2016; Priebus 2016;
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Rupnik 2012; Sadurski 2019a, 2019b; Sólyom 2015). To describe the
phenomenon of interest, they came up with an astonishing variety of
keywords, such as “Frankenstate” (Scheppele 2013), “diffusely defective
democracy” (Bogaards 2018), “Potemkin democracy” or “elected autoc-
racy” (Ágh 2015) and “externally constrained hybrid regime” (Bozóki
and Hegedűs 2018). More recent studies also analyse in greater detail
the ideational foundations of the illiberal backlash in ECE countries as
well as the rhetoric of the illiberal agents (Buzogány and Varga, 2018;
Dawson and Hanley 2019; Mos 2020). A few exceptions aside, these
studies focus disproportionally on the most visible cases of backsliding:
Hungary and Poland (Cianetti et al. 2018). They certainly provide an
enlightening take on backsliding dynamics and the associated institutional
changes in these two paradigmatic cases. The domestic roots of back-
sliding and current conflicts between the EU and ECE countries as well
as alternative problem perceptions within these countries, however, have
received comparatively little attention so far.
A second strand of the literature addresses the potential causes of the
illiberal backlash. These studies approach the phenomenon of interest
from various theoretical viewpoints, including political economy theo-
ries, agent-based or institutionalist approaches or theories of political
culture. They explain the erosion of democracy by economic and financial
problems (Szente 2017, p. 472), by demographic developments (Krastev
2018) or by stressing the role of actors and their discourses in making
and unmaking democratic institutions (Dawson and Hanley 2019). Some
trace it back to the post-1989 dominance of the “liberal orthodoxy”,
stressing that post-communist countries were expected to “return to
Europe” mainly by mimicking Western liberal democratic blueprints
(Krastev and Holmes 2020). Others highlight that pre-accession condi-
tionality merely resulted in formal and rather shallow “conditionality
constitutionalism”, underlining that constitutionalism and the rule of law
still lack “a firm social and politico-cultural entrenchment in civil and
political society” (Blokker 2016, p. 250; see also Pridham 2005). In this
perspective, the PiS victory has shown that ECE societies have remained
nationalist and have “merely been pretending to accept the shared norms
of liberal democracy, only to reap the economic and financial fruits of
their EU membership” (Karolewski and Benedikter 2017, p. 519). This
variety of approaches shows that we are still missing a strong and widely
acknowledged explanation of the illiberal trends. As a recent review aptly
concluded, there is no “readily available set of theories that we (…) can
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uncontroversially adopt, adapt, and apply to the problem of backslid-
ing” (Waldner and Lust 2018, p. 106; also compare Cianetti et al. 2018,
p. 243).
A third strand of the literature explores how the EU can enforce its
foundational values. Ample studies analyse the deployment and actual
effects of the EU’s various instruments to counter rule of law back-
sliding in its member states. They focus on political instruments, such
as the Article 7 procedure, which can ultimately result in the suspension
of the backsliding government’s voting rights, the Rule of law frame-
work established in 2014 and the Rule of law dialogue, launched in
the same year by the Council of the EU (Closa 2016, 2018; Kochenov
et al. 2017; Kochenov and Pech 2015, 2016; Müller 2015; Oliver and
Stefanelli 2016). Furthermore, they examine the effects of judicial tools
against backsliding, such as infringement proceedings and private enforce-
ment litigation in national courts (Blauberger and Kelemen 2016; De
Schutter 2017). Most of these studies approach the ECE countries from
an enforcement and top-down perspective, and they agree that polit-
ical and judicial instruments have proven rather ineffective. Thus, some
recent publications discuss if existing instruments could and should be
employed differently (Pech and Kochenov 2019). Other works address
the suitability of new oversight instruments, such as the conditionality of
EU funds (Blauberger and van Hüllen 2020; Neuwahl and Kovacs 2020;
Pech and Scheppele 2017).
Publications on the EU’s instruments against democratic backsliding
are predominantly written by legal scholars (Ovádek 2018, p. 499).
Against this backdrop, it comes as no surprise that they focus on legal
aspects and legalistic remedies for the erosion of the rule of law while
the social, political and cultural preconditions of the rule of law have
remained largely neglected (Blokker 2016). Experiences with ECE coun-
tries, however, clearly demonstrate that democracy does not rest on law
alone. It needs to be supported by decision-makers and rooted in a society
which perceives it as legitimate. As Pridham (2005) and Blokker (2016)
and others argued, societal attitudes were much less influenced by EU
conditionality politics than the domestic legal framework. Nevertheless,
they are often ignored by de-democratisation and Europeanisation studies
as well as by legal analyses of rule of law problems inside the EU. Accord-
ingly, some scholars criticise the EU’s assumption that liberal democracy
and compliance within the member states can be secured by law or legal-
istic instruments, and that the European constitutionalism rests upon a
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set of values shared within the member states (Dupré 2015). In this vein,
recent publications called for broadening the one-sided focus on formal
institutions and legal solutions and to examine empirically “the political
and socio-economic factors which enable democratic deficits to take root”
(Ovádek 2018, p. 501, see also Blokker 2016, p. 266; Cianetti et al.
2018).
5 Aims and Outline of the Book
This volume aims to map and to understand illiberal trends and anti-EU
politics in East Central Europe by linking EU studies with area exper-
tise and assembling contributions from different disciplines. Empirically,
it adds to the literature by zooming into domestic processes in all four
countries of the region. Examining rule of law and compliance challenges
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic as well allows us to compare and
contrast the dynamics in Hungary and Poland. Several contributions also
broaden the perspective comparing ECE countries with other EU states,
thereby testing whether differences between the Visegrád countries and
the remaining EU member states are really as pronounced as frequently
claimed.
The volume adds to theory-building by exploring how different theo-
retical perspectives can help to capture the domestic context conditions,
processes and consequences of the illiberal trends and anti-EU politics
in ECE. Individual contributions are not bound to a specific theoretical
perspective. This is not only due to the fact that a generally accepted
theoretical model for these phenomena is still missing. More impor-
tantly, we are convinced that complex problems need complex analytical
approaches as well as area-sensitive solutions. We therefore bring together
complementary analytical approaches from sociology, political and legal
science. This diversity helps to arrive at a more encompassing under-
standing of the current developments in ECE countries and contributes
to moving beyond a mainly legalistic or institution-centred perspective on
backsliding and the EU’s instruments against it.
The different theoretical perspectives aside, the contributions are
connected by a number of shared assumptions. First, they model politics
as a process. Secondly, they focus on individual or collective actors’ percep-
tions, rhetoric, actions and interactions. Thirdly, though focusing on
actors as drivers and shapers of policies, they conceive them as embedded
in a given context. The contributions share the premise that the context
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influences—but does not determine—the actors’ strategies. Therefore,
similar institutions (like democratic or EU norms) and legal instruments
neither have to be perceived in the same way nor yield similar effects.
Fourthly, many of the contributions interpret illiberal trends and anti-EU
politics as causally entangled phenomena which sometimes are not self-
standing policy aims but rather instruments or effects of actors’ strategies
to reach their actual goal.
These shared basic assumptions guide the overall structure of the
book. Following a classic processual input—output model of democ-
racy (Easton), it starts from society and analyses citizens’ perceptions and
demands in part 1. Part 2 then looks at how political actors respond to
these inputs and strive to shape societal demands through their rhetoric
and campaigns. Along these lines, contributions also analyse if actors
follow a coherent illiberal or anti-EU ideology and uncover how they
struggle to realise certain policies inside the government system and with
societal actors. Part 3 illuminates how and why the policy output—illib-
eral reforms and non-compliance with EU rules—causes conflicts with
European actors. It also investigates EU actors’ strategies to secure EU
norms against illiberal backsliding as well as the counter-strategies this has
brought about in ECE countries. The contributions of the concluding
fourth part of the book discuss theoretical and conceptual implications
for democracy, the rule of law and Europeanisation.
In detail, the book is structured as follows: As mentioned, the contri-
butions to the opening part, including Chapters 2 through 4, focus
on citizens’ perceptions and demands. More specifically, the quantita-
tive studies analyse the prevalence of Euroscepticism, the nexus between
Euroscepticism and Islamophobia and conceptions of European solidarity
in East Central European and the remaining member states. Together,
they help to assess whether and how citizens’ attitudes towards the EU
and European integration in East Central Europe differ from other EU
member states and if illiberal and anti-EU politics in ECE countries can
be explained by these differences.
In Chapter 2, Lars Vogel examines if anti-EU politics in East Central
European countries are backed by a particularly negative public opinion
on European integration. To do so, he analyses if there are regional
or EU-wide patterns, trends and determinants of Euroscepticism. He
compares the explanatory power of classic Euroscepticism accounts and
also explores if public opinion on European integration is linked to crit-
ical attitudes towards immigration and illiberal conceptions of democracy.
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Gert Pickel and Cemal Öztürk then analyse in Chapter 3 why especially
the issues of asylum and migration have led to such vehement opposition
from the Visegrád states. Taken together, Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate
that anti-EU politics of ECE countries cannot simply be attributed to
high levels of Euroscepticism in the region. Rather, they result from
the rejection of specific EU policies. This finding is also supported in
Chapter 4 by Florian K. Kley and Holger Lengfeld. To test if ECE coun-
tries generally show lower levels of European solidarity, as often argued
during the refugee crisis, the authors explore solidarity in other policy
areas. They comparatively investigate ECE citizens’ willingness to support
indebted countries financially and their attitudes towards EU-wide redis-
tributive measures. Again, the contribution underlines that ECE countries
are less distinct from the other EU countries than assumed in public and
academic debate.
The second part, including Chapters 5 through 8, sheds light on polit-
ical actors and their illiberal and anti-EU rhetoric and practice. Analysing
politicians, parties, and administrations, the contributions complement
existing studies on backsliding in ECE countries which typically focus on
institutional changes as well as the general state of democracy and devoted
less attention to the agents of the current illiberal trends. The compara-
tive works and case studies reveal considerable intra-regional and temporal
variations regarding the illiberal agendas of political actors. Furthermore,
they demonstrate the differences between the illiberal or anti-EU rhetoric
on the one hand and the actual policies on the other hand.
In Chapter 5, Vratislav Havlík and Vít Hloušek provide a compre-
hensive overview of all four countries of interest, comparing the illib-
eral ideology and practice of governing parties in the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The authors show that not all decision-
makers in the region follow a coherent illiberal agenda and that illiberal
practices vary as well. Differences between rhetoric and practice are also
discussed in Chapter 6. Focusing on Hungary and the Czech Republic,
Paula Beger analyses the link between the public contestation of the EU’s
asylum and migration policies and the member states’ compliance in the
policy field. Her contribution also provides an explanation why similar
levels of public contestation in both countries resulted in a different
compliance performance. Next, in Chapter 7, Michał Dulak looks more
closely at the link between illiberal backsliding and anti-EU party rhetoric.
To analyse this link, he explores over time how the main ruling and the
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main opposition party in Poland, PO and PiS, position themselves vis-à-
vis the EU and then checks whether this is backed by societal attitudes. In
the last chapter of the second part, Petra Guasti sheds light on the anti-
pluralist dimension of illiberalism, analysing how certain political actors in
the Czech Republic and Slovakia block pro-universal rights legislation by
the EU or the Council of Europe (Chapter 8). In line with Chapter 5,
the contribution shows that illiberal backlashes are not necessarily the
result of a coherent illiberal ideology, but also of short-term strategic
considerations of political actors.
The third part of the volume, including Chapters 9 through 11,
addresses the EU’s political reactions to the illiberal turn and anti-EU
politics in ECE countries. To contribute to current scholarly debates
on the EU’s oversight instruments, the authors go beyond a top-down
enforcement perspective and pay particular attention to the interplay
between EU and domestic actors. In doing so, they shed light on
the deployment of the EU’s remedies against rule of law backsliding
and the counter-strategies they have caused. Furthermore, they address
how the problems around the illiberal turn and anti-EU politics can be
solved by non-legalistic means.
In Chapter 9, Attila Vincze critically reflects on misperceptions in
current rule of law conflicts between Brussels and Budapest and their
usage in domestic debates. His contribution helps to understand how and
why governments criticised for illiberal practices can frame EU interven-
tions such as the Article 7 procedure as political attacks. The same is true
for Chapter 10 by Lisa H. Anders and Sonja Priebus, who analyse how the
Commission justified rule of law-related infringement procedures against
Hungary and how the Fidesz government reacted legally and rhetorically.
Given the apparent shortcomings of the EU’s instruments, Claudia Y.
Matthes then investigates in Chapter 11 how domestic civil rights move-
ments can contribute to safeguarding the rule of law in a bottom-up
manner. Focusing on the Polish case, she illustrates how and by which
means civil society organisations can keep the issue of backsliding on the
domestic and European political agenda.
The three contributions of the concluding fourth part of the book
discuss conceptual and theoretical implications for future research. They
add to EU studies by moving beyond ECE and a narrow EU perspec-
tive and embedding the empirical observations into broader theoretical
reflections on democracy and rule of law. In Chapter 12, Luca Tomini
and Seda Gürkan elaborate on how illiberal trends and autocratisation
1 EXAMINING ILLIBERAL TRENDS AND ANTI-EU POLITICS … 17
are related to anti-EU-politics and de-Europeanisation. Ireneusz Paweł
Karolewski argues in Chapter 13 for a general theory of democratic back-
sliding, stressing that it should cover societal, institutional and processual
aspects. In the final chapter, Chapter 14, Astrid Lorenz and Lisa H.
Anders highlight the added value of the volume by summarising how the
main findings of the individual chapters speak to each other and jointly
provide a comprehensive picture of illiberal trends and anti-EU politics in
ECE. Moreover, they link the findings to the state of research and discuss
theoretical implications as well as potential avenues for future research.
Overall, the contributions provide rich empirical material to illuminate
various facets of the illiberal trends and anti-EU politics in East Central
Europe. They thereby contribute to filling a gap that has emerged due to
the decline in regional and area studies in many EU member states since
the 1990s. When referring to East Central Europe, EU scholars often
have to rely on a small number of sources available in English and they all
too often infer from the politicians’ public rhetoric to their actual policies.
As theory-building is also dependent on in-depth case knowledge, this will
be provided by contributions of authors with the required language skills,
along with the profound country, regional and theoretical expertise.
To be clear, the regional focus of the book neither implies that illib-
eral trends and anti-EU politics are limited to this region nor that they
are equally manifest in all four East Central European countries. Illiberal
rhetoric and action, critical discourses on the EU in general and joint
decision-making in particular, as well as the renewed interest in national
solutions are not confined to the region. Thus, the findings will be of
interest not only to experts on East Central European countries, but also
to those studying the rule of law, illiberal backsliding and the EU’s instru-
ments against it. They will also broaden the empirical knowledge of all
those interested in European integration and the interplay between the
European and the domestic level.
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PART I
Societal Roots of the Illiberal Trends
and Anti-EU Politics
CHAPTER 2
Illiberal and Anti-EU Politics in the Name
of the People? Euroscepticism in East Central




Until around the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, public opinion on Euro-
pean integration was described as “permissive consensus” (Lindberg
and Scheingold 1970), implying that citizens in Western Europe tacitly
supported their elite’s efforts to push integration further. In the coun-
tries of East Central Europe (ECE), citizens had strongly supported EU
membership as a “return to Europe” since the 1990s at least until the
accession in 2004. Nevertheless, the support was not consensual (Guerra
2013). Nowadays, public opinion on European integration in both ECE
and the EU in general is characterised by a “constraining dissensus”
(Hooghe and Marks 2008); that is, significant parts of the population
evaluate European integration negatively or even oppose it. This public
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contestation constrains pro-European elite’s leeway in pursuing further
steps of integration and encourages parties—both at the fringes and
from the mainstream—to politicise European integration and its liberal
constitutional foundations.
Anti-EU and illiberal policies of governments may thus be backed
by negative public opinion on European integration. With institutional
reforms that contest the rule of law or by open non-compliance with
EU immigration policy, national governments in ECE—encompassing
Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—may thus be responsive to
domestic Eurosceptic public opinion or actively mould the latter to get
domestic support for such policies. The present chapter, accordingly,
describes patterns, trends and determinants of public Euroscepticism in
ECE to analyse whether public opinion on European integration in these
countries is related to the contestation of both the immigration policies
and the constitutional principles of the EU by the respective governments.
By using longitudinal and cross-sectional, cross-country and country-by-
country analyses, the chapter makes two contributions to the research on
public opinion on European integration and to regional studies on ECE.
Firstly, three dimensions of attitudes towards European integration are
delineated and empirically validated: diffuse regime, input- and policy-
specific support. Secondly, the chapter analyses the results of ECE in a
comparative perspective to investigate whether Euroscepticism in ECE is
characterised by regional or by European-wide patterns. It shows only
weak indications for a ECE-specific Euroscepticism, i.e. similar patterns
among all ECE countries that are distinct from the EU average. In
contrast, ECE is less characterised by regional similarities but rather by
country differences with regard to both the degree of Euroscepticism
and its linkage to the issue of immigration and conceptions of democ-
racy. Additionally, the standard explanatory factors for Euroscepticism
need to be amended for and are mediated by country-specific factors.
For instance, negative assessments of domestic democracy are positively
related to Euroscepticism in Czechia and Slovakia while negatively related
to in Hungary and Poland.
In order to develop these findings in more detail, the remainder is
structured as follows: the following part introduces the multidimensional
concept of Euroscepticism. The third paragraph delineates the hypotheses
to explain Euroscepticism and introduces preferences towards immigra-
tion and conceptions of democracy as explanatory factors that are directly
linked to the ECE governments’ contestation. The final three parts
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present the data, the results of the descriptive and multivariate analysis
and provide some conclusions.
2 Euroscepticism: Concept
Since Euroscepticism implies different meanings, it requires conceptual
clarification before being applied in empirical research. It has to be delin-
eated whether Euroscepticism includes fundamental opposition to Euro-
pean integration as well as a critique of its current praxis and performance,
or just reluctance or doubts. Furthermore, the term Euroscepticism
suggests unidimensionality, i.e. people either support or oppose European
integration generally. However, research on public opinion has demon-
strated that attitudes towards European integration are multidimensional.
They can display ambivalence and ambiguity: instead of consistent pro-
or anti-European sentiments, citizens may reject certain facets or objects
of European integration but favour others (De Vries 2018, pp. 40–41;
Boomgaarden et al. 2011; Stoeckel 2013).
An important starting point for conceptual clarification is provided
by Easton’s (1975) concept of political support that distinguishes
between authorities, regime, and community as three different objects
of evaluation, as well as between specific and diffuse as two different
modes of support. According to this perspective, scepticism is the
lack or withdrawal of support. While specific support is based on
the positive evaluation of the performance of the authorities, insti-
tutions or the entire regime, diffuse support is not referring to the
actual performance of an object but is derived from the support of
the values and norms it represents. This conceptual distinction was
refined when applied to attitudes on European integration, but the
difference between “utilitarian/specific/output-oriented support [and]
affective/diffuse/input-oriented support” (Boomgaarden et al. 2011)
still appears in most of these approaches. For instance, Kopecky and
Mudde (2002), in their work regarding party stances on European inte-
gration, differentiate between support (or lack of) that is affective/value
based (Europhiles and Europhobes) or performance based (Optimists and
Pessimists). The combination of both dimensions results in a typology
in which Euroscepticism encompasses fundamental opposition towards
European integration (Europhobe pessimists) and rejection of the actual
practice of integration (Europhile pessimists). This dichotomy is resem-
bled in the distinction between “Hard” and “Soft” Euroscepticism
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(Taggart and Szczerbiak 2004) or in the category of “critical citizens”
(Norris 1999), who support the idea of democracy but evaluate the
practice of democracy in their own country negatively. Weßels (2007)
underlines that each mode of support—value and performance based—
can be applied to each object except the community, i.e. for authorities
and institutions as well as for the entire process of European integration.
An additional dimension of specific support is policy-related support,
which is derived from the dichotomy of input- vs output-legitimacy
(Scharpf 1999) or regime- vs policy-evaluations (Dahl 1998). On the one
hand, specific support is input-based on the assessment of the responsive-
ness and inclusiveness of a regime. For democratic systems such as the
EU, input-based support is particularly important, since it is normatively
based on democratic equality in terms of participation and representa-
tion. On the other hand, specific support is based on the output a regime
delivers, for instance, the provision of economic goods or social secu-
rity. Recent studies underline that the demand for a shift of competencies
to the EU level is influenced by the comparison between the perfor-
mance of the domestic government in a particular policy field and the
(presumed) performance of the EU institutions in that policy field. The
demand for further integration is, accordingly, a specific form of policy
support based on the presumed superiority of policy solutions at EU level
compared to national solutions—averaged for multiple policies (De Vries
2018, pp. 45ff).
In order to capture the described multidimensionality of attitudes
towards European integration, we distinguish (I) diffuse regime support,
(II) input-specific regime support and (III) policy-specific regime
support, which are further combined in a typology of Euroscepticism (s.
below).
3 Explaining Euroscepticism: Hypotheses
Theoretical approaches to explain public support of European integration
either focus on economic considerations, identity issues, such as anti-
Muslim attitudes (see Chapter 3), benchmarking, cue-taking or, rather
seldom, democratic conceptions as explanatory factors (Ejrnæs and Jensen
2019; Hobolt and Vries 2016).
Economic or utilitarian approaches assume that citizens support Euro-
pean integration, should the perceived benefits of membership of a given
country in the EU outweigh the costs (Gabel 1998). These approaches
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distinguish between individuals and collective benefits. Individual benefits
of European integration are unequally distributed among the popula-
tion and conditional on socioeconomic status traits such as, for instance,
education, occupation and income. The higher the education and income
and the more skilled the occupation, the more advantages individuals
can retrieve from trade liberalisation in the course of European inte-
gration and the more they support it. In contrast, the less skilled and
educated people are, the more their job security is endangered by liber-
alisation, which makes them less supportive. Sociotropic assessments of
the benefits of EU membership for ones’ own country can be based on
the attributed responsibility of the EU for the macroeconomic perfor-
mance of this country or on its status as net-recipient or net-contributor
in the EU system of fiscal transfers. Other approaches have focused on the
welfare system and assume that European integration is less supported in
countries with a developed welfare state, which is perceived as threat-
ened by further liberalisation. In countries with high levels of inequality,
European integration is perceived as stimulating further redistribution.
The underlying assumption is that individuals’ support is linked to their
attitudes to the welfare state (Garry and Tilley 2015).
In the ECE countries with comparatively weak welfare states and high
levels of inequality, support for the EU is, accordingly, supposed to be
stronger among citizens who support further redistribution. Accordingly,
we assume that policy-specific support for European integration decreases,
the lower the individual socioeconomic status becomes (H1a) and the more
one supports welfare-state redistribution (H1b). Diffuse regime support and
input-specific regime support are presumed as less influenced by these factors.
Identity approaches (Hobolt and Vries 2016) emphasise cultural issues
such as identity, immigration and religion (Carey 2002). In this view, citi-
zens perceive European integration not primarily in terms of economic
liberalisation but as a more general process to overcome national and
cultural boundaries. Citizens who share conceptions of distinct and
culturally homogeneous nations are, accordingly, more likely to feel
threatened by European integration than those who favour cosmopolite
conceptions of culturally heterogeneous societies (s. also Chapter 3 in
this volume). Accordingly, Euroscepticism is expected to be higher among
citizens with nationalist world views compared to those with cosmopolite
orientations (H2). The former share homogeneous and exclusive concep-
tions of national identity that are expressed, inter alia, by sceptic to hostile
attitudes towards immigration.
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Scholars of public opinion have emphasised that citizens lack knowl-
edge, time, interest and commitment to gather sufficient information
on the basis of which they are able to evaluate distant objects such as
the EU and its institutions. They rather rely on informational shortcuts
or cues that are more easily accessible in their daily experience (Zaller
1992; Anderson 1998). The impact of several cues has been investigated,
including the media coverage of the EU, attitudes of domestic elites,
stances of established and challenger parties, and the performance of
national governments (Hobolt and Vries 2016). These cues are primarily
derived from objects in the domestic context and presumed to enfold two
opposite influences. The cueing argument was developed in research on
voting behaviour in European elections: if people are satisfied with their
domestic government, they vote for the parties that form this govern-
ment (Franklin et al. 1995). Generalising this argument assumes that the
less one is satisfied with the national government, the less one supports
European integration. In contrast, benchmarking approaches (De Vries
2018; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000) stress that the national contexts provide
a benchmark for the evaluation of the EU: if citizens are not satisfied
with their national government or the democratic regime in their country,
they may perceive a shift of competencies to the supranational level of
the EU as an appealing alternative. Vice versa, citizens who are satisfied
with their national government are likely to oppose shifts of competencies
from the national to the supranational level; that is, they are Eurosceptic
concerning the policy-specific dimension of political support. Whether
cueing or benchmarking dominates is conditional on the national context
(Ejrnæs and Jensen 2019). We therefore assume that satisfaction with the
government is linked to both input- and policy-specific support for the EU
(H3a), satisfaction with the economic situation is linked to policy-specific
support (H3b), while satisfaction with national democracy is linked to
input-specific support (H3c). However, whether the domestic evaluation is
a cue that is directly transferred to the EU level or serves as an indirect
benchmark is conditional upon the national context.
Parties and governments also actively mould public opinion towards
European integration (Gabel and Scheve 2007; Steenbergen et al. 2007).
Since the consensus among established political elites to support Euro-
pean integration has remained longer than the “permissive consensus”
among the population (Vogel and Rodríguez-Teruel 2016), attempts to
politicise European integration were pursued primarily at the fringes of
the national party systems. Parties and elites on the left mobilise voters
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against the neoliberal and, since the financial crisis, the austerity policy of
the EU, whereas on the right, they mobilise by accusing the EU of under-
mining the national identity and sovereignty (Hobolt and Vries 2016).
If citizens take cues from parties they support, the degree of Euroscepti-
cism is supposed to be higher for citizens who support a Eurosceptic party
(H4). The causality may, however, also be reversed: Eurosceptic atti-
tudes may originate endogenously and subsequently determine the party
choice. Although we cannot completely rule out this alternative interpre-
tation, two caveats are made. Firstly, if citizens’ Eurosceptic attitudes were
endogenous to party stances, the choice for a Eurosceptic party would be
significantly influenced by the other explanatory factors discussed in this
section. Thus, the absence of multicollinearity would support the cueing
interpretation. Secondly, voters’ choice for Eurosceptic parties is in any
case not completely influenced by the Eurosceptic stances of these parties.
This is more likely for Eurosceptic parties with a broad programmatic
package compared to niche parties and in electoral competitions, which
are not centred on issues of European integration, i.e. rather in national
than European elections.
Input-specific support is linked to the perception of responsiveness in
the policy-making process; that is, both private interests and the inter-
ests of the own country are regarded in the policy-making process (see
Chapter 7). Empirical evidence shows that perceived external efficacy of
the EU indeed decreases Euroscepticism (Rohrschneider 2002; McEvoy
2016). We assume that input-specific support is further influenced by the
conceptions of democracy. This assumption links the debate on Euroscep-
ticism with the one on democratic backsliding and contestation of EU
law by the ECE governments. We distinguish analytically between an
illiberal conception of democracy that stresses the primacy of national
popular sovereignty and majoritarian rule, and a liberal conception which
puts universal civil and minority rights as well as institutional control and
division of power in the foreground (Mény and Surel 2002). Citizens
may perceive the EU as a threat to illiberal conceptions, since qualified
majority voting can result in EU decisions that are contrary to national
majorities. Additionally, economic liberalisation is inextricably linked to
the protection of individual civil rights such as, for instance, free move-
ment, which constrains national sovereignty further. We therefore assume
that citizens with an illiberal conception of democracy are less supportive of
European integration on the input-specific dimension (H5).
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Combining these assumptions in a longitudinal perspective, diffuse
regime support for the EU is presumed to have remained stable in the
ECE countries in the period under investigation, but specific support, both
input- and policy-related, is volatile and dependent on the domestic context.
Since diffuse regime support is driven by value-based evaluations, it
should be more stable than specific support. Accordingly, the economic
developments of the ECE countries are presumed to contribute in partic-
ular to policy-specific support. In particular, the economic difficulties
since the financial crisis of 2007/2008 may have changed the percep-
tion of economic benefits resulting from EU membership. Less benefits
are perceived, if the responsibility for economic decline is attributed
to the EU, but also, if the responsibility for successfully coping with
economic hardships is attributed to the national governments instead of
to the EU (Vogel and Göncz 2018). Additionally, cultural issues may
have influenced policy-specific support in the course of the so-called
refugee crisis of 2015/2016 and the efforts at EU-level to reform the
relocation scheme for immigrants and refugees. In the ECE countries,
in which some national governments portrayed the EU as undermining
national ethnic homogeneity and thus the foundation of cultural iden-
tity, policy-specific support is considered to decrease in the aftermath
of 2015. Input-specific support might have decreased too, since govern-
ments in ECE countries fuse their accusation of the EU undermining
national identity and sovereignty with their conception of an alternative,
illiberal view of democracy that challenges the liberal foundations of the
EU enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
4 Data Basis: The European
Election Voter Studies 2004–2019
The data for this investigation is derived from the four Voter Studies
of the European Election Studies (2004, 2009, 2014 and 2019).1 Our
sample includes all countries in which the survey was conducted at each
election to the European Parliament since 2004, thereby including 24
states that were EU members in 2019 (except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta
and Romania). Each Voter Study was conducted after the respective Euro-
pean election and contains around 1000 randomly selected respondents
1http://europeanelectionstudies.net/.
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in each wave in each country. The recommended weighting procedures
were applied for post-stratification and to take into account the different
number of inhabitants of the countries in the case of reporting EU
averages.
Dependent Variables
Diffuse regime support is measured by the answer to the question
“Generally speaking, do you think that [country]’s membership of the
European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither?” and input-
specific support by the question “All in all again, are you very satisfied,
fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democ-
racy works in the European Union?” To capture policy-specific support,
the following standard item was selected: “Some say European unifica-
tion should be pushed further. Others say it already has gone too far.
What is your opinion?” Since policy evaluations in the multi-level context
of the EU are linked to policy allocation, respondents who evaluate the
problem-solving capacities of the EU better than that of their national
political system are supposed to favour further integration. The member-
ship question was asked in all four waves; satisfaction with democracy was
not asked in 2014 and neither was the question on unification in 2004.
Independent Variables
Individual utilitarian judgments are not directly assessed but measured by
the length of formal education and the subjective social class (Table 3
in the Appendix). Self-assessment of class belonging serves as a valid
indicator for the access to resources that is otherwise measured by occupa-
tion and income (Wright 2000). Sociotropic utilitarian considerations are
measured by the preference for welfare-state redistribution. Nationalist
and cosmopolite orientations are distinguished by measuring respondents’
attitudes towards immigration. Cueing and benchmarking are assessed
by asking for the satisfaction with democracy within a given country,
the disapproval of the national government and an assessment of the
national economic situation. Party cues are assessed by asking for which
party respondents have voted in the most recent national election. By
this focus on the national election instead of on the European elections,
it is less likely that the electoral choice was influenced by parties’ posi-
tions on European integration (see above). The classification of parties as
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Eurosceptic is based on their belongingness to one of the following party
groups in the European Parliament: GUE/NGL, ID and ECR (Table 4
in the appendix). The exception being Fidesz, which was categorised as
Eurosceptic despite their affiliation to the EPP. If parties do not belong to
any parliamentary group, the classification follows the overview provided
by Barbieri (2015). Finally, the measurement of democratic conceptions
is constrained by the indicators that are available in the EES. We use the
support for the restriction of civil rights to combat crime as an indication
of illiberal conceptions. Citizens who approve restrictions are more likely
to share illiberal conceptions of democracy, since they provide individual
civil rights not universally, but only if this is not seen as an obstacle to the
realisation of certain policy goals.
5 Euroscepticism in ECE
2004–2019: Description and Typology
Regime support increased in all ECE countries since their accession in
2004 even though in Hungary it is only marginally higher in 2019
compared to 2004 (Fig. 1). In Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, diffuse
support in 2019 is even above the average of the remaining EU member
states, while support in Czechia remains remarkably lower. With the
exception of Hungary, neither in ECE nor in the remaining EU, diffuse
regime support dropped at the peak of the economic crisis in 2009.
Instead, it decreased slightly afterwards (except in Hungary and Poland),
since the economic crisis has developed into a financial and state budget
crisis. Furthermore, neither the conflicts during or in the aftermath of
2015’s massive influx of asylum seekers nor the contestation of the rule
of law by constitutional reforms in Hungary and Poland nor the non-
compliance of the Visegrád countries with the relocation scheme have
been accompanied by a decrease in public diffuse regime support for the
EU since 2015. Moreover, diffuse support has even increased, while it
decreased in the average of the remaining EU countries.
In contrast, satisfaction with EU democracy has decreased in almost all
observed ECE countries since 2004, except in Poland, which parallels the
development of the average in the other member states (Fig. 2). Similar
to the level of diffuse support, the input-specific support in Hungary and,
especially, in Poland was always above the average of the remaining EU
countries including Slovakia and Czechia. Finally, policy-specific support
is the most volatile dimension: in all ECE countries and in the average of




2004 2009 2014 2019
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia EU
Fig. 1 Diffuse regime support: EU membership is a good thing (Means 2004–
2019, EES) Note Generally speaking, do you think that [country]’s membership
of the European Union is a good thing (3), a bad thing (1) or neither (2)?
(answers are recorded). EU without ECE countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and
Romania
the other EU countries, it decreased significantly in 2014 with a re-rise
in 2019 (Fig. 3). Only in Czechia did policy-specific support not re-rise
after the drop from 2009 to 2014.
These different and, accordingly, loosely coupled developments in
ECE—increasing diffuse support, decreasing input-specific support and
volatile output-specific support—corroborate the multidimensional struc-
ture of attitudes towards European integration at the macro-level. To
investigate this multidimensionality at the individual level, input-specific
support and policy-specific support are combined into three categories of
specific support: (1) citizens who are not satisfied with EU democracy and
who judge European integration as too far-reaching,2 (2) citizens who are
both satisfied with EU democracy and with the current status of Euro-
pean integration (or even want it to be pushed further) and (3) those with
mixed evaluations of input and policy. In the observed ECE countries
2Before, the question measuring policy-specific support was collapsed in two categories:
those who think European integration has gone too far (0–4) and those who are either







Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia EU
Fig. 2 Input-specific support: Satisfaction with EU democracy (Means 2004/9/19,
EES) Note All in all again, are you very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very
satisfied (2) or not at all satisfied (1) with the way democracy works in the European









2004 2009 2014 2019
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia EU
Fig. 3 Policy-specific support: Evaluation of European integration (Means 2009–
2019, EES) Note Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others
say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using
a scale from 0 “has already gone too far” to 10 “should be pushed further”. EU
without ECE countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania
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in 2019, the relation between those three categories of specific support
and diffuse regime support is rather close (Table 1): 69.3% of those
who are sceptical towards the regime display no specific support, while
70.7% of the diffuse supporters are simultaneously satisfied with both EU
democracy and policy performance. Those who are undecided about the
benefits of EU membership judge input and policy overwhelmingly mixed
or negative. In the average of the other EU member states (no figure),
65.1% of those without diffuse support show no specific support, which is
close to the ECE average of 69.3%. But only 47.6% of those with diffuse
regime support display outright specific support. This suggests that in the
ECE countries, regime support is more closely coupled with performance
assessment than in the remaining member states, which is presumably due
to the shorter experience with European integration in ECE.
Based on these observations, a typology of Euroscepticism, i.e. of
those who explicitly judge at least one dimension of European integra-
tion negatively, is applied to the EES of 2019 (see Table 1). Relying on
the categories proposed by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) and Weßels
(2007), “Hard Eurosceptics”, who neither display diffuse nor specific
support, constitute a minority of 6.2% of all ECE citizens. “Soft Euroscep-
tics”, who lack specific support but do not judge the membership of
their country in the EU negatively (but also not positively), are the
majority of Eurosceptics constituting a slightly greater share of the ECE
population (8.4%). “Critical EU supporters” are those who evaluate EU
Table 1 Types of Euroscepticism in ECE countries (Column- and (Total-)
Percentages, EES 2019)


















Mixed 23.6 (2.1) Sceptical
Instrumentalists
40.6 (8.8) 22.4 (15.6) 26.5
Supportive 7.1 (0.6) 20.7 (4.5) 70.7 (49.1) 54.2
Total 8.9 21.6 69.5 100.0
For details of calculations: s. above
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membership positively but who are critical both about policy and demo-
cratic performance of the EU. The few citizens who perceive no benefits
from EU membership, but are either satisfied with EU democracy or
policy output or both are “Sceptical Instrumentalists”.
Taking these four types together, Eurosceptics appear as a minority
in the ECE countries and in the average of the remaining EU countries
(Fig. 4). Nevertheless, in Czechia and Slovakia, as in the EU average,
its amount increased in the past ten years. In 2019, it even encompasses
a huge minority of 43.5% in Czechia. In contrast, Euroscepticism has
decreased in Hungary and Poland in the same period, which rules out
that rising Eurosceptic public opinion has fuelled the non-compliance in
immigration policy of the national governments in these two countries.
Despite these differences, the composition of Eurosceptics differs only
marginally: in most of the countries, Euroscepticism is primarily based on
a lack of diffuse regime support (“Hard” and “Soft” Eurosceptics) and its
increase is primarily due to a growing amount of “Hard” Eurosceptics.







2009 2019 2009 2019 2009 2019 2009 2019 2009 2019
Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia EU
Hard Eurocepcs So Euroscepcs Crical EU Supporters
Scepcal Instrumentalists Neutrals/Supporters
Fig. 4 Types of Euroscepticism in ECE and EU-20 (Percentages,
EES 2009/19) Note EU without ECE countries, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and
Romania
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critical about both the EU’s input and policy performance, constitute the
minority of Eurosceptic citizens in most countries.
6 Findings: Multivariate Analysis for 2019
To analyse the determinants of these attitudes to European integration,
we use single-level linear regression models for the country-by-country
analyses and two-level random intercept models for the cross-country
analyses (Table 2). We first investigate the impact of individual utili-
tarian considerations based on the own social status. The higher the
self-estimated social class-affiliation, the higher the diffuse regime and
policy-specific support in the average of the EU. Formal education
additionally increases input-specific support. In contrast, in the ECE
countries, both factors enfold an impact only in Czechia. Here, education
increases diffuse regime support and higher social class increases policy-
specific support. Thus, in ECE, with the exception of Czechia, all types
of EU support are independent from individual utilitarian judgements,
which is a remarkable difference to the EU average for which H1a is
confirmed.
Proceeding to sociotropic judgements, H1b is partially confirmed;
that is, welfare-state preferences are linked to diffuse regime support in
Slovakia but not in the EU average, while they are linked to specific
support in the EU and in Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary. There is no
link between preferences for redistribution and EU support in Poland.
Furthermore, the domestic context mediates not only the degree but also
the direction of the impact: the more citizens reject redistribution, the
more they support the EU in Czechia and Slovakia, while the support
is lowered among Hungarian opponents of redistribution. Following
the explanations suggested above, the EU is perceived by Czech and
Slovakian citizens—and in the EU average—as an agent of economic
liberalisation and is thus valued by those who want to constrain redis-
tribution. In contrast, the Hungarians perceive the EU rather as means
for fostering redistribution that makes the EU more valued among those
who support redistribution. This mediating effect is presumably due to
the differing degree of inequality and welfare-state institutions in the
respective countries.
In the EU average, citizens who approve restriction of immigration—
used as proxy for nationalistic orientations—are less likely to display
both diffuse support and specific support compared to citizens with

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and, furthermore, to Hungary and Poland. The more Hungarian and
Polish citizens favour restrictions of immigration, the more they are
dissatisfied with EU democracy and the more they perceive integration
as too far-reaching. The results corroborate H2 in that citizens who
share conceptions of culturally homogeneous national identity are more
reluctant to support European integration—presumably due to its border-
transcending impact. The lack of such a link in Czechia and Slovakia is an
exception from the general picture in the EU.
Satisfaction with national democracy, the government and the
economy are presumed to influence the attitudes towards the EU either
via the cueing or the benchmarking mechanism. Dissatisfaction with
democracy decreases diffuse support and specific support in the EU
average as well as in Czechia and Slovakia. This underlines the cueing
effect of the domestic context. As presumed in H3c, the evaluation of
domestic democracy has the strongest impact on satisfaction with EU
democracy. It is, however, also relevant for diffuse support for which it
is even one of the most influential predictors. The Polish and Hungarian
cases, in contrast, support the benchmarking interpretation: dissatisfaction
with democracy increases policy-specific support of the EU; that is, the
more one is dissatisfied with Hungarian or Polish democracy, the more
EU integration is requested to be pushed further. In Hungary, however,
dissatisfaction with domestic democracy is also connected positively to
dissatisfaction with EU democracy. While EU democracy is judged by
the Hungarians by the same measure as domestic democracy, there is
no evidence for such a link in Poland. In both countries, further EU
integration seems to be perceived to solve democratic deficits at national
level and in Hungary at both levels.
Disapproval of the national government fuels diffuse support in
Czechia only, accordingly, Czech citizens’ satisfaction with their govern-
ment goes along with increased Euroscepticism. This negative effect
corroborates the benchmarking approach for Czechia, but the effect
prevails in no other ECE country. Rather, the opposite cueing effect
dominates in the EU average: dissatisfaction with the own national
government decreases enthusiasm for further integration.
Slovakia is the only ECE country in which the perception of economic
decline goes along with lower EU support in all three dimensions.
In Poland, a negative sociotropic assessment is connected to decreased
diffuse support, while in the EU average it goes along with diffuse and
policy-specific EU support. Sociotropic assessments are not linked to the
EU evaluation in Czechia and Hungary.
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Voting for a Eurosceptic party in the most recent national election is
strongly and consistently linked to lower EU support in all dimensions,
which holds true for the EU average and for almost all ECE countries—
with Slovakia as a remarkable exception. It should be underlined that the
voting decision is controlled for other explanatory factors and shows only
low multicollinearity. Thus, the decision to vote for Eurosceptic parties
in the last national election is just partially motivated by the utilitarian
and benchmarking considerations or by the policy- and politics-related
attitudes, which are analysed here to explain Euroscepticism.
Finally, illiberal conceptions of democracy, measured by the approval
of civil rights restrictions in favour of reaching a certain policy goal, go
along with decreased diffuse regime and input-specific support in the
EU average. In contrast, Hungary is the only country in ECE in which
illiberal conceptions of democracy are linked to attitudes on European
integration: Hungarians who accept restrictions of civil rights are more
likely to display lower input-specific support.
The multi-level cross-country analysis shows a significant and positive
impact of the domestic context in Hungary and Poland for input-specific
support and, for Hungary, for diffuse support. The attitudes towards
European integration in Czechia and Slovakia are, in contrast, explained
thoroughly by the explanatory factors valid in the EU average. This
result corroborates observations of a “Europeanisation of Euroscepti-
cism” in Czechia; that is, Eurosceptic attitudes are decreasingly linked
to the domestic historic, social and political characteristics of a country
but are increasingly connected to a Eurosceptic political discourse with
similar patterns and narratives in all EU member states (Havlík et al. 2017,
pp. 163–164). In contrast, the higher levels of support in Hungary and in
Poland indicate additional domestic factors that decrease Euroscepticism
in these countries vis-á-vis their explicitly Eurosceptic governments.
Furthermore, the country-by-country analysis of the ECE countries
has demonstrated that the impact of many general explanatory factors is
conditional upon the national context—with the exception of the vote
for a Eurosceptic party. In Czechia and Slovakia, utilitarian consider-
ations and cueing effects of domestic democracy are most important.
However, in Slovakia, the sociotropic benefits are important, including
the preferences for redistribution, while in Czechia only individual utility
is important. The two countries differ further as Slovakia is the only ECE
country in which the stances of the (two) Eurosceptic parties do not
decrease EU support among their voters, and Czechia is the only country
in which the government serves as a benchmark instead of as a cue for
EU evaluation.
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By contrast, in Poland and Hungary, utilitarian considerations are not
decisive for attitudes towards European integration—except the prefer-
ences for redistribution in Hungary—but preferences for immigration
enfold significant impact. Furthermore, in both countries, dissatisfaction
with democracy serves as a benchmark instead of as a cue for policy-
specific support implying that dissatisfaction with domestic democracy
goes along with the demand for further integration, which is in strong
contrast to Czechia and Slovakia and to the EU average—even though
the picture in Hungary is more complex due to the cueing effect on
input-specific support. The peculiarity of Hungary is further underlined
by the negative connection between input-specific support and illiberal
conceptions of democracy, which is unique in ECE.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to describe the structure, development and
determinants of attitudes towards European integration in ECE in order
to analyse whether and how the contentious politics of the govern-
ments in this region vis-à-vis the EU are related to public opinion on
European integration. The chapter focused especially on the connection
between Euroscepticism and illiberal conceptions of national identity and
democracy in the context of standard explanatory factors. Using data
from a series of European Election Studies, the chapter distinguished
Euroscepticism analytically in diffuse regime, input- and policy-specific
support. It demonstrated that public support for European integration
in ECE is more closely linked to instrumental performance assessments
than in the EU average. This result may be explained by the shorter EU
experience of citizens in the ECE countries, which provided less time
to decouple diffuse regime support from performance evaluations.
Given this coupling, governments in ECE may back their contentious
politics by drawing on negative assessments of the EU in immigration
policy and its constitutional regulations. The results indicate, however,
that the relation between public opinion and government politics is less
straightforward. Firstly, Euroscepticism is not widespread and has even
decreased in Hungary and Poland, i.e. in those countries that pursue
the fiercest politics of EU policy contestation. It is, however, remark-
ably high—and has even increased—in Czechia and Slovakia. Secondly,
although contestation began to escalate in the course and aftermath of
the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, Euroscepticism in ECE shows only
a moderate increase in its input-specific dimension since then. Thirdly,
the determinants for Euroscepticism reveal rather country-specific than
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region-specific patterns. Especially, the cultural issues that are most salient
in ECE governmental politics—immigration and conceptions of democ-
racy—are only relevant for public Euroscepticism in Hungary and Poland,
but not in Czechia and Slovakia, where socioeconomic and utilitarian
considerations are more important.
The country-specific domestic context is also relevant for the outcome
of comparisons between the performance at the national and the EU
level. While dissatisfaction with democracy is generalised to the EU level
in Czechia and Slovakia, dissatisfied citizens in Poland and in Hungary
are more likely to support further integration. Obviously, the domestic
public discourse and its narratives, including the politics of the national
governments, are built upon and revolve around country-specific criteria
for citizens’ evaluation of European integration. National grievances
that serve as cues to increase Euroscepticism in some countries increase
support of European integration in others, presumably as a means to over-
come them by further integration. Given this intra-regional heterogeneity,
the level and the determinants of public Euroscepticism do not provide
a thorough explanation for the similarity of the Visegrád governments in
their illiberal and anti-EU politics.
Appendix
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Table 3 Question wording
Wording
Self-estimation own class (Higher) If you were asked to choose one of
these five names for your social class,
which would you say you belong to? (1)
the working class, (2) the lower middle
class, (3) the middle class, (4) the upper
middle class or (5) the upper class
Education (Higher) How old were you when you stopped
full-time education? (Age in years,
classified by EES team)
Reject redistribution 0 You are fully in favour of the
redistribution of wealth from the rich to
the poor in [country] …10 You are fully
opposed to the redistribution of wealth
from the rich to the poor in [country]
Favour immigration 0 You are fully in favour of a restrictive
policy on immigration … 10 You are
fully opposed to a restrictive policy on
immigration
Dissatisfaction with democracy in own
country
On the whole, how satisfied are you
with the way democracy works in
[country]? Are you: (1) very satisfied;
(2) fairly satisfied; (3) not very satisfied;
(4) not at all satisfied
Dissatisfaction with government Let us now come back to [country]. Do
you approve or disapprove of the
government’s record to date? (1)
approve; (2) disapprove
Dissatisfaction with economy What do you think about the economy?
Compared to 12 months ago, do you
think that the general economic
situation in <country name> is: (1) a lot
better; (2) a little better; (3) stayed the
same; (4) a little worse; (5) a lot worse
Vote for Eurosceptic party in national
election
Which party did you vote for at the
[General Election] of [Year of Last
General Election]?
Favour restriction of civil rights 0 You fully support privacy rights even if
they hinder efforts to combat crime …
10 You fully support restricting privacy
rights in order to combat crime
Source EES
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Table 4 List of Eurosceptic Parties (EES country and party codes)
1040 Austria 1040420 Austrian Freedom Party
1040600 Alliance for the Future of Austria
1056 Belgium 1056325 Workers Party of Belgium (Partij van
de Arbeid van België (PVDA +))
1056335 Workers Party of Belgium (Parti du
Travail de Belgique (PTB))
1056711 Flemish Interest
1056913 New Flemish Alliance
1196 Cyprus 1196321 Progressive Party of the Working
People
1196951 National Popular Front
1203 Czech Republic 1203220 Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia
1203413 Civic Democratic Party
1203951 Freedom and Direct Democracy Tomio
Okamura
1208 Denmark 1208220 Red-Green Unity List
1208421 Liberal Alliance
1208720 Danish People’s Party
1233 Estonia 1233810 Conservative People’s Party of Estonia
(EKRE)
1246 Finland 1246223 Left Wing Alliance
1246820 True Finns
1250 France 1250225 Unbowed France
1250720 National Rally
1276 Germany 1276321 The Left
1276621 Alternative for Germany
1300 Greece 1300210 Communist Party of Greece
1300215 Coalition of the Radical Left
1300611 Independent Greeks
1300710 Golden Dawn
1348 Hungary 1348421 FIDESZ-KDNP Alliance
1348700 Jobbik
1372 Ireland 1372951 Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone)
1380 Italy 1380631 Brothers of Italy - National
Centre-right
1380720 Northern League
1380956 Five Star Movement
1428 Latvia 1428723 For Fatherland and Freedom - National
Independence Movement of Latvia




1440952 Election Action of Lithuania’s Poles
1528 The Netherlands 1528220 Socialist Party
1528526 Christian Union
1528600 Party of Freedom
1528661 Forum for Democracy
1528951 Party for the Animals
1616 Poland 1616436 Law and Justice
1616953 Kukiz’15
1620 Portugal 1620211 Left Bloc
1620229 Unified Democratic Coalition
1703 Slovakia 1703440 Freedom and Solidarity
1703710 Slovak National Party
1705 Slovenia 1705710 Slovenian National Party
1724 Spain 1724230 Podemos (We Can)
1724955 Voice




1826 United Kingdom 1826210 Sinn Fein
1826620 Conservative Party
1826903 Democratic Unionist Party
1826951 United Kingdom Independence Party
Source EES
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In the 2019 European elections, right-wing populist and far-right parties2
witnessed a clear plus in votes. While their electoral success has fallen short
of the nightmare scenarios of the supporters of the European Union,3
it is an enormous challenge for the EU. Whether in government or as
opposition in national parliaments, right-wing populists have successfully
torpedoed joint action of the EU in recent years. A prominent example is
the resistance of the Visegrád States against binding quotas for the distri-
bution of refugees and asylum seekers. Their political agenda threatens
the much-vaunted ‘European Community’ and its values in the name of
national interests. This unexpected comeback of nationalism weakens the
EU beyond Eastern Europe, as something like Brexit shows. It is another
write-in likely to give European right-wing populists a further boost.
The so-called refugee crisis is frequently mentioned as a catalysing
factor. The demand for a restrictive immigration regime has become
the battle horse of right-wing populists ever since. The allusions to the
so-called refugee crisis, however, are far too simplistic from our point
of view. They do not explain how and why the immigration of 2.3
million people—which constitute less than 0.5% of the total population
of the EU—has succeeded in sparking deep conflicts. In addition, the
label ‘refugee crisis’ conceals the fact that the controversy over migration
has indeed become an anti-Islam discourse. Based on existing studies,
we hypothesise that Islamophobia—understood as a collective hostility
vis-à-vis Muslims and their religion—is tied to Eurosceptic positions.
Right-wing populists have instrumentalised this connection to increase
1Substantial parts of the article stem from research activities carried
out in the research group ‘Multiple Secularities—Beyond the West, Beyond
Modernities’ at the University of Leipzig, which is funded by the German Research
Foundation (DFG). for further information see Www.Multiple.Secularities.de.
2 In our article, we use the well-known term right-wing populism. In the relevant
research literature, however, the radical right-wing orientation of these parties is increas-
ingly emphasised, while the populist style of pitching ideological content is regarded as a
supplemental feature (see Mudde 2019).
3Empirical findings reveal a high mobilisation of EU supporters (Stark et al. 2019).
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citizens’ distance from the EU and thus exacerbate an erosion of its
support among citizens.
To investigate whether Islamophobia has become a driver for
Euroscepticism, we first shed light on the extent of derogatory attitudes
towards Muslims. We demonstrate that Islamophobic attitudes among
citizens have become a pan-European strain for the EU, while at the
same time, they are more pronounced in Eastern Europe. Secondly,
using the European Social Survey data, we scrutinise the Islamophobia-
Euroscepticism Nexus in a comparative perspective, showing that in
Western Europe, it is primarily (though not exclusively) supported by
voters of right-wing populist parties, while in the new EU member states,
right-wing populists and mainstream politicians attempt to outbid each
other when it comes to Islamophobic statements. This strengthens anti-
EU efforts. Thirdly, we show that the nexus works separately from the
presence or absence of Muslims. Finally, we discuss our conclusion that
the hostile stance of the Visegrád States against immigrants is therefore
in line with public opinion. Supranational bargaining attempts like the
quota system for the distribution of refugees are thus doomed to failure.




A linkage between anti-migration attitudes and individual stances towards
the EU is the subject of various studies investigating the causes of
Euroscepticism. It appears that citizens with negative attitudes towards
immigrants are more likely to have negative outlooks vis-à-vis the EU
(Stockemer et al. 2018; Yavçan 2013). Obviously, the EU is seen
as a stakeholder in migration policy issues (e.g. Schengen, Dublin
Agreement & Frontex). Among other reasons, this explains why the
so-called refugee crisis has increasingly become a stress factor for
Brussels (Stockemer et al. 2018). Eurobarometer (2018) data also reveal
that, since 2015, citizens have identified immigration and terrorism as
the main problems faced by the EU (see Fig. 1). Revealingly, fear of
terror and immigration are mentioned in the very same breath. This
pattern suggests that the anti-immigration discourse of recent years has de
facto become an anti-Islam discourse, primarily directed against Muslims
(Pickel 2018; Stockemer et al. 2019).
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Fig. 1 Key issues faced by the EU from the perspective of citizens (Source
Eurobarometer [2018])
We stress, however, that the Islamophobic discourses are not a new
trend (Pickel and Öztürk 2018a). The so-called refugee crisis only had
a catalysing effect that activated and intensified already existing resent-
ments against Muslims. Two factors were decisive for this: First, most
immigrants who have arrived since 2015 are either Muslims or originate
from predominantly Muslim societies, such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Secondly, Muslims have been associated with terrorism since the 9/11
attacks and whole series of ISIS attacks in European cities since 2015
have further amplified such perceptions. In any case, it is hardly deni-
able that many Europeans perceive Muslims as bigots, dangerous and
violence-prone (Pickel and Pickel 2019).
The impact of such threat perceptions on the emergence of collective
prejudices takes centre stage in the Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan
and Stephan 1996). In essence, this theory assumes that fears and threat
perceptions provide the driving force underlying hostile attitudes vis-à-
vis outgroups. This socio-psychological framework of prejudice research
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is at the end of the day a refined version of the Social Identity Theory
(Tajfel 1982). Social Identity Theory argues that the emergence of resent-
ments is preceded by (a) the construction of collective identities, and (b)
a categorisation process. The additional argument of Integrated Threat
Theory stresses that collective identities unfold their conflict potential if
the outgroup is perceived as a threat. A distinction is drawn between real-
istic threats covering concrete concerns (such as anxiety about economic
decline or worries about inland security), and symbolic threats, standing
on more diffuse fears (such as a menace to a country’s way of life)
(Stephan and Stephan 1996). Both perceptions of threats are no rarities
when it comes to Muslims: In popular discourses, they are often presented
as a burden for ‘native’ welfare systems, the fifth colonnade of Islamist
terrorism, and as a cultural threat to the liberal achievements of Western
societies (Ciftci 2012; Pickel and Yendell 2016).
Since these threat perceptions are widespread, extending all the way
into the mainstream of European societies (Kallis 2018), and since citizens
blame the EU for issues relating to immigration, our hypothesis is:
H1 Islamophobic orientation patterns correlate with and promote
Eurosceptic attitudes.
However, attitudes towards immigrants and the EU do not arise in
a vacuum. Citizens use ‘information shortcuts’ to shape their attitudes
towards Brussels and Strasbourg (Roodujin and van Kessel 2019). The
positions of individually preferred parties towards the EU and its socio-
political agenda matter (Steenbergen et al. 2007, for another perspective
on the citizens-parties linkage see Chapter 7).
We consider the voters of right-wing populist parties to be predestined
for a fusion of Islamophobic and Eurosceptic attitudes because, following
the approach of Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), the nucleus of populist
parties is the propagation of an antagonistic conflict between the ‘ordinary
people’ and the allegedly ‘alienated, corrupt elites’ plus the demand that
politics should be decisively determined by the ‘volonté générale’. Accom-
panying this by a nativist ‘host ideology’, right-wing populists portray the
people in an ultra-nationalist manner and with exclusionary intentions as
ethnically homogeneous (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017). The hostility of
the European right-wing populists is directed against the national polit-
ical elites, but also against the EU which is perceived as a citizen-distant
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and elite-dominated institution. Moreover, their complex and opaque
decision-making processes are difficult to reconcile with the demand for
a direct implementation of the alleged ‘volonté générale’ (Rooduijin and
van Kessle 2019; Werts et al. 2013). Right-wing populists campaign on
a pan-European level against Islam and Muslims and agitate against the
so-called Islamisation of their nations (Hafez 2014; Kallis 2018; Pickel
and Yendell 2018). The Brussels-based bureaucrats have been accused
of orchestrating the alleged ‘invasion of Muslims’ (Kalmar 2018; Krastev
2018).
H2 Voters of right-wing populist parties are particularly susceptible
to a combination of Islamophobic and Eurosceptic attitudes.
The Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus, however, operates under
strongly varying context conditions. Muslim communities have become
a visible reality in everyday life in many Western European and Scandi-
navian societies. In most Eastern European societies, on the other hand,
their presence is marginal. They often make up less than 1% of the popu-
lation (PEW 2011). The contact hypothesis (Allport 1971) can serve to
assess whether these contextual variations pose a moderating effect upon
the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus (Stockemer et al. 2018). This
hypothesis suggests that contact with outgroups can contribute to the
erosion of resentments. This, however, is not an automatism.
A prejudice-reducing effect is more likely (a) if there is equal status
between the involved groups, (b) if common goals are pursued and (c)
if the institutions of a society endorse this contact (Allport 1971). If
the contact hypothesis is optimistically transferred to the Islamophobia-
Euroscepticism Nexus, one could argue that it is precisely the absence of
Muslims that intensifies resentment against them. If Islamophobic atti-
tudes do indeed promote scepticism towards the EU, then it could be
assumed that the individual linkage of Islamophobia and Euroscepticism
is particularly pronounced in societies with few Muslims.
Studies investigating the causes of Eurosceptic attitudes often do not
share this optimistic reading of the contact hypothesis. Azrout et al.
(2013) point out that the political situation in many European societies
(i.e. nationalism, electoral success of right-wing populists, and widespread
fear of Islamist terrorism) would not satisfy the conditions set out by
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Allport (1971). On the contrary, contact under these unfavourable condi-
tions could exacerbate tensions between Muslims and the majority popu-
lation. The premise is then exactly the opposite. This reading assumes that
the individual linkage between Islamophobia and Euroscepticism is much
stronger in societies with larger Muslim communities.
According to us, the moderating effect of the presence or absence of
Muslim communities on the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus should
not be overestimated. First, studies show that there is a gap between
the real and perceived proportion of immigrants with many citizens
overestimating their share within the population (Gorodzeisky and Semy-
onov 2019). Therefore, citizens’ subjective perception is decisive. If
citizens believe that there are too many immigrants and that their exis-
tence is threatening, Eurosceptic attitudes are a very likely consequence
(Stockemer et al. 2018). Secondly, several studies were able to validate the
assumptions of Allport’s (1971) contact hypothesis. An anti-Muslim social
climate is particularly pronounced in Eastern Europe, where the number
of Muslims is comparatively small (Marfouk 2019; Pickel and Öztürk
2018b; Schlueter et al. 2019). This increasingly salient anti-Muslim social
climate, further intensified by the so-called refugee crisis, might have led
to a loss of reputation for the EU in Eastern Europe (Krastev 2018).
Against this backdrop, we assume that the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism
Nexus is not a Western European peculiarity.
H3 The smaller the share of Muslims in the total population, the
more pronounced an anti-Muslim social climate is (H3a). However,
the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus is not tempered nor inten-
sified by the different share of Muslims (H3b).
3 Research Design: Data and Method
We use the seventh wave of the European Social Survey (2014) as the
central database for testing our hypotheses.4 This survey allows us to
investigate the research guiding hypothesis because citizens were asked
whether they would like to see an immigration ban for Muslims and
whether they believe that the European unification process has gone too
4For further information see https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
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far. We consider the support of a Muslim ban as a proxy for Islamo-
phobic attitudes (Pickel and Öztürk 2018b). To classify the ideological
leanings of parties, we refer to the PopuList of Rooduijn et al. (2019).5
The percentage of Muslims in the total population is derived from a
publication of the Pew Research Centre (2011).
The ESS (2014) provides a representative survey of 18 EU member
states, as well as Israel, Switzerland and Norway. Since the so-called
refugee crisis has led to the aforementioned conflict over binding quotas
for the distribution of asylum seekers within the EU, we have decided to
limit the case selection to its member states. Despite this limited number
of cases, we believe that the ESS (2014) is a suitable database for testing
our hypotheses. These 18 European societies differ substantially in terms
of their geographical location, socio-economic conditions, experience
with democracy and the share of Muslims. Since we assume a pan-
European Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus despite these different
contextual conditions, our research resembles the idea of a most-different
system design (Pickel 2016).
The data were gathered between 2014 and 2015. We do not consider
the timing of the survey to be a major problem. We acknowledge that the
refugee flows and the political conflicts over their distribution in the EU
member states reached their peak after the data were gathered. However,
debates about an increased terrorist threat by Muslim immigrants arose
when the data were collected. It even coincided with the attack on Charlie
Hebdo (January 2015) in 11 states (Castanho Silva 2018). As already
mentioned, anti-Muslim hostility is not a new trend in Europe (Pickel and
Öztürk 2018a). Even before the so-called refugee crisis, effects between
Islamophobia and Euroscepticism have been observed (Boomgarden and
Freiere 2009; Hobolt et al. 2011).
The ESS (2014) data also allow us to control for conventional
explanatory factors of Eurosceptic attitudes beyond Islamophobia into
the empirical analysis. We include mistrust in political institutions, the
ideological left-right positioning of individuals, identity-based factors such
5We have coded the support of the following parties as a vote choice for right-wing
populists: Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ),
Flemish Interest (VB), National Front (FN), Freedom and Direct Party (SPD), Danish
People’s Party (DF), Conservative People’s Party (EKRE), Finns Party (Ps), National Rally
(FN), Alternative for Germany (AfD), Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz), The Movement
for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), Party for Freedom (PVV), Law and Justice (PiS), Sweden
Democrats (SD), and the UK Independence Party (UKIP).
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as strong identification with one’s own nation and threat perception
towards immigrants. The structure of the data further allows us to incor-
porate utilitarian considerations. Some of these can be motivated either
by egoistic considerations (i.e. well-educated and wealthy individuals are
regarded as the winners of the process of Europeanisation) or by socio-
tropical considerations (e.g. an assessment of the economic situation of
one’s own nation) (Abts et al. 2009; McLaren 2007; Van Elsas et al.
2016). As a further robustness check, we control for the residence, gender
and age of the respondents. For an overview of all indicators, please refer
to the appendix.
We used multilevel analysis to test the hypotheses (Gelman and Hill
2007; Hox 2010).6 This statistical procedure fits the hierarchical structure
of the data. In addition, we present other visualisations in order to make
the findings accessible to a more intuitive interpretation.
4 First Result: Anti-Muslim
Attitudes Foster Euroscepticism, But…
A superficial glance at Fig. 2 suggests that positions towards immigrants
are subject to pragmatic and utilitarian considerations in most European
societies. It is perceived as particularly important that immigrants adapt
to their lifestyle, learn their language and possess the necessary work
skills and educational qualifications needed in their countries. Conversely,
however, this in no way means that ascriptive characteristics such as reli-
gious affiliation or even the skin colour of people are irrelevant. Many
citizens in European societies openly admit that they would prefer immi-
grants with a Christian background and that they are opposed to the
immigration of non-white people.
However, there are substantial differences between European societies.
In Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, only one in ten respondents
considers a Christian background and the colour of people’s skin to be an
important criterion for the acceptability of immigrants.
In Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia, these
ascriptive features of immigrants are considered important by one in four
respondents. The preference of these particular selection criteria translates
6We visualise the results of the multilevel analysis with the coefplot command (Jann
2014).
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Fig. 2 Qualifications considered important for immigrants (Note The figure
shows the percentage of agreement with these criteria. Source European Social
Survey [2014])
into a predominantly pronounced rejection of Muslims, as Fig. 3 shows.
Attitudes towards immigrants are subject to an explicit hierarchisation in
all European societies. Immigrants from poorer EU member states are
preferred over immigrants from poorer non-EU countries. The strongest
rejection, however, is directed against Muslims. Again, notable differences
between European societies catch the eye. While in Sweden, Germany and
Denmark a Muslim ban is supported by less than 10% of the population,
it is one in four in Poland, Lithuania and Estonia; even one in two in the
Czech Republic and Hungary who would applaud it. To put it bluntly:
The resistance of the Visegrád States’ governments against binding quotas
for the redistribution of refugees are in line with public opinion on this
issue in their countries (Krastev 2018; Pickel and Öztürk 2018a).
But do these Islamophobic attitudes indeed foster negative attitudes
towards the EU? The results obtained from the multilevel analysis in
Fig. 4 validate the research-guiding hypothesis: individuals in favour
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Fig. 3 Rejection of different groups of immigrants (Note The figure shows
the rejection of these groups of immigrants in per cent. Source European Social
Survey [2014])
of a Muslim ban are more likely to say that the European unification
process has gone too far (bivariate regression coefficient = 0.219, p <
0.0001). To be sure, Islamophobic sentiments are not the only source
of Euroscepticism. Beyond Islamophobia, negative attitudes towards the
EU are facilitated by political and identity-based attitudes, utilitarian
considerations and social structural characteristics of individuals.
Citizens who distrust national political institutions, who voted for
right-wing populists in the last elections, who have a strong identifica-
tion with their nation, who perceive migrants as a threat, and consider
the current state of the economy to be precarious, tend to show nega-
tive attitudes towards the EU. The EU enjoys greater support among
citizens with higher levels of education, inhabitants of large metropolitan
areas and the younger generations. Yet, even under the control of these
factors, there is a statistically robust linkage between Islamophobia and
Eurosceptic attitudes (regression coefficient in the overall model = 0.086,
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Fig. 4 Sources of Euroscepticism (Note The figure shows the results of a multi-
level analysis. Individual-level variables are group-mean centred. The proportion
of Muslims in the societies is grand-mean centred. The coefficients shown are
based on robust standard errors. Number of countries: 18. Number of cases
(total): 17,311. Number of cases (average): 962. Wald statistics: 874.53, p <
0.0001. Source European Social Survey [2014], PEW Research [2011], and
Rooduijn et al. [2019])
p < 0.0001). In line with the Integrated Threat Theory, these results
reveal that citizens who perceive immigrants and an ever-growing cultural
diversity in their societies as a threat thus withdraw their support from the
European project (Stockemer et al. 2019). The effect of socio-economic
factors is practically negligible in comparison.
Are voters of right-wing populist parties the main bearers of the Islam-
ophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus? In Fig. 5, we have plotted the average
support of a Muslim ban in relation to the Eurosceptic attitudes of voters
from all parties in the sample.7 Four ideal typical positions can be differ-
entiated with the Scatterplot: (1) A non-Islamophobic support for Europe
(bottom left), (2) a non-Islamophobic Euroscepticism (top left), (3) an
7To safeguard resilient empirical results, we only use parties with more than 20
respondents in the sample.
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Fig. 5 Relationship between Islamophobic and Eurosceptic attitudes among
voters of different parties (Note The Scatterplot relates the support for a Muslim
ban to the perception that European unification has gone too far. This is the
average attitude of voters from all parties of the sample examined with at least
20 respondents. Both scales were normalised to a range between 0 and 1. In
addition, we set two reference lines at their mean value. Source European Social
Survey [2014] and Rooduijn et al. [2019])
Islamophobic support for Europe (bottom right) and (4) an Islamophobic
Euroscepticism (top right). If we now locate the electorate of right-wing
populist parties in this scatterplot, we can see that their average voters
applaud a restrictive immigration policy against Muslims.
Except for the voters of the Polish PiS, a Eurosceptic attitude also
prevails. To clarify: Voters of right-wing populist parties tend to be
Islamophobic Eurosceptics. It is also clear, however, that they are not
alone when it comes to these attitudes. Islamophobic Euroscepticism is
a broader phenomenon, and it extends into the mainstream of European
societies. Other groups featuring a combination of these attributes are,
for example, voters of populist parties, to whom Rooduijn et al. (2019)
do not attest a clear-cut nativist host ideology (e.g. the Czech ANO).
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The list also includes Eurosceptic parties (e.g. the Dutch 50PLUS), left-
wing Eurosceptic parties (e.g. the Portuguese Coligação Democrática
Unitária), left-wing populist parties (e.g. the Irish Sinn Féin), as well
as the voters of liberal (e.g. the Danish Venstre), social-democratic (e.g.
the Austrian SPÖ) and conservative (e.g. the British Tories) mainstream
parties.
If we turn our focus to internal polarisation, then a blatant differ-
ence becomes apparent between Eastern European societies on the one
hand, and Scandinavian and Western European societies on the other.
Figure 6 shows that voters of right-wing populist parties in Scandinavia
and Western Europe are much more Islamophobic and Eurosceptic than
the average citizen—an ironic finding if we bear in mind that right-wing
Fig. 6 Differences in Islamophobic and Eurosceptic attitudes between voters
of right-wing populist parties and average citizens (Note The bar charts visu-
alise the mean value differences between the attitudes of voters of right-wing
populist parties and the average citizen in the respective societies. The Islamo-
phobia and Euroscepticism scales were normalised to a range between 0 and 1.
Source European Social Survey [2014] and Rooduijn et al. [2019])
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populists portray themselves as the voice of an alleged ‘silent majority’.
A very different picture emerges in post-socialist societies. The attitudes
of voters of right-wing populist parties in Eastern Europe hardly differ
from those of the average citizen. In fact, right-wing populists and main-
stream politicians in Eastern Europe attempt to outbid each other when it
comes to Islamophobic statements (Hafez 2018; Slačálek and Svobodová
2018). Tomio Okamura, chairperson of the right-wing populist Freedom
and Direct Party, for example, has become famous across the borders of
the Czech Republic for his call to take pigs and walk with them in front
of mosques.
5 Second Result: The Share
of Muslims Does not Matter
In East Central Europe, even among mainstream politicians, Islamo-
phobic statements are no rarity. The Czech president and former chairman
of the Czech Social Democrats Miloš Zeman considers Islam a ‘religion
of death’ and declared in public that he considers the term ‘moderate
Muslim’ to be an oxymoron, just as there would be no ‘moderate Nazis’
either (Trait 2016). Given that (right-wing) populist governments in the
Czech Republic (ANO), Poland (PiS) and Hungary (Fidesz and Jobbik)
have combined their nationalist course against immigrants with harsh
criticism against the European Union’s cosmopolitan elites, it is hardly
surprising that the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus is not condi-
tioned by the proportion of Muslims in the overall population (regression
coefficient of cross-level interaction = 0.044, p > 0.10).
It may seem paradoxical that right-wing populists in Eastern Europe
have become part of the anti-Islam chorus. From the perspective of the
contact hypothesis (Allport 1971), however, this finding comes as little
surprise. Anti-Muslim resentments are most widespread where Muslims
rarely live (see Fig. 7). Since Muslims in Eastern Europe often do not
even make up 1% of the population, personal experience cannot work
to counter this attitude pattern. Thus, many Eastern Europeans do not
have the opportunity to align the shrill statements of their governments
with reality through real-life interactions with Muslims. What complicates
matters is that so-called parasocial contacts (Horton and Wohl 1956) fill
the place of a lack of personal contacts.
Several studies demonstrate that the media fill that void and shape the
perception these voters have of Muslims. Further aggravating these views
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Fig. 7 The relationship between the percentage of Muslims in the overall popu-
lation and the support for a Muslim immigration ban (Note The scatterplot links
the proportion of Muslims in the total population with the support for a Muslim
ban. Source European Social Survey [2014], PEW Research [2011])
is a predominantly negative bias in reporting. News about conflict in the
Middle East, a whole series of Islamist terrorist attacks in European cities
committed by ISIS, and the image of no-go zones for whites in Muslim-
dominated neighbourhoods contribute to an image in which Muslims—
as a collective—appear to be fanatical, violent and dangerous. The ever-
growing dependency of the media on right-wing populist governments
in Eastern Europe is likely to intensify this trend (Ahmed and Matthes
2016; Kalmar 2018; Pickel and Yendell 2016).
What this means is that for most Eastern Europeans living outside the
large metropolitan areas there is hardly any possibility of countering these
stereotypes with the reality that provides real contact with Muslims. The
markedly varying share of Muslims in the total population, however, does
not affect the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus, as shown in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 8 The moderating effect of the share of Muslims as a proportion of the
total population on the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus
(Note The scatterplot relates the individual-level effect of Islamophobic attitudes
on Eurosceptic opinions to the percentage of Muslims in the total population.
The beta coefficients were extracted from regression analyses. They provide
information about the strength of the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus at
the individual level in the 18 investigated societies. We controlled for left-right
orientation, education, place of residence, gender and age of the respondents.
Source European Social Survey [2014] and PEW Research [2011])
This result underlines the importance of subjective perceptions of citi-
zens. When individuals perceive Muslims as a threat and embrace a restric-
tive immigration policy towards Muslim immigrants, they tend to display
more Eurosceptic attitudes in all societies under study. The strength of
the Islamophobia-Euroscepticism Nexus effect is more pronounced in the
Czech Republic and Poland than in Sweden, as well as more pronounced
in Lithuania than in France. In short: The presence or absence of
Muslims is of secondary importance when it comes to the strength of
the individual-level linkage between Islamophobia and Euroscepticism.
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6 Conclusion: Right-Wing Populists,
Euroscepticism and How the EU Can Deal with It
To summarise, our results indicate a robust relationship between the
support for a Muslim ban and the perception that the European unifi-
cation process has gone too far. The setting provided by the so-called
refugee crisis served to reveal Islamophobia as a major stress factor for
the EU. It even fosters a perception of distance between citizens and
European institutions.
Voters of right-wing populist parties are the main bearers of this Islam-
ophobic Euroscepticism. Crossed-out mosques, the collective demon-
isation of Muslims as rapists, and the call to defend the so-called
Christian Occident have become their pan-European core brand. Right-
wing populists combine Islamophobia with fierce criticism of the allegedly
corrupted national and European elites. According to their rhetoric,
bureaucrats in distant Brussels allegedly orchestrated the so-called inva-
sion of the Muslims to promote what they refer to as the ‘great exchange’.
This might sound shrill. Yet, our findings reveal that right-wing populists
target their attacks on an already unpopular group of people. There are
deep-rooted cultural and historical resentments against Muslims. Addi-
tionally, and since the rise of Islamist terrorism, Muslims appear to many
EU citizens as fanatical, dangerous and, above all, violent. With the
so-called refugee crisis, latent resentments against Muslims gained new
intensity or were activated anew. Europe’s right-wing populists serendip-
itously welcomed these events and have been profiting from them (see
Norris and Inglehart 2019).
A new tendency is that Eastern European right-wing populists have
become a vocal part of the anti-Islam chorus, although (or specifically
because) Muslims constitute a marginal group there. Their hostilities used
to be directed against the Roma and other minority groups present in
their societies. In line with the contact hypothesis, it is precisely the
absence of Muslims that favours an anti-Muslim social climate. There-
fore, ‘Islamophobia without Muslims’ provides a dividend for Eastern
European right-wing populists. Wherever they control the government,
they use their great influence on the media to construct a fear-mongering
image of Islam and Muslims.
Politicians such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Lech Kaczyński in
Poland hope that this rhetoric can yield advantages in national elec-
tions—even more since voters from right-wing populist and mainstream
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parties largely agree in their rejection of Muslim immigrants. Moreover,
the stereotypes of Muslims transmitted by the media cannot be adapted
to a more profane reality through contacts. Since the EU is pushing
for mandatory quotas for the distribution of refugees, populist attacks
against the elites can be further projected towards Brussels. For populists
in decision-making positions, this rhetoric is very attractive.
Spurred by the right-wing populists’ rhetoric, many citizens are now
under the impression that the EU wants to impose on them unwanted
refugees from the Middle East. The shrillest voices even claim that the
foreign rule of the Kremlin was replaced by Brussels (Kalmar 2018;
Krastev 2018). But as we have shown, the anti-immigration stance of
the Visegrád States reflects a congruence between government behaviour
and public opinion. For many Eastern Europeans, a restrictive immigra-
tion policy is a top priority. The so-called refugee crisis served to reveal
diverging attitudes between Western and Eastern Europe and fuelled
their conflict potential. These rifts further endanger the EU’s legitimacy
(which was never particularly pronounced anyway), undermine even weak
versions of the European project and have led to serious controversies
between the EU’s 28 member states.
It almost seems as if Visegrád’s protectionist position has triggered an
imitation effect among the right-wing populists of Western Europe. They
present their agenda with more self-confidence than ever before, and force
supporters of a cosmopolitan Europe into defensive positions. By doing
well in elections, right-wing populist parties have moved from the margins
into the mainstream of most party systems. For fear of further losses of
their votes, mainstream politicians like Horst Seehofer and Sebastian Kurz
team up with Viktor Orbán. Their goal is to further strengthen and safe-
guard the walls of ‘Fortress Europe’. Inside the EU, attacks on Muslims
and their places of worship have increased in recent years. A mutual recog-
nition of all citizens as free and equal (Habermas 1996) is thus in danger.
Their current target is Muslims, but these attacks are clearly against the
open society and the European project.
The consequences for the EU are controversial. It is hard to deny
that the so-called refugee crisis has led to a loss of reputation for the
EU. Egoistic national tendencies do not only complicate supranational
solutions to immigration policy issues. The anti-immigration campaign
of the Visegrád States has facilitated the power ascension and consolida-
tion of (right-wing) populist governments. The signs of the times point
to an unprecedented comeback of nationalism. In these circumstances,
76 G. PICKEL AND C. ÖZTÜRK
a deepening of the European project is hardly realistic. However, even
right-wing populists are quite divided on the consequences to be drawn
from their EU criticism. The options range from promoting an exit to
the attempt to rebuild the European project in an anti-cosmopolitan
manner. Kalmar (2018) argues that right-wing populist politicians and
their parties in Eastern Europe are not necessarily against the EU. Their
dependence on its structural and investment funds is too great for this.
Rather, their political mission is to create a ‘different EU’, that is, a
‘Fortress Europe’ that protects them from rejected (Muslim) immigrants.
In fact, the Euroscepticism that exists in Eastern Europe therefore does
not question EU membership. This alliance with other European coun-
tries is seen in the Baltic States and Poland as a guarantee of independence
from Russia. Their Euroscepticism is aimed rather at different EU policies.
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CHAPTER 4
Is There an East–West Divide over
European Solidarity? Comparing
European Citizens’ Attitudes
Towards Cross-Border Solidarity 2016
Florian K. Kley and Holger Lengfeld
1 Introduction1
Media and academic debates concerning the Visegrád governments
rejecting the EU refugee relocation scheme and their criticism of
‘Brussels’ suggest that the East Central European countries are marked
1This research was part of a joint venture between the international research
project Solidarity in Europe: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship—SOLIDUS
funded by the European Commission through the Horizon 2020 research programme
(Grant Agreement n. 649489) and the research unit Horizontal Europeanisation funded
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) (FOR 1539). This chapter is based
on an unpublished final survey report provided to the European Commission (Gerhards
et al. 2017).
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by strong anti-EU politics and attitudes. To contextualise this impression,
this chapter analyses European solidarity in different fields of European
integration. In recent years, a series of crises have hit the European Union
(EU) with the refugee crisis being only one of them. These crises have
challenged solidarity between both European citizens and member states
of the EU. In this chapter, we investigate attitudes towards different
domains of transnational solidarity of citizens from East Central Euro-
pean (ECE) and other European countries: firstly, the European banking
and financial crisis, and secondly, the Great Recession.
The European banking and financial crisis of 2008 resulted from
massive insolvencies in the American real estate market that jeopardised
the stability and liquidity of several major European banks. To save banks
teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, some EU member states took
out large government loans, which resulted in adverse deficits in their
national budgets. The mismatch between drastically increased govern-
ment debts and stagnating gross domestic products led to a devaluation
of the (international) credit status of some European countries. More-
over, the sovereign debt crisis weakened the Euro as a whole and put the
European Monetary Union (EMU) under pressure. These institutional
deficits were tackled by a series of financial support measures provided
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank
(ECB) and not least of all, the EU member states. Although the Maas-
tricht Treaty specifically prohibits such actions (formerly known as the
‘No Bailout Clause’), richer countries, followed by EU institutions, de
facto allocated financial aid to countries in need. Finally, all these financial
measures were publicly subsumed under the well-known term ‘bailouts’.
We call these emergency financial measures among EU member states
European fiscal solidarity.
The following economic crisis (also known as the Great Recession)
starting in 2009 was a distinct sort of crisis, which is a direct consequence
of the sovereign debt crisis that had besieged some member states. Coun-
tries had to meet strict requirements by the EU creditors, who made
extensive structural reforms a condition of the bailout measures. While
these policy actions are expected to restore economies to sustainable
growth in the long term, in some member states the so-called austerity
measures even fostered an economic downturn in the short term. In this
context, austerity measures have further worsened the situation, especially
in the crisis-stricken Mediterranean member states, where the welfare
state was comparatively weak even before the crisis (e.g. Gelissen 2000).
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Besides this growing North–South divide come the lasting East–West
differences with the economically less powerful countries in Eastern and
Central Europe. Thus, we complement our research by adding questions
concerning distributional mechanisms between rich and poor countries in
Europe. Throughout the chapter, we refer to this as European territorial
solidarity.
Regarding public support among citizens from ECE countries, one
may assume different results for the two domains of solidarity.2 Over
the progress of the crises, none of the ECE countries received finan-
cial assistance from rescue funds. Public debate and discourses played an
important role anyway, when national politicians in Slovakia raised their
voice against extensive financial measures for other, wealthier EU member
states (Kulish and Castle 2011). Taking into account their comparably low
levels of economic wealth, one may assume citizens from the ECE coun-
tries could be rather sceptical towards European fiscal solidarity than other
member states, especially the crisis-stricken Southern ones. In contrast,
one may assume public opinion for European territorial solidarity to be
rather pronounced among the peoples of these countries. At the time of
their accession in the 2000s, and still today, ECE countries lag behind
the economic level of many Central and Western European countries
(Eurostat 2017). Having benefitted from the already existing redistri-
bution mechanisms, such as the European Social and Investment Fund,
citizens may claim these systems to be extended even further in future
to close the intra-European wealth gap. Both solidarity domains were
discussed extensively in recent years, making the question of citizens’
views on these issues highly relevant.
In this paper, we analyse to what extent citizens from thirteen EU
countries are willing to show each form of European solidarity. By doing
so, we investigate if and to what extent attitudes of citizens from the
three ECE countries of Hungary, Slovakia and Poland differ in compar-
ison with other European countries. In Sect. 2, we will elaborate on the
conceptual framework of our study. By European solidarity, we mean a
form of solidarity expanded beyond one’s own nation state; recipients of
solidarity are other EU countries, or citizens living in another EU country.
In Sect. 3, we describe the methodology of the data used, the Transna-
tional European Solidarity Survey (TESS). In Sects. 4 and 5, we present
2For the concepts of diffuse and specific support of (European) democracy, see
Chapter 2.
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descriptive results on the strength of European solidarity. The subjects of
the analyses are two domains of European solidarity, territorial and fiscal




To ensure an empirically reliable measurement, scholars usually define the
term solidarity according to relevant literature. This, however, raises two
different issues. On the one hand, scholars researching solidarity face a
large amount of different definitions (Bayertz 2000; Hechter 2001). On
the other hand, the meaning of the term solidarity is blurred by its day-to-
day use in the political arena, where the term often operates as a normative
concept for legitimation (Bayertz and Boshammer 2008).
Against this backdrop, we rely on classical sociological theory and
conceive solidarity as a specific form of social action (see Gerhards et al.
2019b). Solidarity is the act of allocating resources which are provided
by a donor and given to a recipient in need of the specific resource. This
transaction takes place voluntarily without expecting a mutual return. In
some cases, solidarity is mediated by a third actor, who pools resources
on behalf of the donor(s) and allocates them in a second step. In such
a specific case, we speak of institutionalised solidarity. The best-known
example of institutionalised solidarity at the national level is the welfare
state systems. Because most people do not have an opportunity to directly
help fellow Europeans, we base our research on fictive, yet realistic forms
of institutionalised solidarity.
Further clarifications of our understanding of ‘European solidarity’ are
important for the empirical measurement. We do not examine real acts
of solidarity, but attitudes towards different domains of institutionalised
solidarity, i.e. whether citizens are in favour of solidarity. This is theoreti-
cally plausible, because according to the ‘theory of planned behaviour’ (cf.
Ajzen 1991), we can assume that the essential preferences of individuals
determine their concrete actions. Thus, our operationalisation serves as a
reliable proxy for measuring institutionalised solidarity at the European
level. Furthermore, we distinguish three dimensions that the construct
of solidarity consists of: (1) types of actors, (2) domains and (3) spatial
levels.
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1. Regardless of being a donor or recipient, actors are defined as either
individuals or collective actors (i.e. regions or nation states). While a
European perspective could also focus on solidarity directly towards
individual actors in Europe (e.g. supporting the poor in other
European countries), we will focus on citizens’ attitudes towards
institutionalised forms of solidarity where donors and recipients are
collective units in the first place.
2. Recipients (both individuals and collective actors) of solidarity may
differ in terms of their level of vulnerability in regard to a certain
domain of solidarity. A variety of domains or causes of solidarity in
Europe can be distinguished.3 In our research, we primarily focus
on recipients whose circumstances are affected by one of the two
crises Europe has recently experienced:
a. Territorial solidarity: This domain takes wealth disparities within a
territorial unit into account. Redistribution policies which reduce
such inequalities are present within many EU member states,
and even between member states in the form of the European
Structural and Investment Funds. Hence, we measure territorial
solidarity as the support to reduce wealth disparities between poor
and rich territorial units.
b. Fiscal solidarity: When collective actors fall into insolvency, better-
off actors act as guarantors. In the case of the financial crisis,
better-off member states guaranteed surety for the monetary
loans of countries which could not pay back their debt. Therefore,
we define fiscal solidarity as the willingness to support indebted
collective actors financially (see also Lengfeld et al. 2020).
In this paper, we have chosen these two domains as they are of high
salience for the ECE countries. More than other countries, ECE ones
profit from already established mechanisms of territorial solidarity within
the EU (e.g. due to the European Structural and Investment Funds).
ECE countries also took a unique role during the financial crisis. We will
discuss the backgrounds in detail in the corresponding sections of the
chapter.
3See Gerhards et al. (2018, 2019a, and 2019b) for the discussion and analyses of other
domains of solidarity.
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3. As our research interest is to determine the extent of a unique
European solidarity, we set our focus on a specific spatial level. To
determine its strength, a relational comparison with other regional
spaces is used. Even though European integration has come a long
way and has led to the integration of rights for European citizens
(Gerhards and Lengfeld 2015), the nation state has been the central
institution of solidarity in many ways and remains so in the present.
As national levels of solidarity should be fairly established in most
countries, they may serve as a helpful starting point of compar-
ison in the first place. Additionally, since globalisation continuously
boosts transnational exchange between people and countries world-
wide (Held et al. 2000), we also explore to what extent European
solidarity differs from cosmopolitan solidarity at the global level.
Hence, we compare the strength of European solidarity for each
domain in relation to a similar national and global one.
3 Methodology
In the following sections, we present descriptive findings based on the
Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS). The TESS is a unique
survey conducted by the research projects ‘SOLIDUS’ (EU/Horizon
2020) and ‘Horizontal Europeanisation’ (DFG). Fieldwork was carried
out in 2016 in thirteen European countries by the polling institute
Kantar TNS Berlin with national subsidies from Kantar TNS, using
computer-assisted telephone interviews.4 The final sample contains a
total of 12,500 respondents, with approximately 1000 respondents per
country, including Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, France, Hungary,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden.5
To analyse a broad spectrum of countries that allow us to explore the
domains of solidarity as deep as possible, the country selection was guided
by the following criteria: (1) Did a country receive financial help from an
international fund or facility during the Euro crisis? (2) Is the country part
of the Eurozone? (3) What kind of regime does the country’s welfare state
4In eleven out of the thirteen countries, the fieldwork was conducted in June and July
2016. In France and Ireland, the fieldwork phase was set for October and November
2016.
5For Cyprus, 500 interviews were sufficient due to its scarce population.
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belong to (liberal, social democratic, conservative, Mediterranean, post-
socialist)? (4) Does the country presently have a rather Eurosceptic or
Non-Eurosceptic government? We aimed to sample a diverse set of coun-
tries containing a balanced number of states for each criterion. Therefore,
we selected Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain and Ireland as receivers of
international funds and facilities due to the Euro and banking crisis.
Sweden represents a social democratic welfare state regime as the only
Scandinavian country in our sample. France, the Netherlands, Germany
and Austria are all Western European countries that are part of the Euro-
zone. Most importantly for this chapter, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary
represent East Central European EU member states. By selecting Poland
and Hungary, we also covered two non-Eurozone member states.
In order to reap reliable data that is representative of each country’s
population, we considered two major constraints for the sampling. Firstly,
we took the various national landline/mobile phone mix of the gross
sample into account.
Secondly, to cover all regions of each country proportional to the
number of inhabitants, the numbers in the gross sample were stratified
regionally by using NUTS-2 regions. The gross sample was allocated to
cells representing the NUTS-2 regions according to their share in the
population. Within each cell, the dialed numbers were selected at random.
Furthermore, respondents in the survey are citizens eligible to vote in
national elections in the respective country exclusively. In landline house-
holds with multiple members, the interview partner was identified using
the last birthday method.
For our analysis, we solely rely on descriptive analyses of approval
rates in general as well as for each country. The approval rates depicted
are weighted, either for the whole sample or for each country sepa-
rately, relying on two different weighting variables. The items used are
listed in the Appendix (Tables 1 and 2) with further information on
country-specific adaptations as well (Table 3).
4 Fiscal Solidarity
As a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis that emerged in the
US spilling over to European economies, national governments had to
stabilise their banks that were threatened by massive loan defaults. Addi-
tionally, they experienced an economic depression starting in 2009. Both
crises destabilised national budgets especially in the Southern member
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states, leading to the Euro and sovereign debt crisis. In order to bolster
the single currency, the EU, its member states and the IMF implemented
financial measures towards European fiscal solidarity by granting guaran-
tees and loans to Eurozone countries facing serious financial difficulties,
such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus. A permanent, highly capi-
talised bailout for future crisis situations was established in the form of the
temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), followed by the
permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). At the same time, the
purchased government bonds would support crisis countries. Ultimately,
the Eurozone countries made a commitment to reciprocal, albeit limited,
European fiscal solidarity in the event of a failure to balance their national
budgets.
The main criticism often focused on the problematic legal situation
of the financial assistance measures, as they were contradicting the ‘No
Bailout Clause’, which prohibits the liability of the EU as well as member
states for debts of other countries (Article 125 TFEU). Within the ECE
countries, the assistance measures were additionally regarded as out of
proportion. For example, the Slovak Parliament was the first political
entity to vote against the expansion of the EFSF in 2011. The oppo-
nents of the EFSF argued that it would be unfair for Slovakia, the second
poorest country in the Eurozone, to have to secure loans for countries
like Greece and Portugal. These countries were not only wealthier than
Slovakia, they were also considered to be self-responsible for bringing this
emergency upon themselves through lax fiscal policies (Kulish and Castle
2011).
Little is known about attitudes of ECE citizens on European fiscal soli-
darity from survey research, with most studies focusing on individual-level
explanations or face qualifications due to limited numbers of countries.
Yet the results are somewhat contradicting. On the one hand, some
studies find people from ECE countries to be rather sceptical towards
such measures. Slovaks have proven to be among the least supportive in
regard to European fiscal solidarity (Kleider and Stoeckel 2018, p. 13;
Verhaegen 2018, p. 885), while Poles highly emphasise that states should
help themselves in debt situations (Pellegata 2017). However, Juan Díez
Medrano et al. (2019) show that Romanians barely differ in their atti-
tudes towards financial assistance measures in comparison with citizens
from other member states, such as Denmark. Based on the contradicting
results and the briefly outlined political discussion, we expect people from
the ECE countries in our study to be more likely to refuse European
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fiscal solidarity than people from the other countries surveyed, especially
in comparison with the Southern crisis-stricken ones.
In the TESS survey, we raised the question of whether EU citizens
consider the pursued political strategy to be legitimate. Are they willing
to show fiscal solidarity with member states faced by heavy economic trou-
bles? To answer this question, we again followed our theoretical concepts’
spatial solidarity levels by measuring attitudes towards fiscal solidarity on
three spatial levels: between regions within an EU member state, between
EU member states and between EU member states and countries outside
the EU (see Table 1 in the Appendix for item formulation).
As Fig. 1 shows, two-thirds of all respondents were in agreement with
their country providing financial aid to EU countries. Compared to this,
fiscal solidarity with countries outside of the EU was significantly lower
and not shared by a majority of respondents. These results show that
many respondents regarded the EU as an exclusive solidarity space that is
distinct from the cosmopolitan idea of universal solidarity. Finally, results
demonstrate that the nation state remains the dominant social space for
supporting areas in crisis: a huge majority of 83% of respondents would
give financial help to suffering regions within their own country.
How homogeneous are attitudes of citizens from different EU member
states towards European fiscal solidarity? As Fig. 2 demonstrates, citizens
from each surveyed country agreed on it by majority. Yet, differences exist
with an approval rate of 53% in Hungary and 78% in Spain. We found the
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Fig. 1 Approval for bailouts in times of crisis by different spatial levels (Source
TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,927, relative frequencies, valid answers
only, weighted)
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Fig. 2 Approval for bailouts in times of crisis by different spatial levels:
country differences (Source TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,927, relative
frequencies, valid answers only, weighted)
Portugal. Here, more than 70% of the population agreed on supporting
countries in need. However, only in these countries (and in Sweden),
a majority of respondents also wanted their country to provide finan-
cial help to countries outside of the EU. This result seems to indicate
that citizens experiencing (or having experienced) a severe crisis in their
own countries are wary of its negative consequences to a higher extent
and thus speak out for supporting other troubled countries. However,
this holds true only in countries that overcame the crisis successfully. In
Greece and in Cyprus, less than 60% approved bailouts within the EU.
For the ECE countries of Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, we observe
comparable support rates. Despite being below the overall mean, levels of
approval are still above the majority threshold of 50%. Furthermore, with
the exception of Hungary (approval rate of 53%), Slovakia and Poland
(both 57%) barely differ from other countries with lower approval rates,
such as Cyprus (57%) or Greece (59%). They therefore do not constitute
the extensively sceptical cluster as we had expected.
Besides approval in general, solidarity requires effort and, in the case
of the European bailout funds, those providing the assistance must also
assume the risk for failing loans. However, this does not specify the form
and extent of the aid the individual must provide. If a debtor country were
to default on its loan repayments, the donor country would have to stand
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guarantee, and these costs would burden national budgets. As a result,
donor countries would have less money available for their own spending,
for investments and for servicing their debt. However, it is impossible to
say how these constraints would directly impact individual citizens living
in the donor countries. This would be different if all EU citizens were
to co-finance relief efforts with their own income via a dedicated, direct
tax. Thus, a direct European solidarity contribution in the form of an
additional tax would result in a heavier direct burden on the population
and therefore pose a stress test for the willingness to show European fiscal
solidarity.
An additional European tax of this kind does not yet exist but might be
plausible in a certain scenario. To test the approval for this, respondents
were given a three-part statement with different tax rates and asked to
indicate whether they agree or disagree with each of the three proposed
rates. All respondents were asked about the same tax rates, but these
were combined with different absolute values (in Euro or the national
currency) according to the average income of the member states (see
Table 3 in the Appendix). With the highest tax rate mentioned first, it
was assumed that acceptance of the proposed rates would increase as the
tax rates decreased. Hence, if a respondent accepted a certain tax rate, the
following question(s) with lower values were skipped (see Table 1 in the
Appendix for item formulation).
According to the findings shown in Fig. 3, a clear majority of 61% of
the respondents supported the proposal for an income-related solidarity
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Fig. 3 Willingness to pay into a solidarity fund (Source TESS 2016, own
calculations, N = 12,187, relative frequencies, valid answers only, weighted)
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in budgetary crises, and agreed on one of the three scenarios. Within
the group of supporters, 34% of Europeans would have paid 3% income
tax, followed by 19% respondents who would not have paid 3% but 2%,
and 8% of interviewees who only agreed to the 0.5% tax proposal. These
findings indicate that, on average, a hypothetical European solidarity tax
would have been accepted by the majority of Europeans living in the
countries surveyed.
Figure 4 presents approval and disapproval rates by survey country.
The results are even more differentiated between the countries than
European fiscal solidarity in general. Even though potential contributors
have been in the majority in twelve out of thirteen countries, in France
a slight majority of 53% disagreed on all three proposals. The highest
rate of acceptance can be found in Ireland (78%). Among the six coun-
tries with above average acceptance rates are those countries that have
received or were receiving bailout funds from the EU and IMF at the
time of fieldwork. In these countries, the highest tax rate also received the
highest support. Compared to the (former) crisis countries, citizens from
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Fig. 4 Willingness to pay into a solidarity fund: country differences (Source
TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 12,187, relative frequencies, valid answers
only, weighted)
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contributing to a solidarity tax. Nevertheless, they accepted the general
idea by majorities with the exception of France.
Finally, the ECE countries are quite heterogeneous, with half of the
Hungarians approving the measures (51%), while Slovaks (62%) and Poles
(67%) displayed much higher rates of approval. As the latter two show
average rates of acceptance comparable with other member states, e.g.
Portugal (66%) or Austria (62%), respondents from France showed an
even lower level of approval (47%) than the Hungarians. This supports the
previous results, with the ECE countries not being outstandingly refused
on this issue compared to other EU countries, even if Hungary marks an
exception to some degree.
To sum up, European bailout funds, such as the ESM, were established
by the EU and the IMF to grant loans to Eurozone countries facing the
most serious financial difficulties. This deepening of European solidarity
was accomplished in a very short time and has also not gone unchal-
lenged in Europe. However, the findings of our analyses point to a great
willingness to show European fiscal solidarity, which is much higher than
solidarity expressed with troubled countries from outside the EU. This
impression is supported by the fact that a good two-thirds of respon-
dents from across the EU would accept a 0.5% or higher solidarity tax
on income. The ECE countries in our sample turned out not to consti-
tute a cluster of refusal, as we had expected. The results from Slovakia
and Poland are comparable with those from other member states, while
only the Hungarians are somewhat more sceptical. Despite this, they still
accept European fiscal solidarity in general, albeit with a slight majority,
and are not refusing the possibility of accepting a solidarity tax by a huge
majority.
5 Territorial Solidarity
With the accession of twelve new member states in 2004 and 2007, the
EU faced a huge increase in welfare disparities: in the newly joined ECE
countries, the gross domestic product was far below the EU average
(Eurostat 2017). Nevertheless, the new member states experienced an
increase in economic growth rates in the following years both in abso-
lute and in relative terms (Eurostat 2017). It seemed as if the economic
convergence process, one of the central goals of the EU (Article 3 (3)
TEU; Article 174 TFEU), was well on its way. With the economic and
Euro crises beginning in 2008, the situation changed. Although at a
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slower rate than before, the new member states, especially in the ECE
countries, were able to further reduce the gap with the wealthier states,
despite lagging considerably behind the richer ones. Despite this, a new
cleavage arose with the countries hit hardest by the crisis in Southern
Europe falling behind on economic terms (Eurostat 2017).
With the North–South divide reinforcing and the East–West divide
basically persisting, spatial disparities seem to be one of the biggest chal-
lenges to the EU today. What could be done to reduce inequality between
the member states of the EU? One way would be to establish territorial
redistribution measures. With the European Structural and Investments
Funds, such measures have existed within the EU for several decades
already. Yet these measures are limited in two ways: firstly, although they
take up a big part of the overall EU budget, they are restricted in their
financial scope. Secondly, with the exception of funds like the European
Solidarity Fund, established for providing financial help to countries in
case of (natural) disasters, such measures aim at enhancing the situation of
subnational regions particularly by supporting projects in certain thematic
fields.
With the calculation of redistributive measures primarily based on the
GDP of regional units, the ECE countries were among the group of
member states profiting the most from these measures. With the aim of
fostering convergence between EU countries and regions, the funds were
used for financial investments in different fields, such as infrastructure
(due to the European Regional Development Fund; European Parlia-
ment and Council of the European Union 2013a) or to fight poverty
(European Social Fund; European Parliament and Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2013b). While the economically weaker member states thus
profit from the redistribution system, political debate was rather critical
within the wealthier countries. The criticism of the debate on being ‘net
contributor’ states even became one of the central arguments for the
successful campaign on leaving the EU in Great Britain (Henley 2016).
While there is, to our knowledge, no empirical research analysing citi-
zens’ attitudes towards these measures at a European level, we expect that
the self-interest of citizens from poorer countries, and their experience as
beneficiaries from the already known system, will lead to higher levels of
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Fig. 5 Approval for reduction of spatial differences by different spatial levels
(Source TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,843, relative frequencies, valid
answers only, weighted)
approval for a general system of redistribution among EU member states
in the ECE countries.6
Within the TESS, we surveyed citizens’ general attitudes towards the
reduction of territorial disparities: Would they support the reduction
of wealth differences among different spatial areas? According to our
concept of spatial solidarity levels, we measured attitudes towards such
a form of solidarity on three different levels: solidarity among regions
within one’s own nation state, among countries within the EU and among
countries worldwide (see Table 2 in the Appendix for item formulation).
Figure 5 shows that a majority of 71% of the respondents have been
in favour of the reduction of spatial differences among EU countries.
Support for solidarity between different regions of a nation state was
only slightly bigger. For a global reduction of disparities, we find only
a scarce majority. Overall, we can observe a huge support for reducing
disparities within the EU and the nation state, while a global reduction is
controversial.
Do citizens from different countries differ in their acceptance
of European territorial solidarity and what do citizens from ECE
countries think? Figure 6 shows that in every country under
investigation, a majority of respondents have spoken out for the
reduction of disparities among the EU states. With a maximum
6In their study for Spain, Laia Balcells et al. (2015) showed that people from regions
that are perceived to be rather wealthier show lower levels of support for measures of
regional redistribution. This finding is in line with our expectation.
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Fig. 6 Approval for reduction of spatial differences by different spatial levels:
country differences (Source TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,843, relative
frequencies, valid answers only, weighted)
level of approval of 88% (Greece) and a minimum of 53% (the
Netherlands), country differences are still very distinct. Once again,
regional clusters can be identified; especially among Southern European
member states, the idea of reducing disparities within the EU was highly
accepted. Although Ireland forms an exception with an acceptance rate
above the average (74%), Western and Northern European countries
showed the lowest rates of acceptance in the sample, with the highest
level in Austria (66%) and the lowest in the Netherlands (53%).
Compared to the mean level of approval, the three ECE countries
in the sample showed average approval rates on European territorial
solidarity: while approval in Hungary (83%) and Slovakia (78%) was some-
what above the mean (74%), in Poland it was below (68%). Hence,
approval among the ECE countries has been lower than in Southern
member states, but higher than in Western and Northern ones. Strikingly,
both the Southern and the ECE countries are those countries where the
agreement on EU-wide reduction of territorial disparities exceeded the
acceptance of the comparable question for reducing differences within
the country.
It thus seems that whether a country’s citizens are supporting this form
of solidarity depends on its economic and financial potential as well as the
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experience as a beneficiary of the current policies. In contrast to popula-
tions from Southern and ECE member states, people from Northern and
Western European countries may feel disadvantaged by the institutional-
isation of comparable measures, as their role as net contributors may be
intensified in such a scenario.
However, is there still a majority of citizens supporting measures of
reducing spatial disparities in Europe when taking into account that
resources are scarce and a (hypothetical) decision has to be made between
the three spatial levels? To find out, we asked the respondents to decide
on which level the reduction of territorial inequalities should be realised
first: within the nation state, among EU countries, or among countries
worldwide? Consequently, we asked for a second choice, omitting the
option chosen before (see Table 2 in the Appendix for item formulation).
As Fig. 7 shows, the majority of respondents preferred to reduce terri-
torial inequalities within the nation state first. Every fourth has chosen the
European level, while 18% would have liked to reduce disparities among
countries worldwide. The priority of one’s own nation is not surprising,
though the low difference between the relative number of choices of the
EU and the global level, on the other hand, is. Regarding the second
choice, almost two-thirds of the respondents had chosen the European
level, far ahead of their own nation or the global level. Taken together, the
pattern is clear: while citizens prioritise reducing disparities within their
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Fig. 7 Where should territorial differences be reduced first and second? (Source
TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,169, relative frequencies, valid answers
only, weighted)
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Figure 8 depicts country differences. For reasons of simplification, we
focus solely on the first choice and on the comparison between national
and European solidarity. Unsurprisingly, the EU level is not mentioned
as often as the national level in any of the countries. For the European
preference, differences are remarkable once again with 17% selecting the
European level in Hungary and 40% in Greece as the first option. As for
the general approval shown before, respondents from Southern European
countries preferred EU solidarity to a higher degree than respondents
from the Western and Northern countries do. ECE countries do not
constitute a homogeneous cluster, with a bigger share mentioning the
EU level in Slovakia (35%) and the lowest among Hungarians (17%).
Consequently, the latter showed a very high level of reducing disparities
within their nation state, while the Slovaks did so only on a comparably
moderate level. Taken together, the nation state is still the preferred level
for reducing territorial disparities in all surveyed countries, being even
more pronounced in ECE countries. The significance of the EU varies
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Fig. 8 Where should territorial differences be reduced first? Country differences
(Source TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,169, relative frequencies, valid
answers only, weighted)
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In sum, our results show that a great majority of EU citizens agreed
on reducing disparities among countries within the EU. This majority
existed in every country surveyed, even though levels of agreement
varied strongly, with the highest levels of approval in Southern coun-
tries and lower levels of approval in Northern and Western European
ones. Furthermore, the results imply that the nation state is still the
most important space for reducing disparities, while the EU comes second
before the global level. Although the ECE countries follow the general
patterns, they are at the same time rather heterogeneous: while Slovaks
showed levels of European territorial solidarity and ranking of the Euro-
pean level to be very close to the European average of our sample,
Hungarians and Poles, on the other hand, both emphasised the reduc-
tion of the disparities within their countries. Additionally, Hungarians
showed comparably higher levels of European territorial solidarity, while
in Poland, the approval level was below the average. Citizens from ECE
countries do not, therefore, constitute a consistent group of the strongest
advocates of European territorial solidarity.
6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we asked to what extent citizens of EU countries approved
different domains of solidarity. For that, we derived two domains of
solidarity for empirical testing, both resulting from EU crises in recent
years. Firstly, the Eurozone and sovereign debt crisis—followed by bailout
measures introduced by the EU, the ECB as well as the IMF—raised the
question whether citizens approve such assistance measures for indebted
EU countries. We call this domain European fiscal solidarity. Secondly, as
a consequence of the negative economic developments of the crisis coun-
tries, as well as the already existing wealth differences among EU member
states, the issue of reducing economic disparities by means of redistribu-
tion between countries is another politically controversial topic among
the EU public. We name this domain European territorial solidarity—
a kind of solidarity, existing already in the form of the European Social
and Investment Funds. After having laid down a systematic approach to
grasp and measure solidarity among Europeans, we empirically analysed
the question of country differences with a focus on East Central European
countries for both domains.
Our descriptive analyses using the 2016 TESS survey revealed a high
level of approval for the idea of European fiscal solidarity with two out of
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three respondents agreeing on it. Furthermore, a question on accepting
to personally pay into a fictive fund has shown that a clear majority would
have also been willing to pay for solidarity with their own income. We
expected citizens from ECE countries to show lower levels of support
for European fiscal solidarity as they were not affected by the crises
themselves and may feel disadvantaged when helping wealthier coun-
tries. We found clear country differences, and although Slovakia, Hungary
and Poland—the three ECE countries in the TESS—showed among the
lowest levels of approval for European fiscal solidarity, we nevertheless
found a majority within each. Differences to some other EU member
states turned out to be small as well. Furthermore, we found majori-
ties to be willing to personally pay into a fictive fund within each ECE
country under observation, although the rates of approval differ with
especially Hungarians refusing the idea more often than others. However,
among the countries under observation, Hungarians have still been less
sceptical than respondents from France.
For European territorial solidarity, we found an even more pronounced
level of approval among all respondents than for European fiscal solidarity.
Nevertheless, when asked to set out a priority, respondents would have
rather chosen to redistribute within the boundaries of their nation state,
with the European level being second ahead of a global system of redis-
tribution. With regard to the ECE countries, we expected to find higher
approval rates, as they would probably profit from redistributive measures
due to their weak economic situation in the EU. Again, country differ-
ences in general were remarkable. We found higher approval rates for
European territorial solidarity among the ECE countries than in Western
and Northern ones, but not exceeding the high rates of approval in the
Southern member states. Furthermore, the three countries in focus show
diverging levels of approval to some degree. Finally, we identified huge
differences among ECE states when it comes to the question of priority,
with an average level of preferences for the nationwide equalisation over
a European one in Slovakia and the highest rate of national favouritism in
Hungary among all countries surveyed.
From this, we derive two important observations. Firstly, despite their
relatively young membership within the EU and their comparably weak
economic position, citizens from ECE countries do not stand out on
matters of solidarity as expected—neither in refusing European fiscal nor
in claiming European territorial solidarity. Secondly, differences between
the ECE countries under observation are noteworthy. While citizens from
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Slovakia, the only Eurozone country among the three, show the most
similar patterns compared to the other EU member states in our sample,
Hungary especially stands out with lower rates of approving fiscal soli-
darity, simultaneously being more demanding in the case of European
territorial solidarity with a distinct national focus. In short, to speak of a
homogenous group with attitudes contradicting those of other member
states would be misleading. We interpret the lack of a controversial
cluster in combination with tendencies towards majority approval rates
for solidarity among all countries under investigation as a sign of a rather
close-knit EU.
As a consequence, further integration steps, like expanding already
existing measures of solidarity, such as financial assistance (e.g. the
ESM) or redistribution mechanisms (e.g. European Social and Investment
Funds), may be legitimated by the citizens of the EU. The peoples of ECE
countries do not mark an exception, showing that the idea of a group of
veto players in the east is not realistic in these domains.
However, our study faces several limitations, restraining the idea of
unconfined expansions and developments of further policies. Firstly, with
thirteen countries, the TESS is a very good starting point for a system-
atic analysis of solidarity in Europe. Nevertheless, the country differences
revealed in this study show that we need information for each member
state on such issues to be able to rule out the possibility of coun-
tries refusing such ideas and becoming veto players in the political
arena. Secondly, our sociological perspective is restricted to general ideas.
Explicit policies in these fields, such as the introduction of Eurobonds or
the expansion of the funding system, may bring along opponents rejecting
the practice, not the general idea. Besides research on the effectiveness
of different policies, further research on public opinion is needed here.
Thirdly, the analyses in this chapter can only make a point on the two
domains of solidarity in focus—fiscal and territorial. As we could show
elsewhere (Gerhards et al. 2019b), in the case of redistributing refugees
or sharing the costs on this matter among EU countries, perspectives on
solidarity are highly diverse between the citizens of different EU member
states. We therefore recommend caution on what topic which measures
of European solidarity are introduced.
Appendix
See Tables 1, 2, and 3
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PART II
Rhetoric and Practice of Illiberal and Anti-EU
Politics
CHAPTER 5
Differential Illiberalism: Classifying Illiberal
Trends in Central European Party Politics
Vratislav Havlík and Vít Hloušek
1 Introduction
Studies on Euroscepticism in East Central Europe and its links with illib-
eral politics (Havlík et al. 2017; Styczyńska 2018) are often focused on
the ‘transnational cleavage’, generated by globalisation and Europeanisa-
tion and further strengthened by the migration crisis and the Eurozone
crisis (Hooghe and Marks 2018, see also Chapters 1 and 14).1 However,
so far, a comprehensive, comparative analysis of the ideological premises
of illiberal party politics, as well as an evaluation of how these premises
have been put to practice, has been lacking. It is the aim of our chapter to
1This work was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (Grant GA18-05612S).
The authors would like to express their gratitude to Štěpán Káňa who translated the
chapter to English.
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fill this lacuna, exploring illiberal trends in the party systems of the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
The existing research mostly consists of case studies of individual coun-
tries. Even those works that address East Central Europe as a whole
(Pakulski 2016) are not consistently comparative. However, we can build
on the analyses of the Hungarian (Bozóki 2012; Bozóki and Hegedűs
2018; Bugarič 2015; Ilés et al. 2018; Innes 2015; Körösényi 2018;
Pappas 2014) and Polish (Buras and Knaus 2018; Pacześniak 2015;
Zarycki et al. 2017) approaches to an illiberal concept of democracy,
as well as those of East Central European populism (Havlík and Voda
2018). Besides, we draw on our own research on the Czech Republic
and Slovakia.
First, we introduce the concept of illiberal democracy and its oper-
ationalisation in the areas of ideology and political practice. The next
section presents and briefly compares the party-political actors of illiberal
politics in East Central Europe, i.e. Andrej Babiš’s party ANO (Czechia),
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz (Hungary), Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law and Justice,
or ‘PiS’ (Poland) and Robert Fico’s SMER—Social Democracy (Slovakia).
The following section analyses the ideologies of these parties, in terms
of their compatibility with illiberal democracy. We then show how these
ideas are implemented in the political practice of the aforementioned
government parties, and to what extent, limitations are placed on the
liberal model of governance. In the final section, we compare and contrast
these changes and show that in East Central Europe we have to differen-
tiate among potentially illiberal party-political actors according to their
ideological sources and the degree of their success in introducing illiberal
measures into political practice (for other analyses of political practice, see
Chapters 7 and 8).
2 Illiberal Democracy: The
Concept and Its Operationalisation
The concept of illiberal democracy has been part of the debate involving
political philosophers and experts on democratic theory since Fareed
Zakaria’s famous article (1997, 2003). In 2014, it was transplanted by the
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán into the political and ideological
discussion:
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The most popular topic in thinking today is trying to understand
how systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies
and perhaps not even democracies, can nevertheless make their nations
successful. […] We are trying to find the form of community organisa-
tion, the new Hungarian state, which is capable of making our community
competitive in the great global race for decades to come.
We shall see that Orbán is certainly not the only East Central European
politician to take such a route. However, although this quotation shows
what form of state organisation Orbán rejects, it does not provide us with
a clear definition of illiberal democracy that could be operationalised and
serve for an analysis of contemporary East Central European politics in
our study.
Zakaria’s definition of a liberal democracy as ‘[A] political system
marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law,
a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech,
assembly, religion and property’ (Zakaria 1997, pp. 22–23) implies a
certain tension between the constitutional-liberal component of limita-
tions being placed on power and protection provided to minorities, and
the democratic component—that is, the political will of the majority, or
the principle of the absolute sovereignty of the people. Disregarding the
liberal component leads to populism, the excessive concentration and
abuse of power, disrespect for civil and human rights and restrictions on
freedoms.
Drawing upon Zakaria, Wolfgang Merkel classified illiberal democra-
cies within the broader category of defective democracies and defined
the former as the most frequent empirical type of the latter: ‘In illib-
eral democracies, the principle of the rule of law is damaged, affecting
the actual core of liberal self-understanding, namely the equal freedom of
all individuals’ (Merkel 2004, p. 49).
The introduction of the elements of illiberal democracy has both an
ideological and a practical dimension. For the former, we will analyse key
documents such as political party programmes and statements by leading
party and government figures in which they formulate their criticisms of
liberal democracy, the ‘Western’ variant of liberalism and the concept of
human rights. Our narrative analysis (Patterson and Renwick Monroe
1998) is based on the assumption that it is precisely the creation of an
illiberal narrative in opposition to the Westernising and Europeanising
discourses that is characteristic of the contemporary political trends in
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East Central Europe. These narratives do not seek to act as fully-fledged
ideologies, but they do provide explanations for the gradual change of
politics, in particular the political system.
For analysing the practical steps being taken by politicians, we use
Merkel’s conception of ‘embedded democracy’. Of the five dimensions
(Merkel 2004, p. 36), restrictions on—or the absence of—the following
lead to illiberal democracy: freedom of expression and freedom of asso-
ciation, the horizontal accountability of power, individual liberties and
rights, and the principle of equality before the law. Given that in our
analysis we will chiefly address the construction of illiberal democracy as a
political system—in the sense that the basic political institutions are under-
going a change—we can reduce the activities testifying to the illiberal
trend as follows (see Table 1).
If an illiberal ideology is put into practice, this can limit the principle
of the separation of powers and options for the external oversight of the
political process via the media and civil society institutions. Law is being
‘bent’ to serve those who control political power, and to allow them to
use it against the opposition. We will be looking into the politics of the
Visegrád Group countries for such changes to the law and government
implementation measures that correspond to the manifestations described
above. We have chosen EU accession as a symbolic opening landmark of
our study, as it was a culmination of the transition and consolidation of
liberal democracy in East Central Europe (Vachudova 2005).
3 Actors of Illiberal Politics
Of the parties examined in this chapter, Hungary’s Fidesz has been active
the longest. It was founded in 1988 as a response to the gradual decline
of the communist regime in the country and it has been linked with
the figure of Viktor Orbán since its inception. During its history, the
party has witnessed a major ideological turn: after the 1994 elections,
what was originally a liberal party appealing to young voters turned into
a classic conservative party. Gradually, Fidesz managed to push out or
absorb all the other right and centre-right entities, and became the domi-
nant—or practically the only—party on the right. Orbán formed his first
government in 1998 (in office until 2002) and then went into oppo-
sition. However, since 2010, he has won three parliamentary elections
in a row, thus becoming the longest-serving prime minister in the four
East Central European countries. Unlike the Czech ANO 2011 and the
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Table 1 Dimensions and indicators of illiberal politics
Dimensions Indicators
Restrictions on freedom of expression State control or political regulation of
public service broadcasters
Politically motivated regulation of
journalism generally
Political or economic concentration of
mass media ownership, threatening
pluralism
Restrictions on freedom of association Legal regulations affecting the activities
of opposition parties or civil society
Economic regulations impacting the
activities of civil society
Regulation of other autonomous
spheres, such as universities and
academic liberties
Politically motivated interference with
private property and the autonomy of
proprietors’ actions in the economy
Restrictions on the horizontal accountability
of power
Strengthening the executive to the
detriment of the judiciary or the
legislature
Regulations limiting or obstructing the
opposition’s checking of government via
parliament or other institutions, typically
in the form of amendments to the rules
of procedure
Limitations on the independence of the
judiciary
Source Authors, based on Merkel (2004, pp. 36–43)
Slovak SMER leaders, Orbán never sought to deny his strong ideological
grounding, with topics such as a strong Hungarian nation, Hungarian
minorities abroad and a significant emphasis on Hungarian history tradi-
tionally serving him as major political issues. Also characteristic of Orbán
has been a strong anti-liberal appeal, consisting not just in a critique of
liberal left parties (Havlík 2012) but also in attacks on liberalism as such,
with the Western political model pronounced dead (Buzogány 2017,
p. 1307).
The PiS party in Poland was founded in 2001 and so far has only
been led by the Kaczyński brothers. The party has established a strongly
conservative profile, with a major emphasis on Polish national conscious-
ness and the role of the Catholic Church. Like Viktor Orbán, Jarosław
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Kaczyński can be described as an opponent of liberalism. Law and Justice
formed the government in 2005–2007, inviting in 2006 the nationalist
parties Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families into the coali-
tion. The steps of the current PiS government, in office since 2015,
are increasingly discussed in terms of ‘dismantling the foundations of
Poland’s liberal democratic order’ (Markowski 2016, p. 1320), though
PiS is more implicitly than explicitly illiberal.
In Czechia, the most striking illiberal party-political actor is the ANO
2011 movement, founded in 2012 by Andrej Babiš, one of the richest
Czechs. The movement emerged from the civic association Action of
Dissatisfied Citizens, established in 2011 and very closely linked with the
figure of its founder since its inception. ANO 2011 presented itself as
a protest against the current and previous political establishments since
1989 (Balík and Hloušek 2016, p. 111), and this, in combination with
the form of political marketing it chose, quickly earned it the label of a
populist movement. It has been characterised by an anti-political appeal
and a business-firm party structure (Kopeček 2016). The 2017 elections
confirmed the party’s ascendance and Babiš became the prime minister.
For more than a decade now, the SMER—Social Democracy Party—
has been a phenomenon of Slovak politics. It was founded in 1999 by
Robert Fico, formerly of the Party of the Democratic Left. With the
exception of a brief intermezzo in 2010–2012, SMER has been in govern-
ment and has also held the post of prime minister since 2006. From
the outset, Fico was seen as a largely non-ideological and pragmatically
oriented figure, who styled himself as resolving people’s everyday prob-
lems (Učeň 2001, p. 407). Like the Czech ANO, the party initially
refused to be placed on the left-to-right axis and sought to define itself in
opposition to the existing political establishment. However, Fico gradually
abandoned his non-ideological profile and started to adopt the funda-
mental principles of social democracy (Spáč 2012, pp. 245–246). The
party won such a strong position in the 2012 elections that it could form
a single-party government, which further strengthened Fico’s grip on
Slovak politics. After the 2016 elections, SMER, pragmatically, changed
its position on European integration considerably, replacing its frequent
criticisms of the EU over the previous years practically overnight, and
now supporting a shift for Slovakia into the ‘hard core’ of European
integration.
We saw that in East Central Europe, the gamut of actual or potential
illiberal parties runs ideologically from the leftist SMER to the ostensive
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anti-ideological and anti-political, centrist ANO, to the national conserva-
tive right of PiS and Fidesz. How do these differences manifest themselves
in party programmes and ideologies?
4 The Ideologies and Programmes
of Fidesz, PiS, ANO and SMER
Viktor Orbán has endorsed an illiberal conception of politics the most
explicitly. Although in the case of Fidesz, these tendencies have long
roots, reaching back to before 2010 when the party won a constitutional
majority in parliament, it is Orbán’s 2014 speech to the members of the
Hungarian minority in the Romanian town of Băile Tuşnad (Tusnád-
fürdő) that is most often described as crucial. In this important speech
(Orbán 2014), Orbán described several specific principles that illustrate
in detail his notion of governance:
a ‘liberal democracy and the liberal Hungarian state did not protect
community assets’;
b ‘a democracy does not necessarily have to be liberal’;
c ‘societies that are built on the state organisation principle of liberal
democracy will probably be incapable of maintaining their global
competitiveness’;
d ‘we must break with liberal principles and methods of social organi-
sation, and in general with the liberal understanding of society’.
Liberalism—Orbán’s chief ideological antagonist—was given a specific
face before the 2018 elections. Fidesz based its election campaign on
attacking George Soros, an American investor with Hungarian roots.
They accused him of seeking to turn Hungary into a ‘country of immi-
grants’ and thus to disrupt its sovereignty (Fidesz 2018). In 2015, the
migration issue became the flagship in the party’s policy manifesto. As
part of a ‘national consultation’, Orbán said that ‘we will not allow
immigrants to threaten the jobs and security of Hungarians’ (Fidesz
2015). Fidesz’s understanding of the decision-making process is substan-
tially illiberal, irrespective of which issue or policy is at stake. Particularly
characteristic has been the concentration of power, accompanied by the
decline of pluralism (Havlík and Stojarová 2018), when Orbán’s Fidesz
defended many often fundamental legislative and constitutional changes
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by reference to the mandate it had won in elections. This can be shown
in the wording of the ‘Declaration of National Cooperation’, adopted by
Orbán’s government in 2010 shortly after coming to office (Office of the
National Assembly 2010). The voters, who secured a two-thirds majority
of seats for the party, have according to this resolution ‘decided to create
a new system: the National Cooperation System’. Fidesz interpreted its
electoral victory as an active mandate from the electorate to create an
entirely new system for the functioning of the state.
The roots of the ideology and programme of Law and Justice (PiS) in
Poland reach back into the late 1980s to a wing of the Solidarity move-
ment that sought a Christian-democratic and nationalist orientation. After
an initial stage in 2001–2002, when the party described itself primarily as
fighting against corruption and crime generally, it gradually emphasised
its Christian social-conservative profile (Millard 2010). The notion of a
‘Fourth Republic’ (Czwarta Rzeczpospolita) provides a key to this profile.
The Fourth Republic idea envisaged a substantial political as well as
social transformation of the Polish state, the role of which was to be
substantially strengthened overall. Crucial parts in this were to be played
by Polish nationalism, a thoroughgoing decommunisation, moral renewal
driven by Polish Catholicism and a new union between the people and
the political elite. The vision of the new system was populist and strongly
anti-pluralist (Obacz 2017). At times, this radical rejection of the ‘state
pathology’ of the Third Republic as well as of the ‘Tusk system’—i.e. the
politics of the government in office 2007–2015 (PiS 2014, pp. 15–44)—
was messianic and left little space for a liberal conception of citizenship
(cf. Nalewajko 2013, pp. 336–339). The key concepts of the transforma-
tion from Third to Fourth Republic were framed in terms of culture and
identity, and this corresponded to the tradition of Polish politics in the
twentieth century (Zarycki et al. 2017). Programmatic elements linked
with moral issues, such as the struggle against cultural ‘progressives’ and
the rejection of abortion, and the rights of sexual minorities, have been
very important for PiS in the long term. PiS also very strongly endorses
Christianity, or more precisely Catholicism, as an important source of
political values standing against the ‘demoralisation of society’ (PiS 2014,
pp. 7–14; 2005b, pp. 24–32).
PiS demanded a thoroughgoing ‘cleansing’ (meaning decommunisa-
tion) and transformation of the political and administrative system, with
the aim of strengthening the Polish state (PiS 2005a). Already at this
point, it was argued that the judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office
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needed to be subject to state supervision, and the immunity of judges
limited (PiS 2005a, pp. 20–21). Later on (PiS 2009), the fundamental
characteristics of the proposed political system were set. Poland would be
shifted towards a semi-presidential system, where the government would
have to cooperate with the president, and the controlling role of the
parliament over the executive would be weakened overall. Whereas the
proposal to strengthen the prime minister’s role in government did not
contain elements of illiberal democracy, the proposal that the government
would be able to issue, via the president, decrees with the power of law—
this combined with limiting the scope and powers of the Constitutional
Court—was oriented in an illiberal direction. PiS stressed the general
need to reform the judiciary and to strengthen the control exercised by
the Ministry of Justice over the courts of law (PiS 2014, pp. 66–68).
It also called for new and essentially greater regulation of public service
broadcasters (PiS 2014, pp. 142–143).
It is not easy to classify Czechia’s ANO party ideologically. The fact
that it is a member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
(ALDE) group in the European Parliament does not help us much. This is
because the party has sought to keep its programme and ideology as flex-
ible as possible. In 2013, it presented itself as an alternative to traditional
right-wing parties. In 2017, it responded to the shift of the electoral core
to the left by emphasising the social aspects in its manifesto. Moreover,
the party’s rhetoric is flexibly obeying the demands of political marketing.
ANO’s manifesto for the 2013 parliamentary elections contained no
illiberal elements, nor radical proposals to overhaul the political system.
Some of the points in the manifesto—for example, the plan to create a
Supreme Judicial Council, which would strengthen judiciary autonomy—
would in fact improve the quality of liberal-democratic government
in Czechia. However, observing the actual campaign, we note that it
was informed by the overarching simile of the efficient management of
the state as a business firm—that is, it was to be managed efficiently,
but without ‘superfluous’ control mechanisms. As Buštíková and Guasti
(2019) have shown, Babiš could pick up the threads of discourses that
existed during the 1990s and even during Communist President Gustáv
Husák’s ‘normalisation’. Against the vision of a liberal democracy, he
pitted a technocratic populist vision of managing politics and public
administration, which would substantially reduce democratic checks and
balances for the sake of efficiency.
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Babiš was quite open in a book that he used as an enticement to voters
during his campaign for the 2017 elections. In it, he first points out that
the legislative process is protracted and that government stability and effi-
ciency are low (Babiš 2017, pp. 119–126). The key to this is the abolition
of ‘superfluous’ institutions such as the regions and the Senate, decreasing
the number of MPs by half, limiting parliamentary discussion via changes
to parliamentary procedure, strengthening the role of direct democracy to
the detriment of representative democracy and increasing political control
of public officials (Babiš 2017, pp. 128–133). Still, there is no explicit
illiberal discourse here, nor nationalist nor culturally conservative rhetoric
typical of PiS or Fidesz.
In Slovakia, SMER gradually abandoned its non-ideological stance, as
we mentioned above. Crucial for the establishment of SMER’s firm posi-
tion in the party-political spectrum was the period 2002–2006, when it
was seen as a strong left-wing critic of Mikuláš Dzurinda’s second govern-
ment (Kopeček 2007, p. 290). However, SMER’s ideological identity
was not an easy one to determine even after that date, and there were
doubts when it formally anchored itself as a party of the left. The social-
democratic label clashed with more or less illiberal ideological elements,
which came to the fore particularly after 2006, though they had been
visible previously. In its 2006 manifesto, a Fico-led government by SMER
and two other nationalist parties officially committed the country to
supporting the education of minorities in their own tongues. However,
the developments of the subsequent years, characterised by Fico’s playing
the ‘Hungarian card’, were adumbrated in the proviso that ‘teaching
in the national minority’s language cannot be to the detriment of the
quality of teaching of the state Slovak language’ (Vláda SR 2006, p. 35).
Fico’s characteristic pragmatism—governing alongside the nationalists—
was seen by the Party of European Socialists as infringing its fundamental
values, and for that reason, it suspended SMER’s membership for several
years, arguing that ‘Slovakia needs social democracy, but not at the cost
of compromising with extreme nationalism and xenophobia’ (PES 2006).
After 2012, SMER somewhat moderated its illiberal rhetoric, either
because the quality of Hungarian-Slovak relations improved, or because
the party was able to form a government on its own, without coali-
tion partners. The period 2012–2016 was largely dominated by the issue
of Slovak-Russian relations. Fico’s traditionally declared support for the
EU was in direct contrast to the ever-closer relations between the two
countries (Maťašovská 2012; E15.cz 2016). At the same time, Fico and
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Orbán started to support each other, especially in their resistance to the
accepting of migrants (HN Televízia 2016). SMER’s ideological flexibility
then subsequently gradated in spring 2017 when Fico, in a sudden rhetor-
ical U-turn, stopped criticising the EU and started actively supporting
Slovakia’s participation in an ever-closer union. As Fico said, ‘to be at
the core with Germany and France, that is the essence of my policy. For
Slovakia, the Visegrád Group is not an alternative to the EU’ (Vilček
2017).
5 Illiberalism as Practical Politics
In terms of the practical steps taken by Orbán’s Hungarian govern-
ments, there have been several after 2010 that have been described
as ‘illiberal’ (see also Anders and Priebus in this volume). The main
point of contention was the Media Act; later, in connection with the
‘migration crisis’, it was Orbán struggle against the Central European
University (CEU) funded by George Soros and against those NGOs who
supported migrants. Other issues that will be briefly discussed include
concerns about the erosion of the horizontal accountability of power and
a problematic electoral system.
What has been called the ‘Media Act’ is in fact a group of several laws
regulating the media. Orbán’s government attracted attention shortly
after coming to office by adopting the act in 2010. The Act on the
Freedom of the Press and the Fundamental Rules of Media Content stip-
ulates in Article 10 that ‘all persons shall have the right to receive proper
information on public affairs at local, national and European level, as
well as on any event bearing relevance to the citizens of the Republic
of Hungary and the members of the Hungarian nation’. The oversight
of the media is entrusted to the newly created National Media and
Infocommunications Authority—specifically, to its strong Media Council
(National Media and Infocommunications Authority 2011). Opponents
of this legislation were particularly critical that the media came under the
substantial control of a body appointed by the state. Under pressure from
the European Commission, the Hungarian government agreed to revert
to a milder proposition, namely that ‘it is a task for the entirety of the
media system to provide authentic, rapid and accurate information on
affairs and events’ (Haraszti 2011, also see Chapter 11). Doubts about
the independence of the Hungarian media continued in the following
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years, particularly as Lörincz Mészáros, a close ally of the prime minister,
has recently bought more and more media titles (Novak 2017).
Another area where Orbán’s government took specific legislative
measures is its struggle against migration. After 2015, the government
raised its standard by adopting legislation limiting the activities of NGOs
and other groups involved in the migration issue. A 2018 act on illegal
immigration stipulates that whoever ‘helped persons who entered the
territory of Hungary illegally […] to obtain a residency permit’ has
committed a criminal offence, as has anyone who ‘facilitated in Hungary
the opening of proceedings to grant international protection to a person
who is not subject to persecution on the grounds of race, nationality,
belonging to a particular social group or having a political belief’ (Magyar
2018). Dubbed ‘Stop Soros’, this act has brought domestic and inter-
national criticism on the government (Beauchamp 2018) and is clearly
incompatible with the role of NGOs in liberal democracies.
The Hungarian government also took specific steps in the area of
academic freedoms. The so-called Lex CEU, which began to be imple-
mented in practice in January 2019, requires universities accredited
abroad and providing teaching in Hungary to also have a campus in the
country of origin. A second, more fundamental condition (Bárd 2017)
requires foreign universities to act in Hungary only on the basis of an
intergovernmental agreement between the two countries. The act, which
according to commentators was obviously aimed against the Soros-funded
CEU, led to the prestigious university’s exit from Hungary.
Particularly in connection with the adoption of a new constitution
(which came into effect in January 2012), the Hungarian government
has been criticised for eroding horizontal accountability. By decreasing
the retirement age in the judiciary from 70 to 62, the constitution retired
274 judges with immediate effect (Halmai 2017, p. 471). This was prob-
lematic because at a stroke it removed a whole generation of judges, many
of them in senior positions. Following domestic and international criti-
cism, the legislation was amended to allow the judges to return to their
profession; however, the changes in the leadership of the courts of law
mostly remained in place. A new system of administrative justice, adopted
in late 2018, which gave the government the power to approve these
judges, attracted similar criticism. It has been pointed out in this context
that the impartiality and independence of a segment of the judiciary were
under threat (Gorondi 2018).
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The Hungarian government owes its exceptionally strong position to
the electoral system, among other factors. The new 2012 electoral law
further strengthened its majoritarian elements, not to mention the fact
that according to some political scientists, the drawing of single-member
constituencies can be described as ‘gerrymandering’ (Krekó and Enyedi
2018).
The first stint of Law and Justice in the government of Poland in 2005–
2007 foreshadowed the future direction of the illiberal reform of Polish
institutions. Nevertheless, more ambitious changes were not planned,
let alone implemented. PiS then spent eight years in opposition, but after
the autumn 2015 elections formed a government led by Beata Szydło,
whom Mateusz Morawiecki replaced in December 2017. Of the illiberal
institutional changes undertaken by the PiS government after 2015, we
need to note the reforms of judicial power, the ‘fight’ of the government
with the Constitutional Tribunal and the amendments to the electoral
system. Beyond this, legislation was quickly introduced that affected the
vital actors of a liberal-democratic regime, the media.
Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal (Trybunał Konstytucyjny, TK), which
operates as a classic Constitutional Court in the process of preventive and
subsequent control of constitutionality, had previously come into conflict
with PiS’s political intentions (Solska 2018). After the 2015 elections, the
conflict between government and the TK became more acute. Playing a
role in its escalation was the precipitous nomination of new judges by the
government of the Civic Platform, whom President Andrzej Duda (PiS)
refused to appoint. The TK countered that the president must appoint
the judges, but the government did not publish this decision in the
requisite manner, and it did not formally come into effect. In December
2015, the government proposed a new TK act, which complicated its
decision-making procedures. PiS also achieved control of the TK in terms
of personnel, by staffing it with judges that were associated with the party
(Kobyliński 2016). According to the opinion of the Venice Commission
(2016), the new act purposely and substantially weakened the role of the
TK as the guarantor of Polish constitutionality and Poland’s legal system.
The judiciary was also affected by other reforms that came into effect
after 2015. The official aim was to improve the efficiency of judi-
cial proceedings. However, the reforms were aimed more at weakening
the independence of the judiciary, largely by politicising the process of
appointing judges. Even President Duda vetoed two out of the three
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government reform acts. Particularly dangerous was the potential politi-
cisation of the National Council of the Judiciary. An act lowering the
compulsory retirement age for judges of the Supreme Court, meanwhile,
led in practice to the forced retirements of judges who were considered
supporters of opposition parties. The discussion and the adoption process
of these acts were remarkable: over two weeks, the opposition submitted
about a thousand amendments, which were all rejected en bloc in one
vote. The Supreme Court of Poland, disagreeing with these changes,
submitted in August 2018 a plea to the Court of Justice of the EU
(CJEU). Until the CJEU responds, the Supreme Court of Poland has
suspended the new acts, but the executive (government and president)
have said they do not respect the decision of the court, and nominate
new judges according to the new, dubious rules.
Beyond these changes, the Polish Parliament has adopted an act
that could potentially weaken the independence of the Central Elec-
toral Commission and the National Election Bureau, an act weakening
the freedom of association and a Media Act that caused the replacement
of the leading figures in public service broadcasters with people loyal to
PiS. Public service broadcasters were thus transformed into mouthpieces
of government policy. The parliamentary control over new legislation
has likewise been weakened, because the government, commanding a
majority in parliament, can push through most of its bills in a shortened
procedure that precludes substantial discussion and extensive criticism.
Despite its relative newness, after the 2013 elections, Andrej Babiš’s
ANO 2011 became a member of the Czechia government coalition,
alongside the Social and the Christian Democrats. After the 2017 elec-
tions and an intermezzo of the single-party ANO minority cabinet, which
failed to win parliament’s confidence, a coalition government of ANO
and the Social Democrats was formed in summer 2018. ANO was a
strong partner in both governments and could potentially push through
fundamental institutional changes; yet we also see the real limits to its
power, stemming from the necessity of working in a coalition. The social-
democratic control over the Interior Ministry in particular prevented
ANO from undertaking any radical change of personnel in the police—
for example, any change that could render problematic the already very
sensitive political process of investigating the affairs in which Babiš has
been embroiled (Hanley and Vachudova 2018; Pehe 2018). There were
no attempts to limit the freedom or independence of public service broad-
casters, and no institutional interference with the judiciary, police or
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public prosecution—apart from attempts to discredit the investigators
of cases linked with Babiš and his Agrofert holding company (Hanley
and Vachudova 2018, pp. 284–285) and certain problematic changes of
personnel in the apparatus of ministries, state agencies and state-owned
enterprises. The amendments to the Civil Service Act might be problem-
atic. But even if these are adopted, it cannot be interpreted as an illiberal
political change, but rather as a return to the practice of appointing
and removing state secretaries (the most senior officials in ministries)
according to a political and not an expert key. An amendment of the
parliamentary procedures of the Chamber of Deputies—currently under
discussion—could, potentially, limit somewhat the options of the parlia-
mentary opposition; however, at the time of writing (November 2019),
we are at the stage of general political discussion.
In line with Jiří Pehe’s (2018) evaluation, the foregoing suggests that
Babiš is potentially an actor of illiberal change, but his real policy is limited
by pragmatism, because he is seeking to maximise electoral support and
not to irritate potential voters by radical proposals. He is also hampered
by efforts to cooperate at the EU level and the functional system of checks
and balances in Czech politics, which, faced with attempts at radical insti-
tutional overhaul, is relatively rigid. Babiš does not hesitate to use the
media outlets he owns to influence political discussion; he certainly has no
qualms about shifting the country towards less liberal forms of democracy,
but is unable to push these changes through the Czech political system.
Particularly dangerous are certain changes of personnel undertaken by
Babiš’s government and attempts at ‘state capture’ to serve the business
interests of Babiš’s holding company.
Slovak governments led by Robert Fico differ considerably in terms
of some of the aspects observed here. Whereas his first government, in
office 2006–2010, can be labelled national-populist (Smetanková 2013)
and largely illiberal, later SMER governments were more moderate in
this respect. The causes for this included the different make-up of these
governments and the pragmatic approach taken by the Slovak prime
minister at the time. In 2009, the government coalition of SMER and
two nationalist parties adopted an amendment to the State Language
Act, which modified and made stricter requirements on the use of Slovak
in the public domain and, in fact, limited the use of national minority
languages. That same government also adopted an amendment to the
Press Act, which had been criticised for limiting media freedom, by third
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parties including the OSCE (Prušová 2009). The act in question intro-
duced the right to reply to people who felt offended by news reporting
(i.e. not commentary).
Though Fico’s politics after 2012 can be described as populist (Bugaric
and Kuhelj 2018, p. 24) and still very ‘nationalist’, the attacks on the
Hungarian minority have substantially reduced over time. After the 2016
elections, Fico even formed a government with the Most–Híd party,
representing the interests of the Hungarian minority, and the Slovak
National Party. However, there have been other threats to the rule of
law, from not-entirely-transparent affairs of recent years, whether this
included potential links between former Interior Minister Kaliňák and
some controversial businessmen or speculations about links between Fico
and a figure of the Italian mafia (Kapitán 2019). The illiberal proclama-
tions by the former Slovak prime minister—in particular, those connected
with the ‘migration crisis’—were evidently a pragmatic response to the
attitudes of Slovaks towards the quotas for receiving refugees. A similarly
pragmatic step at the same time was the acceptance of a minimal number
of refugees (in single digits) in order for Slovakia to avoid legal action by
the European Commission.
In conclusion, we note that given the present make-up of the
government coalition and SMER’s weakened position after the affair
of a murdered investigative journalist, no evidently illiberal steps can
be observed in practical politics; however, this might easily change,
depending on the future make-up of government coalitions.
6 Varying Degrees of Illiberalism:
Comparison and Discussion
Looking back on the party programmes, utterances made by leading
politicians of Fidesz, PiS, ANO and SMER, as well as other documents
that deal with long-term visions and strategies, we see that issues of an
illiberal conception of democracy are certainly not explicitly developed or
even addressed in all of them.
The presence of this ideological motive for political behaviour can be
found most strongly in the utterances made by Viktor Orbán who said
explicitly that an alternative to ‘Western liberal democracy’ was needed
and who also outlined his symbolic geopolitical sources of inspiration in
selected authoritarian regimes. However, the Hungarian notion of illib-
eralism is very explicit and loud, but in terms of content or doctrine,
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rather flexible. Thanks to this, Orbán can gradually replace his symbolic
opponents or capitalise on various rhetoric emphases. Certainly, there are
perennial themes in Orbán’s illiberal ideology, including the fight against
Soros, in the figure of whom the Fidesz voter may bring together old anti-
Semitism with very modern anti-globalism. But, as the situation changes,
migrants, the CEU, EU economic governance, the EU as a whole,
other Hungarian parties or indeed anyone else can be freely subjected
to criticism. We see that in Orbán’s case, illiberalism is a powerful
instrument—one that is pragmatically used, with an eye to marketing
principles—that is a loose combination of various elements, rather than
a coherent ideology. This does not decrease its danger, pointing rather
to its relative lack of ideological purity. What is hiding behind the vague
idea is a combination of traditional ethnic nationalism, social and cultural
conservatism, and post-communist oligarchic politics.
In the case of Law and Justice, the notion of ‘illiberalism’ itself does not
appear; but the very detailed doctrine of the party overall provides a set of
characteristics of illiberal ideology that can be more easily grasped than in
Hungary: a mistrust of the separation of powers, a mistrust of pluralism
(of social and cultural pluralism perhaps even more than of political
pluralism), a Christian social and national politically conservative position,
exaggerated anti-communism, Euroscepticism and a centre-left paternalist
economic policy. Liberalism is rejected as a social system, neoliberalism
as an economic one, and Europeanism and globalisation are refused as
enemies of the moral rebirth of the Polish nation. PiS illiberalism can be
read as a modernised and updated version of a long Polish political tradi-
tion. If Fidesz’s Hungarian illiberalism is the loudest and most explicit,
PiS’s Polish version is the clearest and most firmly anchored in a coherent
ideology.
Looking at the rhetoric and programmes of the Czech and Slovak
cases, we do not find explicit illiberalism. Rather, ANO and SMER are
characterised by a populist tone, linked in the Slovak case with strong
nationalism; in the Czech case, with anti-immigration rhetoric; and in
both cases, with populism and long-term soft Euroscepticism. However,
the intensity of Robert Fico’s and Andrej Babiš’s Eurosceptic rhetoric
varies wildly, depending on the topic, context and audience, with theirs
being a more pragmatic rather than an ideological choice. It could be said,
then, that ANO and SMER are not in fact ideologically illiberal parties.
Yet we must note certain illiberal elements present in the rhetoric and
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programmes of the two parties and their leaders. Babiš’s and Fico’s prag-
matism do not prevent them from deploying stronger illiberal emphases,
if there should be demand for that among the electorates.
In the cases of Fidesz and PiS, illiberalism is something of an ideo-
logical ‘master’ leading to practical political steps taken on the basis of
doctrines elaborated on to a greater or lesser degree, whereas, ideo-
logically speaking, both ANO and SMER are illiberal only in potentia.
However, as the historical experience with the trajectory of Viktor
Orbán’s changing opinions and ideological viewpoints shows (Hloušek
and Kopeček 2010, pp. 188–189), even a former pro-Western liberal can
end up on the opposite end of the political spectrum, if there are enough
ideological and pragmatic reasons to do so.
Let us now turn from ideas and doctrines to political practice. In
the preceding segments of this chapter, we have focused on the most
important and most conspicuous elements, which are telling in terms of
the quality of democratic governance. Table 2 summarises these aspects
Table 2 Illiberal practices of governing parties in East Central Europe
Indicators Fidesz PiS Smer ANO
State control or political regulation of public service
broadcasters
Yes Yes Yes No
Politically motivated regulation of journalism generally Yes Yes Yes No
Political or economic concentration of mass media
ownership, threatening pluralism
Yes No No Yes
Legal provisions affecting the activities of opposition
parties or civil society
Yes No No No
Economic regulation impacting the activities of civil
society
Yes Yes No No
Regulation of other autonomous spheres, such as
universities and academic liberties
Yes Yes Yes No
Politically motivated interference with private property
and the autonomy of proprietors’ actions in the economy
No No No No
Strengthening the executive to the detriment of the
judiciary or the legislature
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regulations limiting or obstructing the opposition’s
checking of government via parliament or other
institutions, typically in the form of amendments to the
rules of procedure
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Limitations on the independence of the judiciary Yes Yes Yes No
Source: Authors
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along the three dimensions of illiberal democracy presented in Sect. 2,
namely the control of the media and the limitation of their independence,
limitations on the activities of the opposition and civil society as well as
strengthening the executive and limiting the separation of powers in the
country.
With the exception of Czechia, governments in all three other coun-
tries have at least attempted to establish state control over public service
broadcasters. This process can be considered as achieved in Hungary and
Poland, but in Slovakia the attempts to regulate were neither as vigorous,
nor as successful. The murder of the journalist, Ján Kuciak, in February
2018, caused mass protest, which dampened further attempts at political
control of the media. What is more, Slovakia is a country with a plural
media market, similar to the Czech Republic. In Czechia, it is not the
potential threats to pluralism that concern public service broadcasters, but
the fact that Prime Minister Babiš owns an important media group, Mafra,
whose newspapers support the government. The public service broad-
casters remain independent, and there is pluralism in the private media
market. This, by contrast, is disappearing from the Hungarian media,
whether due to political control over public service broadcasters, as noted
above, or the economic concentration of private media ownership in the
hands of people and companies close to the Fidesz party.
None of the East Central European states has introduced illiberal
measures against the autonomy of proprietors’ actions in the economy. In
the other points of the second dimension, however, the practices of the
countries vary dramatically. In Czechia, there are no political or economic
pressures exerted against civil society, nor against the parties of the oppo-
sition. Somewhat stronger attempts to limit certain civil society actors
could be observed under SMER governments in Slovakia, but the activ-
ities of these sectors are not being suppressed in the country. Poland is
today in this respect closer to a liberal model, with some illiberal elements
mixed in. In Hungary, however, democracy is fully illiberal in this respect;
a combination of political and financial regulation asphyxiates the inde-
pendent activities of civil society, the academic sphere, as well as political
opposition.
We see most illiberal policies in the third dimension. In all four coun-
tries, there have been attempts—albeit of very different intensities—to
increase the influence of the executive at the expense of checks by the
legislature. Where government parties command a clear majority in parlia-
ment (Fidesz and PiS), parliamentary power is diminished by the actual
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behaviour of the government majority. However, the attacks against the
very essence of liberal democracy—an independent judiciary—are even
more serious. In Hungary and Poland, these attacks have progressed the
most, and the judicial review of constitutionality in particular has been
largely paralysed. There is a danger of a similar situation in Slovakia, where
the Constitutional Court is dysfunctional because many justice seats are
vacant. The Slovak example shows that to limit judicial power, one does
not need to change laws and regulations; it suffices to use changes of
personnel, or block them.
What is the weight of the individual dimensions? In terms of consti-
tutional engineering, the third dimension is key for the stabilisation of
an illiberal democracy. It is no accident that the first institutional reforms
in Poland and Hungary that took place were attempts to regulate the
independence of the constitutional judiciary and judicial power. In terms
of the long-term formation of public opinion, the first dimension—the
media—follows. Regulation of media plurality and the transformation of
public service broadcasters, especially TV stations, into mouthpieces of
the regime, lead to long-term change of political discourse. Our analysis
of four East Central European cases shows that civil society institutions
come third in terms of importance. Although they can be very annoying
to illiberal politicians, they nevertheless represent the interests of partial
segments of the population. If they are denied the option of communi-
cating their critical positions in the media and if they are precluded from
responding to arbitrary government action by legal action, their position
vis-à-vis the domestic public becomes very fragile.
7 Conclusion
The absence of long-term democratic traditions, a weak political culture
among citizens and leaders alike, and the absence of political education
and political socialisation of citizens all played their roles in a fragile
and contested position of liberal democracy in East Central Europe, and
together with pressures exerted by rapid political, social and economic
changes, created a demand for leaders of a certain type. The implicit
assumption from the early days of democratic transition—that democrati-
sation and liberalisation must go hand in hand, and that this is a process
of unidirectional progress—has not been confirmed. Nonetheless, it is
evident that in terms of the manifestations of illiberalism, this is no
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coherent group, and that not all countries of the Visegrád Group are
emerging illiberal democracies.
In recent years, Hungary and Poland have presented themselves signif-
icantly differently than Slovakia and Czechia. Whereas the Hungarian
government can be described as illiberal and the Polish government as
halfway illiberal (quite illiberal in terms of ideology, but not as successful
as Hungary in terms of implementation so far), Slovakia’s is more
social populist and Czechia’s a kind of managerial populism. Despite
some elements of illiberalism, the ANO and SMER governments can be
described as more or less liberal; however, always with the proviso that
given the very pragmatic, ideological and rather unanchored style of their
politics, this might be subject to change, at any time.
References
ANO. 2013. Volební program ANO bude líp pro volby do poslanecké sněmovny.
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Zarycki, T., R. Smoczyński, and T. Warczok. 2017. The Roots of Polish
Culture-Centered Politics: Toward a Non-Purely Cultural Model of Cultural
Domination in Central and Eastern Europe. East European Politics and
Societies: And Cultures 31 (2): 360–381.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons
license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
CHAPTER 6
Party Rhetoric and Action Compared:
Examining Politicisation and Compliance
in the Field of Asylum andMigration Policy
in the Czech Republic andHungary
Paula Beger
1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, asylum and migration policy has been a low salience issue
in East Central Europe (ECE), being barely addressed in public debates
and excluded from political parties’ manifestos. Until a few years ago,
policies were in line with EU standards and mainly remained in the hands
of the administration. With the European refugee crisis in 2015, however,
the policy field all of a sudden became politicised and several governments
rejected the implementation of the EU relocation scheme.
Focusing on Hungary and the Czech Republic in the period from
2015 to 2018, this chapter investigates the link between politicisation
and compliance. It starts by showing how asylum and migration policy
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became politicised within recent years. It then goes on to examine compli-
ance with EU directives in the field of asylum and migration policy. It
will be demonstrated that the politicisation of the policy field did not
lead to general non-compliance. While governments of both countries
politicised asylum and migration issues and decided not to implement the
relocation scheme, the Czech Republic implemented other asylum- and
migration-related EU directives. Hungary, however, also violated other
EU rules in the field. Based on the compliance literature of ECE and
building on expert interviews,1 it will be suggested that this is mainly due
to the varying degree of politicisation of the administration. If it remains
de-politicised, it executes the policy in accordance with the EU standards.
The chapter is anchored on the theoretical background of politicisa-
tion, Europeanisation and compliance research. As very little research
has so far been undertaken to combine questions of politicisation and
compliance with EU law, this study contributes to an under-researched
area. Its empirical findings have important implications for research on
illiberal trends and anti-EU politics. They suggest that the pursuit of illib-
eral as well as anti-EU agendas of ruling parties (for party agendas, see
Chapters 5 and 7) can be counterbalanced or at least decelerated by de-
politicised state bureaucracies. Future research, therefore, should focus on
the administration in backsliding states and examine how governments try
to capture them.
2 The Politicisation of Asylum and Migration
Policy in the Czech Republic and Hungary
Politicisation means that the wider public sphere is involved with a specific
issue. Most scholars analyse politicisation by looking at three aspects:
the public salience of an issue, the number of actors involved and the
polarisation of their opinions (De Wilde 2011; Rauh and Zürn 2014,
p. 125). As political parties play a crucial role in this process, they are suit-
able research subjects when examining politicisation (Hooghe and Marks
2012; Dolezal et al. 2016, for the analysis of ECE parties, see also Chap-
ters 5 and 7). Therefore, this section analyses party manifestos of the
1The expert interviews were conducted in 2016 and 2017 with academics and repre-
sentatives from relevant think tanks as well as administrative employees of the Czech and
Hungarian Ministry of Interior and the Immigration and Asylum Office in Hungary.
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Czech and Hungarian governing parties and the three biggest opposi-
tion parties. Manifestos are in general a valid source to identify parties’
opinions (Grande and Hutter 2016, pp. 26–27) and to examine politici-
sation in the partisan arena. The following paragraphs also consider the
public debates on asylum and migration.
In both Hungary and the Czech Republic, the policy field of asylum
and migration policy2 was developed almost from scratch in the pre-
accession phase. In that time, the issue was not politicised. It was low
in public salience and only a few parties formulated programmatic prefer-
ences (Beger 2020). The asylum and migration policy was shaped almost
exclusively by the government and the responsible administration without
receiving much public attention. For these actors, the EU condition-
ality served as the main guideline as one acquis chapter demanded the
building of, for example, a proper border control, domestic institutions
for law enforcement and a legislative framework for asylum and migration
(European Commission 2019). The ECE governments still lacked expe-
rience with immigration and international refugee movements (Grabbe
2003, p. 306; Lavenex 1998, p. 138; Miciukiewicz 2011, p. 186), and
the EU standards were adopted in a technical and uncontested down-
loading process (Author’s interviews, Prague, 23rd January 2018; 31st
January 2018; 29th January 2018; 1st February 2018).
Several of the interviewed experts confirmed that the very apolitical
and bureaucratic policy field reached only the top of the political agenda
with the refugee crisis3 in the Czech Republic (Author’s interviews,
Prague, 23rd January 2018; 31st January 2018; 29th January 2018; 1st
February 2018). Similarly, in Hungary, asylum and migration was not a
disputed issue before 2015 and only since that year became prioritised
2The definition of asylum and migration policy is derived from the corresponding
research in political science that addresses different sub-policies like asylum policy and
policies of migration, such as labour migration or integration (Bendel 2011, p. 377; Faist
and Ette 2007, p. 15). The difficulty in differentiating migration and asylum policy while
respecting the interacting aspects of both categories has remained a challenge (Crisp 2010,
p. 133). Consequently, this chapter frames the policy field as asylum and migration policy.
3The wording “refugee crisis” might be put into an inhuman interpretative framework.
Different frames like the “Schengen crisis” (Börzel and Risse 2018) or the “external rela-
tions crisis” (Falkner 2016) seem more appropriate in this regard. However, the emphasis
on the policy field of asylum and migration is at the centre of this research, and thus, the
expression “refugee crisis” is chosen.
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(Author’s interviews, Budapest, 2nd November 2017; 9th November
2017).
In Czech Parliament, the opposition parties did not delineate from the
government line, even though their deputies did not have to follow any
party discipline because they did not articulate their positions regarding
the policy field in manifestos or party programmes (Shevel 2011, p. 224).
Parties paid more attention to asylum and migration issues in the 2000s
when the asylum and refugee legislation was repeatedly amended, but
nevertheless abstained from formulating clear party positions. The same
was true for Hungary; asylum and migration was not a widely disputed
issue here either (Author’s interviews, Budapest, 2nd November 2017;
9th November 2017). Thus, in both countries, the policy field remained
technocratic until many years after the accession.
As mentioned, political actors started to politicise the issue only in
2015. In this year, the European refugee crisis increased the salience of
asylum- and migration-related questions. The policy entered mass poli-
tics in the Czech Republic and Hungary. Though the numbers of asylum
applicants in the Czech Republic were low, political parties sparked a
public debate about migration and asylum. All political parties of the
Czech Parliament took a restrictive stance in that matter (Jelínková 2019,
p. 36f.). As experts reported, the political parties in Czechia discovered
how they could direct attention towards the issue and how to exploit it
electorally (Author’s interview, Prague, 23rd January 2018).
In their public statements, the populist centrist Action of Dissatis-
fied Citizens ANO 2011 focused mainly on security issues, whereas the
Social Democrats and the Christian and Democratic Union–Czechoslovak
People’s Party also raised the issue, but within a securitised frame. In
addition, both the government and the opposition took a negative stance
towards the EU migration and asylum policy in most of the press inter-
views concerning this policy field (Jelínková 2019, p. 39). Furthermore,
many xenophobic and populist splinter parties emerged in the Czech
Republic focusing on asylum and migration issues (Bertelsmann Stiftung
2018a, p. 35; for anti-Muslim attitudes, see also Chapter 3).
In the 2017 election year, when national parties were running for
the election of the Chamber of Deputies, both government and opposi-
tion parties explicitly addressed the issue in their manifestos. Polarisation
increased as the parties articulated more diverging positions towards the
policy field of asylum and migration. In its party manifesto, ANO 2011
devoted much more attention to questions of migration than other Czech
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political parties. It declared illegal migration as the main issue in Europe
and demanded to end migration waves by means of EU and NATO oper-
ations or with the help of the Czech army. Furthermore, ANO 2011
suggested punishing the abuse of the domestic asylum system with threat-
ening penalties. The EU relocation scheme, though, was not explicitly
addressed (Burst et al. 2020: ANO 2011, position 321–670). In contrast,
its social democratic coalition partner ČSSD openly rejected the manda-
tory quotas of the EU relocation scheme in its party manifesto of 2017
and opted for a preventive system to stop irregular migration while deliv-
ering development aid to African and Asian countries (Burst et al. 2020:
Czech Social Democratic Party, position 446–457).
The three biggest opposition parties positioned themselves with rather
short statements in their manifestos. The liberal-conservative Civic Demo-
cratic Party (ODS) demanded a consistent immigration policy that
should, inter alia, set stricter conditions for the abuse of the social system
(Burst et al. 2020: Civic Democratic Party, position 174–177). The Czech
Pirate Party remained vague and referred to a rational approach to solve
the refugee crisis. It also aimed at supporting humanitarian aid close to
conflict zones (Burst et al. 2020: Czech Pirate Party, position 453–455).
The populist Party Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) referred to the
EU relocation scheme in a xenophobic manner as a forced mechanism
to integrate illegal immigrants (Burst et al. 2020: Freedom and Direct
Democracy, position 28–30).
In sum, while the polarisation increased when compared to the 2014
election year, in 2017, only the ČSSD and the populist SPD made an
explicit reference to the EU relocation mechanism which they refused.
The emerging intra- and inter-party competition over the adoption of
the refugee quotas (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018a, p. 35) was even more
apparent in public debates than in the party manifestos.
In Hungary, asylum and migration has become a similarly salient topic
since 2015, although the debate took different shapes. In the run-up to
the 2014 parliamentary elections, no party had even mentioned immi-
gration in its manifesto (Manifesto Project Data Dashboard).4 Following
4Some statements can only be found in the manifesto of Fidesz from 2007.
Interestingly, Fidesz supports a common European immigration policy (Fidesz 2007,
p. 41f.).
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the vastly increased inflow of refugees and asylum seekers in Hungary,5
the policy field was shifted from a bureaucratic management sphere to a
political one, though not all political parties were increasingly involved
with the issue. From 2015 onwards, political debates about asylum and
migration were dominated by the governing party, the Federation of
Young Democrats–Hungarian Civic Union (Fidesz). The alliance between
the right-wing populist Fidesz and the conservative Christian Demo-
cratic People’s Party (KDNP) started a governmental campaign against
migrants. It built its public communication on mass media measures and
set up a huge billboard campaign and a national consultation on immigra-
tion (Nagy 2019, p. 123). While the public discourse of the government
increasingly turned to spread a “moral panic” (Barlai and Sik 2017), the
government’s campaign remained unchallenged by the opposition parties
of the Hungarian Parliament (Nagy 2019, p. 115). Furthermore, oppor-
tunities for public criticism were restricted, as non-governmental actors
were practically prohibited from broadcasting political advertisements on
public TV or radio (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018b, p. 8). The two biggest
opposition parties, the right-wing extremist party Movement for a Better
Hungary (Jobbik) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), passed
their manifestos right before the Parliament’s elections in 2018 but did
not formulate clear goals for a domestic asylum and refugee policy. Jobbik
associated migration policy with the defence of the Hungarian nation
and identity (Jobbik 2018), while the MSZP put the topic in a domestic
context and mainly addressed Hungarian migrants (MSZP 2018).
The governing party Fidesz chose the EU relocation scheme as an issue
to mobilise domestic support against the EU. First, in September 2015,
the party initiated a parliamentary resolution against the EU quota system
that was perceived to be encouraging immigrants to migrate to Europe
(Resolution 36/2015 [IX. 22], Magyar Közlöny No. 136). Further-
more, the Hungarian government initiated a referendum in October
2016 and Hungarian citizens could vote whether the Hungarian govern-
ment should comply with the relocation scheme,6 but the referendum
5As 177,000 asylum applications in total were registered in Hungary in 2015. That
was an increase of 314% compared to the previous year (Statistics of the Hungarian
Immigration and Asylum Office).
6The referendum was accompanied by mass media measures based on very suggestive
statements while interlinking migration and asylum with terrorism and misusing the terms
migration and asylum. The referendum—which posed the single question “Do you want
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was invalid due to insufficient turnout (Halmai 2016). While Fidesz
became increasingly active in politicising the policy field, it surprisingly did
not reflect its “intense anti-migration campaign” (Bertelsmann Stiftung
2018b, p. 36) within its party manifesto. It rather used measures like the
referendum and a parliamentary resolution to launch an EU anti-rhetoric.
In the same way, the main opposition parties only briefly described
their position towards asylum and migration in their manifestos before
the 2018 parliamentary elections. They appeared to be reluctant to coun-
terbalance the public mobilisation against the EU and especially the EU
relocation scheme.
Focusing on the salience, the actor expansion and the polarisation, it
could be shown that the programmatic dispute was missing in both coun-
tries, as actors—if they positioned themselves—predominantly demanded
restrictive asylum and migration policies. Nevertheless, the issues of
migration and asylum gained high public attention in the two ECE
countries.
3 Different Degrees of Non-compliance
in the Czech Republic and Hungary
The following section analyses whether politicisation resulted in
increasing non-compliance. Though it has been suggested that anti-EU
rhetoric can stir non-compliant behaviour and thus lead to a disintegrative
course (Börzel and Risse 2018, p. 7), the two approaches are rather used
separately. In this context, ECE countries are mentioned in politicisation
(Börzel and Risse 2018; Hutter and Kriesi 2019) or compliance studies
(Falkner et al. 2004; Falkner et al. 2008; Sedelmeier 2009; Toshkov
2012).
Compliance performance can be measured by the number of infringe-
ment procedures. Though infringement data have to be interpreted with
caution, they serve as the most valid source for comparing compliance in
EU countries (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017, p. 201). When the Commis-
sion starts an infringement procedure, a letter of formal notice is issued
to the member state. It can be followed by a reasoned opinion, which
sets out a clear deadline to solve the case of EU law violation that can
to allow the European Union to mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to
Hungary without the approval of the National Assembly?”—demonstrated the anti-EU
mobilisation of the Hungarian government.
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be caused by non-notification, non-transposition, late transposition or
substantially incorrect transposition of a directive (Falkner et al. 2004,
p. 456). A referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union finally
sanctions the non-compliant behaviour. Thus, there is a qualitative differ-
ence between the different stages regarding the depth of non-compliance,
and cases can be differentiated between severe and swiftly solved instances
of non-compliance. While the formal notice suggests the first evidence of
a non-compliant behaviour, a reasoned opinion can be regarded as a last
final written warning before the sanctioning and serves as an indicator for
measuring non-compliance (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017, p. 201; Falkner
et al. 2004, p. 456). If a member state reacts according to the reasoned
opinion, the sanctioning can be avoided. Using reasoned opinions for
measuring formal non-compliance, the two country cases of the Czech
Republic and Hungary show different levels.
Within the period under consideration, the European Commission
issued several formal notices to the Czech Republic that concerned
directives of the policy field. In 2015, for the first time, the Commis-
sion sent two formal notices that criticised the execution of common
procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection and
the standards for the reception of asylum. A year later, the Commis-
sion found fault with the conditions for third-country nationals coming
as seasonal workers or for the purposes of research, studies, training,
voluntary service, pupil exchange schemes or educational projects and au
pairing (European Commission Database on infringement cases). Though
these formal notices were not followed by reasoned opinions that defined
a stage of non-compliance, it is striking that the same year when the
European refugee crisis became part of the public debate, the Czech
Republic got their first formal notices concerning the policy field. In
2017, the Commission started an infringement procedure against the
Czech Republic for not transposing the Council Decisions 2015/1523
and 2015/1601 on relocation and resettlement. As there was no indica-
tion that the Czech Republic would start relocating to its territory, the
Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice of the European
Union (European Commission 2017b). As demonstrated in Table 1, the
refusal to implement the relocation scheme was a definite non-compliant
behaviour.
Compared to the Czech Republic, Hungary has less infringement
proceedings but more of them are referred to the Court of Justice of

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the European Union and thus indicate a more severe form of non-
compliance. Contrary to the Czech case, Hungary already received formal
notices concerning the policy field before 2015 (see Table 2).
In 2013, the Commission sent a formal notice on grounds of non-
compliance with EU asylum directives and the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. A year later, it criticised the standards for the qualification
of third-country nationals as beneficiaries of international protection.
These formal notices were not followed by reasoned opinions, indicating
that the instances of non-compliance were solved swiftly. However, in
2015, the number and scope of the infringement procedures increased
remarkably. The Commission addressed Hungary in a formal notice as
the country did not comply with the EU asylum and migration acquis,
including several directives (Directive 2013/32/EU on Asylum Proce-
dures, Directive 2008/115/EC on Return, on Reception Conditions) as
well as several provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (European
Commission 2017a).
After a period of two months to respond to the Commission’s
reasoned opinion, the majority of the concerns raised had still not been
addressed and the Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice of
the European Union in 2018 (European Commission 2018). The failure
to correctly implement the Council Decision 2015/1601 on relocation
led to another infringement procedure that was referred to the Court
of Justice of the European Union half a year later after Hungary had
not taken any action at all since the relocation scheme started (European
Commission 2017b). Further formal notices followed afterwards that also
concerned third-country nationals for the purposes of, inter alia, research,
training, exchange schemes, measures against illegal immigration and
long-term residents (European Commission Database on infringement
cases).
Comparing the compliance performance in the Czech Republic and
Hungary in the field of asylum and migration, it can be summarised that
in both countries, the infringement procedures considerably increased
since 2015 when the European refugee crisis became politicised in
domestic public debate. While more procedures were swiftly solved in
the Czech Republic, the case of Hungary shows a more severe form of
non-compliance.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 Action in the Background: The de-Politicised
Administration as a Missing Piece of the Puzzle
The previous sections suggest that the compliance in the very policy
field cannot solely be explained by politicisation. Comparable levels of
politicisation in both countries yielded different results. As I will argue
in the following, this can be explained by considering the role of the
administration.
As we know from quantitative studies and comparative case studies on
compliance with EU law, the ECE countries generally outperform their
Western counterparts. They transpose EU legislation faster and also settle
infringement procedures more rapidly (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017,
p. 197ff.; Sedelmeier 2011, p. 26; Zhelyazkova et al. 2017, p. 223f.).
It has been repeatedly shown that administrative capacity serves as an
explanatory factor for this good compliance performance (Börzel et al.
et al. 2010; Falkner et al. 2004; Hille and Knill 2016). Especially, in the
policy field under scrutiny, the administration in ECE countries had a
shaping power while the policy field was developed during the EU acces-
sion phase when it efficiently implemented the strict EU conditionality.
According to this line of reasoning, ECE countries with a high admin-
istrative efficiency and specialised bureaucracy achieve good compliance
as they successfully passed a stress test while adopting a huge amount
of legislation in quite a short period (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017,
Zhelyazkova et al. 2017, p. 231).
Part of this explanation is the idea of a technocratic, non-political
administration which focuses on the efficient implementation of law.
Before Eastern enlargement, the reform of the ECE countries’ centralised
and then over-politicised administrations (Goetz and Wollmann 2001)
was part of the EU conditions for accession. By setting a de-politicised
bureaucracy as a precondition for acceding the EU, the Commission
sought to prevent party patronage (Meyer-Sahling 2006, p. 9). It there-
fore closely monitored especially the de-politicisation of the senior civil
servants in order to separate politics and administration in the higher
ranks below the political leadership (Meyer-Sahling 2011, p. 239f.).
Scholars expected that this strong technocratisation in the accession
process could be at the expense of elected political actors in the post-
accession period (Lippert et al. 2001, p. 982f.). They assumed the
decoupling of the administrative execution and party politics would
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continue even after the EU accession. The costs of replacing the well-
trained, de-politicised and well-connected personnel would have been
too high to be replaced by—potentially less competent—party repre-
sentatives: “The growing involvement of the ministerial bureaucracy in
East Central European countries in EU policy, growing contacts, and
increasing investment in the competence levels of officials suggests that
the costs of replacing ministerial civil servants have been continuously
rising rather than decreasing and that the size of politicisation-free zones
in the ministerial bureaucracy is likely to grow” (Meyer-Sahling 2006,
p. 25f.).
In fact, the Czech Ministry of Interior is considered an institution that
was “perhaps the most thoroughly cleansed following the Velvet Revolu-
tion” (Shevel 2011, p. 196). It can be assumed that, among others, the
migration and refugee policy-executing body was detached from party
politics and the personnel had been exchanged before the EU acces-
sion. Experts confirmed that Czech asylum and migration has been a very
apolitical field until the refugee crisis and was mainly administrative and
bureaucratic (Author’s interviews, Prague, 23rd January 2018). The divi-
sion responsible, the Department of Asylum and Migration Policy at the
Ministry of Interior, has been led by Tomáš Haišman since 1993 for about
25 years (Shevel 2011, p. 197f.). It is considered that he was the main
driver and most experienced person of the domestic asylum and migration
policy. (Author’s interviews, Prague, 23rd January 2018)
In the Czech Republic, the new salience of the policy field provoked
an enhanced public contestation of the government when the relocation
scheme was announced in 2015. According to that, the mandatory model
of the relocation mechanism was considered as problematic across official
bodies (Author’s interviews, Prague, 23rd January 2018; 1st February
2018). In general, a compliant behaviour of the Czech government was
not to be expected in that matter: “How destructive was the discussion
about quotas as in our country. It destroyed the political will concerning a
real contribution in the EU framework to the migration crisis” (Author’s
interview, Prague, 18th January 2018).
Despite the politicisation of the policy field and the salience of the
EU relocation scheme, it was the policy-executing bureaucracy in its
daily practice which examined and decided upon asylum applications.
As various administrative employees underlined, their application of the
asylum law did not change (Author’s interviews, Prague, 18th January
2018; 29th January 2018). This puts the non-compliance of the Czech
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government in the case of the relocation scheme in a different light.
While the relocation mechanism was used by, inter alia, party politicians
to further polarise the policy field as a salient public issue, the politici-
sation of the policy field did not lead to non-compliance because of an
efficient and de-politicised bureaucracy.
In the Hungarian case, in contrast, it seems that the governmental
strategy of restructuring the state administration and its politicisation of
the policy field led to non-compliance. Though during the accession
period, a de-politicisation of senior civil servants has been monitored
by the Commission, the first Orbán government started to re-politicise
the administration in 2001. Senior civil servants were chosen due to
party preferences (Meyer-Sahling 2011, p. 247). When Orbán formed a
government for a second time in 2010, the political executive continued
to fill posts of the central government “with politically loyal, ‘reliable’ civil
servants” (Hajnal and Csengődi 2014, p. 49). Thus, a decade later, the
party politics of the governing parties and administrative executive have
been further coupled.
The government used the EU relocation scheme as “a net internal
game with a far reaching effect as it will push Hungary to the laggards
of the EU” (Author’s interview, Budapest, 19th October 2017). While
in the Czech Republic the administration in the policy field continued to
operate as before, in Hungary, there appears to be a political influence on
the relevant bureaucracy. As one of the interviewees from the Immigration
and Asylum Office stated “Our office has to wait […] and if in the future
a positive result could come from this debate and we will participate in
any way in the future relocation and resettlement programme, our office
could participate in this programme […] because we have the experience
from our previous resettlement programmes. If the situation will be so,
our office will be ready to implement” (Author’s interview, Budapest,
9th November 2017). These considerations let the non-compliance in the
relocation scheme appear different to the Czech case, and the rejection
of the relocation mechanism points to a more structural level of non-
compliance in the policy field.
5 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the politicisation of the asylum and migration
policies since 2015 and also examined the compliance performance in
Hungary and the Czech Republic. Combining expert interviews and
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findings from politicisation and compliance research, it suggests that the
raising salience of an issue affecting party programmes can affect the
compliance performance with EU standards, but that the level of the
administration’s politicisation intermediates this effect.
Empirically, the moment of the European refugee crisis and the rejec-
tion of the EU relocation scheme constituted a turning point. The
formerly rather “technical” policy field that was mainly managed by the
responsible administration became politicised. In the Czech Republic,
some party actors actively responded to the raised issue and new parties
emerged, although they would conform with the EU-critical position of
the national government in this policy field. In Hungary, actors from
opposition parties hardly mobilised and the issue was mainly raised by the
government. However, in the Czech case, the politicisation of the policy
field did not lead to a broader non-compliance, and so far, only the relo-
cation scheme has not been adhered to. As for Hungary, non-compliance
with EU law has increased.
To explain these differences, the chapter drew on studies on the acces-
sion process. They highlight that de-politicisation of the administration
was a precondition to join the EU and that a de-politicised bureaucracy
manages the implementation of EU law efficiently.
In the Czech Republic, this was undoubtedly the case, but in Hungary,
the asylum-related administration, like other bureaucratic fields, has
become increasingly re-politicised during the last decade. Since party poli-
tics of the governing parties and the administrative executive’s action
have been further coupled, the politicised state administration followed
the government’s approach of non-compliance with EU law in the policy
field.
These results are of utmost importance for research on the relation-
ship between the EU and its member states as well as domestic policy
patterns. While studies of illiberal backsliding in ECE often focus on
institutional reforms, administrations have received less attention. Future
studies will hence need to observe their influence upon mechanisms of
politicisation and compliance in greater detail (see also Chapter 14).
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CHAPTER 7
Pro-Europeans and ‘Euro-Realists’: The
Party-Voters Linkage and Parties’ Political
Agendas in Poland, 2004–2019
Michał Dulak
1 Introduction
After the parliamentary election in autumn 2015, the coalition govern-
ment under the right-wing Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość—
PiS) party’s leadership undertook several decisions that put Poland’s
government at loggerheads with the European Commission. Conflicts
arose on a wide range of issues including the government’s attempts
to curb the media, the logging of Europe’s oldest forest and the
refugee relocation scheme. Among them, the most profound and widely
commented on was the judiciary reform that led to triggering the Article
7 procedure of the Treaty on European Union and the rule of law related
infringement procedures.
Such developments suggest that the EU rule violations are not isolated
cases but rather reflect a strategy of transforming Poland from the model
of a pro-integration East Central European (ECE) member state into
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another ‘trouble-maker’ in the time of crises rocking the EU boat. Put in
the broader context of democratic backsliding in ECE countries (Rupnik
2007; Ágh 2014, 2015; Berend and Bugaric 2015; Hanley and Dawson
2016; Krastev 2018), it can be hypothesised that the illiberal turn in
Poland is linked with a process of de-Europeanisation which is being
forced by the PiS government. This chapter examines if party manifestos
are de-Europeanised and if this reflects the parties’ electorates attitudes.1
In representative democracies, the political agenda is, inter alia,
shaped by voters’ preferences. Since parties are interested in attracting
a maximum of votes, the concept of party-voters linkage suggests that
they are influenced by societal attitudes to de-Europeanise their polit-
ical agendas or restrain from doing so. To test this assumption, this
study covers Poland’s EU membership period from 2004 to 2019 and
the two main political parties which were the leaders in governing coali-
tions since 2005, the liberal-conservative PO and the conservative PiS.
Particular attention will be paid to the period of the conflicts with the
EU during the second PiS government in 2015–2019, which so far
has not been thoroughly analysed by political scientists. Interpreting the
data with reference to the previous majority cabinets, when the Plat-
forma Obywatelska-Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PO-PSL) centre-right
coalition government was at the helm, allows us to gain broader compar-
ative evidence of the illiberal trends among political parties and societal
attitudes in the last several years in Poland.
The first section lays down the conceptual ground of the study. It
argues that the de-Europeanisation of parties’ political agendas can take
different forms and theorises how parties react to societal preferences.
Therefore, it uses a mainly qualitative approach to analyse the party-voters
linkage. The second section sketches the development of party positions
on various aspects of European integration and explains how far they
reflect the preferences of the parties’ respective electorates. The third
section does the same for the time since 2015 when the conflicts between
the Polish governments and the EU increased. The chapter concludes
with a summary of the main findings.
1For further reflections on the linkages between parties and voters, see Chapter 3.
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2 Forms and Rationale
of Programmatic De-Europeanisation
The party-voters linkage is one of the fundamentals of representative
democracies. In such systems, the political parties are the carriers of the
representation and deliberation in parliaments. Voters express their expec-
tations towards given political issues either in opinion polls or by casting
their votes during the elections. Since the parties seek societal support
for their political agendas, the voters’ preferences can to some extent
shape their programmes. The political agenda serves then as a code of
conduct for the representatives in the legislature while deliberating, voting
or controlling the government. This follows the standard rational choice
explanation of human behaviour in democratic systems, which underlines
that voters choose representatives that can maximise their preferences
(Downs 1957). It can also be easily applied to political positions on
European integration.
Democratic backsliding is marked by the weakening of political insti-
tutions of a democratic system, a decrease of quality in policy-making and
the reshaping of political procedures in order to serve the objectives of
an even more centralized and authoritarian government (Cianetti et al.
2018; Karolewski and Benedikter 2017; Sadurski 2018). As these devel-
opments collide with the EU’s foundational principles, it seems likely that
democratic backsliding affects Poland’s European policy. In order to test
this assumption, we can use the concept of de-Europeanisation. Origi-
nally, this term referred to changes in direction and content of the foreign
policy of neighbouring EU countries, which turn their backs on the asso-
ciation or accession process. Today, de-Europeanisation has also become
identified with the broader phenomenon of EU disintegration in the face
of crises (Vollaard 2014, 2018; Schmitter and Lefkofridi 2016; Rosamond
2019).
It is commonly accepted that de-Europeanisation is not a simple linear
process of reversing the achievement of Europeanisation (see also Chap-
ters 6 and 12). The following analysis of de-Europeanisation of the
political agenda pursued by parties, therefore, focuses on specific forms
of de-Europeanisation (Jańczak 2010) and how they may influence a
commitment of the member states regarding policies and decision-making
in the EU (Schmitter 1970; Schmitter and Lefkofridi 2016). Following
Jańczak (2010, pp. 102–106), de-Europeanisation is not limited to
decreasing the current level achieved in a given field or the ‘withdrawal’
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from the EU, but can also include a refocusing, customisation and a new
priority setting as distinct forms of de-Europeanisation (Jańczak 2010,
pp. 104–106).
Refocusing refers to the reduction of public interest in EU matters.
It occurs when parties succeed in putting other issues on the political
agenda. They can do it by channels of communication like manifestos or
media. The second form mentioned by Jańczak—customisation—relates
to bottom-up Europeanisation. By forcing national rules and norms into
EU policies and legislation, member states weaken the Europeanisation
process. This form, however, does not necessarily mean withdrawal from
pursuing the integration objectives of the whole EU or reducing the
state’s commitment. The customisation would be primarily used by a
ruling party as the government has the power to coordinate European
policy of a given country. The third form—modified priority setting—
refers to the already successfully Europeanised fields where new solutions
proposed by a member state collide with European ones or are a return to
the old solutions. This form of de-Europeanisation can be implemented
either by the opposition parties or by ruling parties; nonetheless, the latter
are again more privileged as their proposals are often taken by the media
and other politicians as a formal position of government.
When the de-Europeanisation of the ruling parties’ political agendas
influence the commitment of the member states regarding policies and
decision-making in the EU, we are facing what neo-functionalists call a
‘spill back’ of integration, i.e. the withdrawal of a political actor from the
original objective and downgrading its commitment in integration struc-
tures (Schmitter 1970, p. 840). Eventually, ‘spill back’ can end up with
leaving the participation in a given policy and even with the voluntary exit
of a member state from the EU. As Schmitter and Lefkofridi (2016, p. 3)
argue, “(…) such ‘spillbacks’ are fervently advocated by parties on the
radical left and right (albeit for different reasons)”. De-Europeanisation
connects with ‘spill back’ in such a way that the former precedes the latter.
Therefore, the milder forms of de-Europeanisation proposed by
Jańczak (2010, pp. 102–106) can nevertheless ultimately result in parties’
activities which eventually impede the commitment of the member states
regarding EU policies. However, before the parties decide to pull the
public interest away from EU matters (refocusing), to re-nationalise the
European agenda (customisation) or to propose a new agenda which
collides with already existing European solutions (priority setting), they
will probably try to find societal support for such activities.
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Hitherto, empirical studies have shown that in the field of European
integration the party-voter link is not a one-way street and that the
connection between party positions and voters’ opinions is dependent
on certain conditions. The party’s responsiveness to changes in voters’
opinions in EU-related issues (bottom-up relation) dominates when elec-
torates have systemic and predictable preferences (Carruba 2001; Tillman
2004). Even if the voters’ rationality is bounded by little information or
disinterest, their positions on the EU are clearly guided by the extent to
which they benefit from European integration (Gabel 1998; Gabel and
Palmer 1995).
As European integration embraces more and more policy areas, it
becomes increasingly complex and harder to understand by the public.
In such a situation, a ‘top-down’ relation between parties and electorate
dominates. Voters have limited ability to gain information on technical
issues, and in consequence, to formulate structured positions on Euro-
pean integration. In this situation, voters can choose based on their
left-right positions or using other shortcuts to make sense of the EU
policy issue or take cues from the parties on what to think about a
given issue (Carruba 2001; Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004; Gabel and
Anderson 2004, pp. 13–31; Hellström 2008; see also Chapter 3).
Given these ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ relations between party posi-
tions and voters’ opinions, we can identify three factors explaining the
de-Europeanisation of the parties’ political agendas. The first is based on
a pragmatic approach. When voters do not care about EU issues, i.e. if an
issue is within the electorate’s ‘zone of acquiescence’ (Carruba 2001),
parties do not compete on that issue (De Vries 2007, pp. 363–385).
The second factor is rational. According to this approach, parties deem-
phasise EU issues if their party position is far from the average voter’s
attitude (Steenbergen and Scott 2004, pp. 165–192). EU issues are also
neglected in the party’s political manifesto when the voters are divided
on EU-related questions (Hellström and Blomgren 2016, pp. 269–270).
The third factor affecting whether or not parties emphasise EU issues is
the scope of a party’s voters’ disunity on the given EU issue (Hellström
and Blomgren 2016, pp. 265–282). When a party encounters severe
internal conflict, or is split on the EU issue (Steenbergen and Scott 2004,
pp. 165–192), and at the same time a parallel division does not occur
among party voters, the party leadership can deter internal debate on EU
issues.
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All three above-mentioned situations lead to excluding or deempha-
sising EU issues from their political agendas, which are examples of the
de-Europeanisation of parties’ programmes. This elucidates that profound
analyses of the parties’ strategies must necessarily go into the details of a
national context and interpret the data against the background of the
national debates and domestic political processes. This is done in the
following analysis which uses two types of qualitative data. First, the
national social surveys on attitudes towards the EU in Poland. They have
been conducted by one of the main social research centres—Centrum
Badania Opinii Społecznej (CBOS)—since the beginning of Poland’s
EU membership. CBOS collects data annually, using the same question-
naires which provide detailed data referring to the specific EU issues
dividing party electorates. The second type of data used in this section
is the parties’ political manifestos issued since 2004. These data are
contextualised by more complex observations of the parties’ actions and
interplay.
3 Parties’ Political Agendas and Voters’
Attitudes Regarding the EU in Poland Until 2015
Political parties in Poland started to be more interested in specific EU
matters with a delay, and their attention was dependent on the phases
of the integration process. During the 1990s and until 2004, all parties
generally declared that they fully support Poland’s EU membership. The
closer to the accession, the more the divisions between parties over
the EU issues have become apparent. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century, Polish politicians started commonly using labels such as
Euro-enthusiasts, Eurosceptics or ‘Euro-realists’ in public debates. As the
project of the Constitution for Europe failed and the following debate
over the institutional reform proceeded, political parties in Poland also
started to formulate more precise positions on specific EU policies. Since
2007, the parties’ views on European integration and EU policies have
been incorporated into the manifestos usually as a separate issue of the
parties’ political agendas but with strong links with internal policies as
well as with foreign ones (Pacześniak 2013).
Figure 1 shows that in 2007 the positive attitude of Polish society
towards the country’s EU membership was one of the highest. Since then,
the percentage of declared supporters is between 80 and 90% no matter
whether the government was conservative (PiS) or liberal-conservative














































































































































































































































































































































(PO-PSL). The only drop, where sceptical opinions for membership
presented one-fifth of Poles, was visible between 2010 until the second
half of 2013 (a decrease by 14 percentage points). One potential expla-
nation for this drop is the increasing unemployment rate between July
2010 (11.5%) and February 2013 (14.4%). After this period, the situa-
tion on the labour market stabilised, the unemployment rate started to
fall and the level of support for Poland’s EU membership came back to
the previous level.
A deeper analysis of the parties’ electorates and specific issues which
concerned them reveals that the PiS electorate is more diverse regarding
their opinions on Poland’s EU membership than the PO electorate. In the
case of PiS (Fig. 2), attitudes correspond with the general trend displayed
in Fig. 1. Since 2007, there was a slow decline of the number of EU
supporters among the PiS electorate, which probably can be explained in
this case either by the ‘unemployment factor’ or by being the opposition
in the years 2007–2015. In comparison, the PO electorate’s opinion on












2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
First PiS gov First PO-PSL gov Second PO-PSL gov Second PiS gov
Supporters Opponents Undecided
Fig. 2 Attitudes towards Poland’s EU membership in PiS electorate 2005–2019
(Source Own study based on data from Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej—
CBOS [Social Opinion Research Centre], www.cbos.pl. Survey question: What
is your attitude to Poland’s membership in the EU?)
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of opponents in the years 2012–2013, which can be explained by the
aforementioned increase in the unemployment rate (Fig. 3).
The analysis of the electorate attitudes towards four specific issues
regarding European integration and the EU—further deepening, national
sovereignty, the future vision of Poland and the EU, and joining the
EMU—shows that the PiS electorate is generally more divided (Figs. 4,
5, 6, and 7). The PO electorate, in contrast, is unequivocal in supporting
the deepening of EU integration. PO voters obviously do not regard inte-
gration as a limitation for Poland’s sovereignty. The only issue causing
reservations in the electorate of PO is joining the EMU and accepting
the Euro currency.
Between 2004 and 2015, the status of the European agenda in the
political manifestos of PO evolved from a barely mentioned topic to the
issue that intertwined all aspects of political and social life (Master 2014,
pp. 48–57). In its first programmes before the accession, PO viewed
the EU not as something limiting national sovereignty but as a chance
to protect and consolidate it (Master 2014, p. 49). In the 2005 and













2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
First PiS gov First PO-PSL gov Second PO-PSL gov Second PiS gov
Supporters Opponents Undecided
Fig. 3 Attitudes towards Poland’s EU membership in PO electorate 2005–
2019 (Source Own study based on data from Centrum Badania Opinii
Społecznej—CBOS [Social Opinion Research Centre], www.cbos.pl. Survey
















Fig. 4 Attitudes of PiS and PO electorate towards European Integration,
percentage of average answers 2013–2019 (Source Own study based on data from
Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej—CBOS [Social Opinion Research Centre],
www.cbos.pl; Question asked: Some believe that Europe should unite even more.














Fig. 5 Attitudes of PiS and PO electorate towards state’s sovereignty in the
EU, percentage of average answers 2014–2016 (Source Own study based on
data from Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej—CBOS [Social Opinion Research
Centre], www.cbos.pl; Question asked: Which of the statements regarding the
state’s sovereignty in the EU do you agree with?)










Fig. 6 PiS and PO electorate’s attitudes on the Euro, percentage of average
answers 2017–2018 (Source Own study based on data from Centrum Badania
Opinii Społecznej—CBOS [Social Opinion Research Centre], www.cbos.pl;
Question asked: Would you agree to replace the Polish currency (złoty) with
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Fig. 7 Visions of PiS and PO electorate about the future of Poland and the EU,
percentage of average answers 2017–2018 (Source Own study based on data from
Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej—CBOS [Social Opinion Research Centre],
www.cbos.pl, Question asked: Which of the possible visions of the future of
Poland and the European Union you personally most like?)
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sovereignty is the main purpose of the Polish foreign policy, which could
be achieved by Poland’s membership in NATO and the EU (Instytut
Państwa i Administracji 2005). Moreover, PO underlined the need for
creating a new concept of Poland’s sovereignty within the EU, which
would strengthen the state’s position and allow them to realise the raison
d’état (PO 2007, pp. 10f., 74f.).
In both programmes, PO generally declared that Poland would join
the EMU because of its positive impact on the national economy but
simultaneously underlined that the country had not fulfilled all conver-
gence criteria. Interestingly, the 2005 programme proposed a timetable
for joining the EMU, while in the 2007 programme, PO resigned from
fixing a specific date for accepting the Euro currency.
In both previously mentioned programmes, as well as in the 2011
programme, there was no concrete vision of the EU in the future. Such
issues were mentioned only in speeches and declarations of members of
the government, which are not analysed here (Master 2014, p. 53f.).
In the 2011 PO political programme, no separate EU issues were high-
lighted and generally all proposals referring to national public policies
were presented from Poland’s perspective as an EU member (PO 2011;
Master 2014, p. 52).
During the first two years of Poland’s membership in the EU, the
second party analysed in this chapter presented a more detailed vision
of the national European policy and future of the EU than PO. In 2004,
PiS adopted two manifestos especially prepared for the election to the
European Parliament. According to them, the EU should be a strong
association of sovereign nation states. Such a ‘Europe of Nations’ should
be based on solidarity and Christian values which were also underlined
by the founding fathers of the European Communities (Staszczyk 2016,
p. 178).
In the 2005 manifesto, PiS presented a complex vision on EU matters,
which were included in the chapter on foreign policy. It criticised the
proposal of deepening integration presented in the Constitutional Treaty
in 2004 and underlined the primacy of national law over European law.
More precisely, PiS articulated six goals of European policy: accepting
that NATO is a fundamental guarantee of Europe’s security, the invio-
lability of Poland’s sovereignty, maintaining the Nice system of voting
in the Council, maintaining unanimity when deciding on treaty changes,
maintaining the independence of Poland’s economy within the common
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market and maintaining the financial solidarity in regional policy of the
EU (PiS 2005, pp. 38–53).
Those positions clearly put PiS in a neorealist paradigm (Staszczyk
2016, pp. 169–183). The party defined itself as a supporter of intergov-
ernmental cooperation within the EU, who argues for the elimination
of economic inequalities between ‘old’ member states and those which
joined in 2004. The following manifestos from 2007, 2009 and 2011 did
not refer extensively to EU issues. They generally repeated the political
line exposed in previous programmes. Contrary to PO which saw the EU
as a community, PiS perceived it as an international organisation: “The
European Union and similar international organisations, although they
can pursue various purposes for good, for obvious reasons are not able
to become democratic structures replacing national member states; these
countries must remain a strong anchor to prevent the abuse of European
institutions for bureaucratic manipulations, forcing ideological utopias or
for protecting strong nationalisms” (PiS 2009, p. 10).
Thus, PiS opposed all federalist tendencies within the EU, which
should be rather the union of sovereign states (PiS 2011, p. 219). Despite
this general intergovernmental stance, the party also stated that it is
Poland’s interest that the European Commission stays as independent as
possible, serving as a decision centre which can resist the pressure from
the strongest European players (PiS 2011, p. 223).
In its 2014 political programme, PiS again embedded EU issues within
the broader context of Polish foreign policy but simultaneously tried to
draw a new strategy for Poland in times of EU crisis. The core position
was, however, unchanged and referred to the rule of solidarity among
cooperating nation states under the international law and within the
framework of national constitutions (PiS 2014, p. 155). PiS also presented
a future model of the EU according to which the answer to the problems
of European integration cannot be an urge for more integration, or more
centralisation, but instead a call for more freedom and solidarity. The EU
should strive to become polycentric with many regional centres, not the
core one within the Eurozone where peripheries are dependent on it.
The EU should be composed of equal nation states and the law should
be deregulated. The EU should be democratic, open to new members
and solidary, which for PiS means that the EU evolves with the pace of
its weakest member. Finally, the EU should be built “(…) on the roots of
civilisational identity, not social constructivism” (PiS 2014, pp. 158–159).
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The Euro currency was addressed in all political programmes of PiS
since 2005. The position, however, evolved from careful scepticism to
hard rejection of any possibility to join the EMU. In 2005, PiS argued
that Poland’s economy was still adapting to the competitiveness condi-
tions within the EU and that accepting the Euro currency would not
be recommended until the benefits would be higher than the costs (PiS
2005, p. 62f.). In the 2011 programme, joining the EMU was no longer
considered, and in 2014, the party made clear that Poland under the PiS
government will keep the Polish Zloty and a quick decision on joining
the EMU would be a political mistake and irresponsible for the Polish
economy (PiS 2014, p. 74).
4 Parties’ Political Agendas and Voters’
Attitudes Regarding the EU in Poland Since 2015
In 2015, a new issue dominated the political programmes of both parties.
Migration to the EU hit its peak in October that year, causing pressure
to the external borders of the EU and its asylum system. In Poland, the
migration crisis coincided with the campaign for the parliamentary elec-
tion. The positions on how Poland should commit to this issue were one
of the main lines of political rivalry between PO and PiS. At that time,
the polls showed that PiS had a growing chance to form a government
after the elections in autumn.
PO chose a dual strategy. On the one hand, it defended the govern-
ment decision on the relocation scheme from September 2015 under-
lining the need for solidarity among member states facing the humani-
tarian crisis in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it emphasised that
the national government should keep control over separating the legal
and illegal migrants (PO 2015, p. 66f.).
In sharp contrast to its former programmes, EU issues formed one
of the priorities for the PO in its 2015 programme. It straightforwardly
declared itself as a pro-European party (PO 2015, p. 65) and stated
that the EU organisational structures enable Poland to realise its national
strategic interest: “We believe that effective pursuit of the implementation
of Polish strategic goals does not consist in contesting the achievements
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of a united Europe, but in efficiently putting our reasons into an all-
European interest and maximising our impact on the course of events”
(PO 2015, p. 65).2
PO generally supported intensifying European integration and
opposed the Europe of a different speed or two-tier Europe. But instead
of presenting a future vision of Poland and Europe, the proposal for
deepening political integration referred mainly to the deepening of the
integration of the common market and to limit protectionism (PO 2015,
p. 66f.). A more integrated EU in those fields was also presented as
a protection from outside threats. In 2015, PO described its position
towards the Euro as ‘reasonable’, underlining that Poland should take
care that the Eurozone will be open in the future for new members but
at the same time emphasising that both sides need to be ready for joining
the EMU.
In 2015, the PO position on the Euro currency highly corresponded
with its electorate attitudes presented in Fig. 6. Generally, the call for
deepening the integration in the common market is coherent with almost
60% of their voters. But at the same time, PO did not want to discourage
the rest of their voters who were reluctant, ambivalent or supported the
status quo. Similarly, PO followed its voters’ attitudes towards the concept
of national sovereignty within the EU, although not using this term liter-
ally. The party stated that there is no contradiction between pursuing the
national interest and supporting European integration.
It is worth highlighting that PO did not mention any proposal of
deeper political integration, focusing instead on intensifying cooperation
in the common market. This may be intentional as, since 2004, the party
has not presented in its manifestos a precise and unequivocal position
on a direction of political integration of the EU. Such ‘balance strategy’
seems to be a nod to the almost one-fourth of party supporters who are
ambivalent whether Europe should further integrate.
In the election campaign of 2019, PO formed a broader political coali-
tion named Citizens’ Coalition, but still it has been the biggest party
within. The 2019 Citizens’ Coalition’s political programme called for a
pragmatic European policy of Poland. Contrary to the 2015 manifesto,
PO and the other smaller coalition parties did not label themselves as pro-
European. Instead, they proposed that Poland needs to become again one
2All quotes from party manifestos are own translations. There are no sources in English.
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of the leaders in the EU, because only in this way would it be possible to
pursue Poland’s interest and form alliances for the sake of the EU. There-
fore, Poland’s European policy should not be driven by “(…) ideological
phobias and devastation of the rule of law as the PiS government does
it nowadays” (PO 2019, p. 43). According to PO and Citizens’ Coali-
tion, Poland should closely cooperate with Germany and France, which
would allow Poland to become a linkage for the Baltic countries, states
from East and Central Europe and the Danube region. Similarly, as in
previous years, in the programme from 2019 more detailed EU issues
were interwoven in the sectoral agenda.
In the PiS political programme from 2019, Poland’s European policy
was presented as a part of broader foreign policy, similar to the
programme from 2014. PiS for the first time labelled itself in a mani-
festo as a “Euro-realistic” party. This means, according to PiS, that “(…)
Europe will be stronger thanks to the sovereign and dynamic Poland, but
at the same time membership in any international organisation cannot
infringe Polish statehood” (PiS 2019, p. 177). Following this rule, PiS has
adopted a hard position regarding the relocation mechanism, sustaining
Polish national currency, renegotiation of the energy and climate package
in accordance of Polish interests and protecting the trade of Polish land
from the speculation of foreign investors (PiS 2019, p. 178). According
to PiS, Poland’s membership in the EU is a historic chance to accelerate
the country’s development. Due to this fact, the PiS government in the
years 2015–2019 struggled to dynamise the EU based on “(…) solidarity
rule and cooperation of member states within the Lisbon treaty legal
framework and basing on Poland’s constitutions” (PiS 2019, p. 178).
Similarly to PO, PiS also seems to be consistent with its voters’ opin-
ions on EU-related issues. The strong focus on strengthening the identity
and position of the nation states within the EU, which corresponds with
the electorate’s stances (Fig. 7), led the party to support de Gaulle’s
concept of a “Europe of Nations”. This proposal, however, does not speak
to those party voters who call for a more integrated Europe and do not
see the EU as a threat to Poland’s sovereignty. Instead, they can find in
the last party manifesto, as well as in previous ones, proposals for a decen-
tralisation of the EU, more solidarity referring to the cohesion policy and
fostering the intergovernmental cooperation based on freedom. A strong
connection between a party’s position and its voters’ opinions is most
visible in the case of the Euro currency. Between 2012 and 2017, the
opponents of joining the EMU among PiS voters rose by 10 percentage
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points—from 74 to 84% and finally reached 87% in 2018. This was already
mapped in the firm position presented in the 2014 manifesto.
In general, both PO and PiS try to maintain consistency between their
political agendas regarding the EU or they focus only on the general
aspects without going into the details of European integration and EU
policies, both of which seem a safe solution either for the party majority or
the majority of the electorate. However, one can also observe deviations
from voters’ preferences.
PO urged for more economic integration, although the majority of
the party’s voters support a more in-depth political integration, which,
seeing as this party is labelled as pro-European, can be understood almost
as consent for more federal solutions in the EU. PiS called for stronger
cooperation of sovereign nation states based on freedom and solidarity,
avoiding this way to show concrete areas where such type of cooperation
will be implemented. This approach seems to be a nod to the 25–35% of
PiS voters but does not include the positions of around 60% of the party’s
voters who are supporters of a status quo of European integration or who
declared themselves as supporters of a more integrated EU.
While PiS does not label itself as a pro-European party, its current self-
positioning as a “Euro-realistic” party includes the maintenance of EU
membership. The only issue which put the party’s proposal on divergent
trajectories with the rest of the EU is the rejection of adopting the Euro
currency. While such a position is coherent with the party’s electorate
attitudes, it is an example of ‘spill-back’, as it goes against accession treaty
obligations Poland has previously agreed on.
Other examples of de-Europeanisation of PiS policy agenda are
customisation and refocusing of EU issues. PiS in its manifestos supports
deregulation of EU law, more democratic solutions, openness to new
members, references to the Christian roots of European civilisation,
rejecting social constructivism and advocating more solidarity in the EU,
which for PiS means that the EU in its political objectives should take into
consideration a different level of development of some of the member
states. Such an agenda is an example of introducing new topics into
mainstream narration regarding the EU.
5 Conclusions
Starting from the observation that illiberal trends have deteriorated EU-
Polish relations, the aim of this chapter was to examine whether these
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developments went along with a de-Europeanisation of the programmes
of the two main parties in Poland and whether this reflected their voters’
attitudes towards the EU.
The contribution first described the theory of party-voters linkage and
different forms of de-Europeanisation that go beyond the mere call for
an EU exit as well as different strategies to respond to the voters’ pref-
erences. To capture these nuances, a qualitative study for the Polish case
was conducted which focused on the party programmes and societal atti-
tudes and embedded their interpretation in the deeper domestic political
context.
The analysis has shown that in general, both PO and PiS try to corre-
spond to their voters’ attitudes be it by particular preferences or by
formulating vague general goals concerning European integration and
EU policies. PO positioned itself as pro-European while avoiding this
term since 2015. PiS called for stronger cooperation of sovereign nation
states based on freedom and solidarity and, in 2019, started to coin its
position as ‘Euro-realistic’. The only issue where the government openly
rejects further integration is the Euro currency.
The data indicate that this restraint regarding further integration and
the refusal to participate in another policy arena at the EU level is
coherent with the party’s electorate attitudes. Only PiS de-Europeanised
to some extent its political agenda, which was related to differentiated
positions among the party’s electorate over EU issues. Examples of its
customisation and refocusing of EU issues are its support for deregu-
lating EU law, openness to new members, references to the Christian
roots of European civilisation, rejecting social constructivism and taking
into consideration different levels of development of some of the member
states.
These findings suggest that as long as the support in Polish society
for the EU membership is high, radical de-Europeanisation of parties’
political agendas—like calls for withdrawal from the EU—seem to be
rather unlikely. Instead, de-Europeanisation will be limited to customisa-
tion and refocusing of EU issues within the political manifestos. But this
is only the rhetorical dimension of supply and support in the narrower
set of EU-related issues. In practice, the mainly status quo-oriented EU
programme by PiS went hand in hand with a confrontational policy by its
governments vis-à-vis EU institutions. Thus, even pro-European decla-
rations in parties’ programmes do not restrain parties from running a
policy of a different character (for differences between rhetoric and action,
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see Chapters 5 and 6). In the long run, such a policy of confrontation
might foster Eurosceptical attitudes in society with party-programmatic
de-Europeanisation as a response (see Chapter 3). But so far, we have not
found the respective empirical evidence.
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CHAPTER 8
Same Same, but Different: Domestic
Conditions of Illiberal Backlash Against




Across Central Europe, the ‘refugee crisis’, which dominated the media
between 2015 and 2018, led to an increased mobilisation along the
cultural dimension (Buštíková and Guasti 2017; Guasti and Buštíková
2020). The cultural dimensions can take on different forms: confessional
versus secular (Poland), or cosmopolitan cities versus the more socially
conservative and sometimes nationalistic countryside (Hungary, but to
a lesser degree, most of the ECE region). Cultural conflicts can also
revolve around ethnic minority issues (Roma, language rights—Romania,
Hungary, but again to a lesser degree, across the region) and new minori-
ties (LGBT, gender equality) (Jasiewicz 2007; Buštíková 2014, 2017,
2019; Guasti 2019, 2020; Guasti and Buštíková 2020).
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Even countries where the cultural dimension was dormant are expe-
riencing its resurgence (Jasiewicz 2007, 2009; Brokl and Mansfeldova
1999; Guasti and Buštíková 2020; Norocel 2018). Conservative groups,
the Catholic Church and the radical right, as well as radicalised main-
stream politicians, are increasingly adopting the populist majoritarian
anti-LGBT and anti-‘gender ideology’ rhetoric. Beyond the rhetoric,
these actors are also blocking pro-universal rights legislation (marriage
for all in the Czech Republic) and running political campaigns on the
rollback of universal rights (restriction on abortion in Slovakia). These
dynamics are an integral part of the illiberal backlash.
The illiberal backlash centres around the notion of sovereignty. It
rejects demands for universal rights as foreign—forced on the country
by the European Union or the Council of Europe (CoE). In this view,
‘members of “non-minorities” are discriminated against and deprived of
basic civic freedoms’ (Normal Man Manifesto 20171). The ongoing back-
lash against the CoE Convention on preventing and combatting violence
against women and domestic violence, the so-called Istanbul Conven-
tion, exemplifies how opponents are raging against the alleged spread of
‘gender ideology’ at the expense of sovereignty, traditions and customs.
The European Union has been vilified for triggering an illiberal backlash
in East Central Europe (ECE) because it has pushed the new member
states to accommodate minority demands (Agarin 2020; Bochsler and
Juon 2020; Kolev 2020).
However, using historical institutionalism for a comparison of domestic
processes around minority rights in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
the present chapter will show that the European Union’s effect on the
conflicts over minority rights is much weaker than suspected. While the
EU and the Council of Europe provide a framework of LGBT rights and
gender equality, the mechanics of the member states’ backlash against
minority accommodation can be mainly attributed to the domestic clashes
between progressive and conservative forces aided by their transnational
allies. As a result of different domestic configurations, some European
norms take root, while in other cases, domestic actors seek not only to
prevent accommodation but increasingly to roll back rights. The 2006
registered partnership law and the law against domestic violence in the
Czech Republic (2006) are examples of the former—the Slovak 2015
1https://www.normalman.cz/hamplproc.
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anti-LGBT referendum, the 2020 proposals of limiting abortion rights
in Slovakia and the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention in February
2020 of the latter.
In order to trace back the mechanisms leading to these diverging
patterns of illiberalism and anti-EU politics, two case studies are
conducted for the legislative handling of LGBT rights and the Istanbul
Convention in both Czechia and Slovakia. They show that strong advo-
cacy groups help to mobilise support for legal change. At the same time,
the legal status quo persists if the political costs of minority accommo-
dation become too high for domestic political actors and if a strong
normative commitment and societal consensus is lacking. To demon-
strate this, the chapter first theorises institutional change and describes
institutions and the European legal framework regarding minority rights.
Next, the case studies on LGBT legislation and the non-ratification of the
Istanbul Convention are presented. A concluding chapter summarises the
main results.
2 Institutions and the European
Legal Framework
An institutionalist approach enables us to frame the dynamics between
the European legal (and normative) framework and domestic actors
(Mahoney and Thelen 2009; Hall and Thelen 2009; Streeck and Thelen
2009). It explains not only why change happens, but also why institu-
tional inertia (i.e. lack of change) persists (cf. Guasti and Buštíková 2019).
The key factor in change is the cost of changing the status quo, which
determines the willingness of domestic actors. Sanctions are an important
form of incentive. These might include the formal sanctions (Hall and
Thelen 2009) of the European Union and Council of Europe.
The EU sanctions include anti-discrimination rulings by domestic
Constitutional Courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU), whereas the Council of Europe sanctions include rulings of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Both types of ruling are
against states (Guasti 2017; Guasti et al. 2017; Guasti and Buštíková
2019). Sanctions by the EU and the CoE can help us to understand
the behaviour of states, but they will not be as helpful in explaining the
variation in behaviour of domestic actors.
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While states are bound by European legal framework to eliminate
discrimination, it is in their discretion to grant rights to LGBT citi-
zens (registered partnership, marriage, adoptions). Institutional inertia
persists if it ‘serves’ the dominant actors (Hall 2005). In political compe-
tition, this means that (vote-seeking) mainstream catch-all parties will
be incentivised to adapt their behaviour according to the prevailing
public opinion. If public opinion indicates that a population is split on
granting adoption rights, or introducing gender education in schools,
mainstream parties will refrain from engaging in this agenda to avoid
injecting additional polarising cultural issues into the party competition.
The calculus of mainstream parties significantly differs from niche
parties, especially the radical right. Unlike mainstream parties, radical
right parties mobilise mainly on cultural cleavage. Salience of cultural
issues and increased polarisation along the cultural cleavage is beneficial
for niche parties. The case of public opinion on the Istanbul Conven-
tion shows that even if the majority (two-thirds in the case of the Czech
Republic in 2019) of the population has no opinion and the polarisa-
tion between proponents and opponents remains limited to about a third
of the population, mainstream political actors will avoid action, and the
radical right will push back against any new form of accommodation,
maintaining status quo.
Institutions and practices do evolve and change. The impetus for
change comes from actors, proponents and opponents of change (Hall
and Thelen 2009, p. 15). The change in the institutional framework of
other countries has essential spillover effects on domestic actors. The
expansion of LGBT rights in numerous countries in Europe provides
strong impetus for proponents of change. It also alarms its opponents
(see Guasti and Buštíková 2020). An international treaty such as the
Istanbul Convention, which came into force in August 2014, is yet
another example of how change can be triggered—driven by international
organisations. The diffusion of rights of sexual minorities and gender
equality in Europe significantly alters the domestic opportunity structures
for domestic change agents.
For East Central Europe, EU accession became a strong incentive to
modify, or even to resolve the relationship between the majority and the
established ‘old’ minority groups. The EU anchored the rule of law and
civil liberties in the EU anti-discrimination framework (Vachudova 2005).
The EU pressure to adopt anti-discrimination legislation was crucial,
as the commitment of domestic elites to minority rights was lacklustre
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(Agarin and Brossig 2016; Nancheva 2016; Rechel 2009; Börzel et al.
2015).
Minority accommodation evolved into a bargaining process, because
the EU lacked common minority standards or a minority rights regime,
and pre-accession funding that would directly target minority issues. The
EU pressure to resolve majority–minority issues prior to accession evolved
into a controversial double standard for the member states and the acces-
sion countries (Börzel et al. 2015; Nancheva 2016). To cope with the EU
pressure, the East Central European countries adapted to the require-
ments of the EU oversight, adopting primary legislation, establishing
institutions dealing with minority issues, building task forces and drafting
action plans. Actual implementation of reforms addressing minority issues
was not top of the agenda (Rechel 2009).
The strategy generally worked. When issues emerged, the EU selec-
tively applied leverage to enforce compliance and resolve these issues. To
illustrate, in 1998, the city of Ústí nad Labem erected a wall separating the
majority population from the Roma minority. What started as a dispute
of neighbours over trash collection and real estate values, escalated into a
small ethnic conflict that captured international headlines. The issue was
resolved in 1999. The wall was removed after the EU made clear that, as
long as the embarrassing wall stands, the EU accession process will halt
(cf. Mudde 2005, p. 41).
It is the agency of the domestic actors which accounts for the differ-
ences in the scope of minority accommodation across countries (cf. Börzel
et al. 2015). Beyond protecting minorities from worse forms of discrim-
ination (such as the case of spatial segregation in Ústí nad Labem),
the EU conditionality also impacted minorities indirectly by empowering
domestic actors. Civil society and liberal politicians were able to find
allies—transnational as well as domestic—to implement reforms, and to
demand that established anti-discrimination bodies actually pursue their
agenda (Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005).
After the accession, the EU leverage has decreased significantly, and
the role of domestic actors further increased. The European Union
continues to play an essential role in creating a legal framework of
anti-discrimination. While the EU prescribes non-discrimination—the
European Charter of Human Rights, adopted in 2000, gave the prin-
ciple of minority non-discrimination a constitutional status—it does not
provide guidelines for accommodation (Galbreath and McEvoy 2011;
O’Dwyer 2018, p. 900).
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The sanction mechanisms of the Court of Justice of the European
Union and the European Court of Human Rights play an essential legal
role by providing avenues for legal redress of minority rights violations.
However, domestic actors ultimately enable and enforce the minority
rights regime (cf. Guasti et al. 2017; Guasti and Siroky 2019). Minority
accommodation is now entirely under the control of domestic actors—the
courts (especially the Constitutional Court) and political actors. How this
relates to the European level is now illustrated in the examples of LGBT
rights and gender equality.
The EU anti-discrimination legislation concerning LGBT rights
evolved from provisions to combat discrimination on the grounds of
sexual orientation (Article 10 and 19 of the Amsterdam Treaty, Article
21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in effect since 2009), Citi-
zens’ Rights Directive, Employment Equality Framework Directive and
the European Court of Justice case law. Because of the freedom of move-
ment, all EU member states must ensure that where same-sex marriage
is not possible, employees in a civil partnership must be granted the
same benefits as their married colleagues (equal treatment, ECJ 2008
case Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der Deutschen Bühnen; and
2013 CJEU case Frédéric Hay v. Crédit Agricole mutual, C-267/12).
Furthermore, EU member states have to recognise same-sex marriage to
EU citizens from other EU member states for granting residency (Coman
and Hamilton versus Romania 2018).
Furthermore, over the past decade, the case law of the ECtHR evolved
from recognising the right of same-sex couples to family life, but not
their entitlement to registered partnership or marriage (2010 Schalk and
Kopf versus Austria). The ruling also banned the exclusion of same-sex
couples from a legal form of partnership, where those exist for opposite-
sex couples (2013, Vallianatos and others v Greece). It set a precedent
by establishing a legal obligation for states to provide legal recognition
for same-sex couples (2015, Oliari and others v Italy) and reconfirmed
that denial of marriage for same-sex couples does not violate the ECtHR
(2016, Chapin and Charpentier versus France).
The sanction mechanisms to enforce the implementation of the
ECtHR judgements are significantly less potent than those following the
failure to implement the CJEU case law (Guasti et al. 2017). However,
most of the ECtHR judgements resulted in the expansion of LGBT
rights. For example, as of 2019, Austria and France allow same-sex
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marriage, while both Greece and Italy provide same-sex couples the
opportunity to enter into a registered partnership.
In this way, the EU legislation, the CJEU case law and, to a lesser
degree, the ECtHR case law represent an essential impulse for insti-
tutional change in the EU and Council of Europe member states.
Transnational legislation constrains the legal options of domestic actors
that oppose the expansion of LGBT rights. At the same time, their exis-
tence also enhances the perceived threat from the attempts of LGBT
advocates and their allies to change the status quo.
Actors, such as pro- and anti-LGBT advocacy groups and polit-
ical parties, are key players to institutional change. The expansion of
LGBT rights takes place because of the varying degree of agency of
proponents and opponents of accommodation and their ability to find
political allies. The agency of a pro- and anti-LGBT advocacy groups
is significantly affected by two factors: resources (including international
financial support) and calculation of political parties (costs and benefits of
accommodation in terms of electoral support). Institutional change (the
expansion of LGBT rights) requires the coordination between pro-LGBT
advocacy groups and liberal political parties.
As regards gender equality legislation, the equal pay policy of the EU
was launched in the Treaty of Rome (1957; Article 119) and evolved
mainly in the 1980s and 1990s into the instrument of mainstreaming
(Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 3). The focus was on eliminating existing
inequalities between men and women in working life by adopting posi-
tive discrimination measures (Article 22). Since their onset, the gender
equality-related policies of the EU were an instrument of the market—
focused on economic recovery (EC) and increasing competitiveness (EU)
(cf. Muehlenhoff 2017; Kantola 2010). The human rights aspect of
gender equality gained momentum in the 1990s. Gender equality became
part of the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) and the normative ‘self-image’ of
the EU (Bal 2019). Via the Copenhagen criteria, commitment to gender
equality became a condition of membership. The EU’s commitment to
gender equality rooted in the EU law also became part of norm diffusion
via international conventions, funding and other measures such as guide-
lines and policy recommendations (Fagan and Rubery 2018; Haastrup
et al. 2019).
The EU legislation has been summarised by Fagan and Rubery
(2018). It includes hard law (directives and CJEU case law),
namely directives on equal pay (75/117/EEC), equal treatment in
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employment (976/207/EEC, amended in 2002 and 2006), social
security (79/7/EEC, 86/378/EEC amended in 1996 and 2006),
self-employment including agriculture (86/613/EEC, amended in
2010), access to goods and services (2004/113/EC), maternity leave
(92/85/EEC), parental leave (96/34/EEC repealed by 2010/18/EU),
equal treatment of part-time workers (97/81/EC), working time
(2003/88/EC) and a 2012 proposed directive on gender quotas for
corporate boards (EC, 2012-COM[2012]614).
The EU soft law includes the European Employment Strategy (EES,
launched in 1997), the open method of coordination, targets, guidelines
and good practices. The key steps were the introduction of gender main-
streaming into the EES and national action plans with country-specific
recommendations to meet EES objectives. The 2000 Lisbon Strategy set
the female employment target to 60% by 2010, and 2002 saw the replace-
ment of four EES pillars with ten guidelines, one of which is gender
equality. In 2003, EES was integrated with the Broad Economic Guide-
lines European Pact (2011–2020) for equality between women and men
annexed to Council conclusions (7166/11). The Pact reaffirms the EU’s
commitment to closing gender gaps in employment, social protection,
providing better work-life balance to women and men, and combatting
violence against women.
Good practice policy exchange mechanisms and guidelines include pay
transparency (2014), work-life balance (2008), sexual harassment (2004)
and reversing the burden of proof (1997, 2015). In order to support
these measures, the EU includes gender equality among the funding
criteria for European Social Fund and research funding Horizons 2020
and collects data across all relevant areas (employment, social conditions,
political representation, research and innovation).
Combatting gender-based violence has been an integral part of the
Council of Europe’s agenda since the 1990s. The Council of Europe has
launched several initiatives (2005 CoE Recommendation on the protec-
tion of women against violence), resolutions (2008 Vienna Declaration),
recommendations (1817/2007) and Europe-wide campaigns (2006–
2008, campaign to combat violence against women). Numerous national
reports, studies and surveys highlighted the magnitude of the issue, the
variation in domestic responses within different member states and the
need for harmonised legal standards. In December 2008, the Committee
of Ministers set up an expert group to prepare the draft Convention.
The process included significant consultation with member states and civil
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society and was concluded in December 2010 when the final draft of the
convention was produced.
The Istanbul Convention (Convention on preventing and combatting
violence against women and domestic violence) was adopted in April
2011 and opened for signature in May 2011. It came into force after
being ratified by ten states (eight of which were CoE member states).
As of February 2020, it was signed by 46 states. In June 2017, EU
Commissioner Vera Jourova signed on behalf of the EU. The majority
of the countries where ratification is pending are in ECE (and the UK).
In 2018, the Bulgarian parliament ratified the Istanbul Convention, but
later that year, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court found the Convention
in breach of the Bulgarian constitution. In February 2020, the Slovak
parliament voted to withdraw the country’s signature from the treaty. As
of March 2020, the Istanbul Convention has 45 signatories (CoE and
non-CoE states such as Mexico, Canada and the USA, plus the EU), and
in seven CoE countries, the ratification is pending. Among the Council
of Europe member states, only Russia and Slovakia are not part of the
Convention.
3 Domestic Dynamics
of Accommodation and Backlash
2
This transnational legal context (EU and CoE) influences domestic
opportunity structures, but it cannot guarantee its self-enforcement and
particular effects. As for the equal pay policy, notwithstanding the EU
legal measures, the gender pay gap in the EU remains at 16% (EU 28
average in 2019), with both the Czech Republic and Slovakia below
the EU average with 21.1 and 19.8%, respectively. Overall, the Czech
Republic currently occupies 78th place and Slovakia 63rd place in the
Global Gender Gap Index (a 0.035 and 0.043 improvement from 2006,
respectively) (World Economic Forum 2019). The strength in both coun-
tries is educational attainment and health, while economic participation,
opportunity and political empowerment remain low. In both the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, most criteria improved very slightly between 2006
and 2020, but not at the speed of other countries (causing a drop in
ranking). The persistence of the gender pay gap and deterioration in the
2See also Guasti and Buštíková (2020).
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Global Gender Gap Index indicates the limits of Europeanisation (cf.
Chiva 2009; Lomazzi and Crespi 2019).
The majority of EU member states currently provide LGBT citizens
full rights (i.e. marriage and adoption available in 16 EU member states
as of 2019) and adopted the Istanbul Convention (34 countries across
Europe and the EU ratified the Istanbul Convention as of 2020). The
transnational legislation (EU, CoE) has to be implemented domestically,
and effective sanction mechanisms exist (CJEU, ECtHR). Consequently,
domestic opportunity structures for the opponents of LGBT rights and
‘gender ideology’ are getting narrower (Guasti and Buštíková 2019;
Sekerák 2020).
Political actors weigh the cost of their actions and also consider other
actors—political competitors and the agency of advocacy groups to sway
public opinion. The key actors are mainstream parties resistant to accom-
modation due to fear of polarisation (the Czech Republic) or radicalising
to fend off radical right challengers (Slovakia). Depending on the agency
of proponents and opponents of universal rights, the sway of public
opinion can go in both directions.
Two factors are critical in explaining the changes in minority rights
accommodation. The first, exogenous factor is the EU anti-discrimination
legislation, international treaties, as well as CJEU and ECtHR case law.
The second, endogenous factor is the agency of progressive and conser-
vative actors. The agency includes the ability to engage with the public
(to shift public opinion) and political parties (that pass legislation).
As will be shown in the following, two strategies/processes are crucial
in institutional change—defection and reinterpretation. Defection refers
to a behavioural change of actors such as a strategic shift among Czech
and Slovak women’s rights NGOs and pro-LGBT advocacy groups to
engage in public outreach to the general population. The focus turns from
lobbying parliamentarians to shifting public opinion—to create pressure
on political actors to act. Reinterpretation is a strategy in which ‘the actors
associated with an institution gradually change the interpretation of its
rules, and thus its practices, without defecting from or dismantling the
formal institution itself’ (Hall and Thelen 2009, p. 19). Reinterpretation
is the success of niche radical right parties in Slovakia to reinterpret the
Istanbul Convention as a danger to Slovak families (later pragmatically
adopted by the governing SMER before the 2020 elections). In February
2020, in a significant U-turn, Slovakia withdrew its signature from the
Istanbul Convention.
8 SAME SAME, BUT DIFFERENT: DOMESTIC CONDITIONS … 189
4 LGBT Rights
Although the European Union provides a unified framework of anti-
discrimination regarding LGBT, the shifts in policies are driven by
domestic dynamics between progressive and conservative forces. While
opponents and proponents used similar arguments, the cases differed.
In the Czech case, public advocacy by the proponents of LGBT rights
and increased media exposure to the everyday grievances facing ‘rainbow
families’ resulted in the ever-increasing support for the rights of sexual
minorities.3 In the more conservative Slovakia, the domestic conditions
differed with the effect of a frozen institutional status quo (cf. Froese
2005).
Similarly to Slovakia, Czech political entrepreneurs strive to increase
political divisions along the cultural dimension. The foes of the LGBT
rights, such as the former President Václav Klaus and current President
Miloš Zeman, utilise the LGBT issue as a symbol of conservative oppo-
sition to changes to the ‘traditional way of life’ and ‘discrimination of
the majority’. For them, full equality of the LGBT minority represents
a threat. In their view, sexual minorities do not belong to the ‘peo-
ple’s sovereign’, the Czech nation. Nevertheless, Czech public opinion
is increasingly supporting the expansion of LGBT rights.
The bill on registered partnership for same-sex couples was submitted
to the Czech parliament four times: in 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2005. The
cross-party support transcending not only party lines, but also govern-
ment and opposition parties was crucial in enabling the bill to reach the
floor of the parliament. The painstakingly built coalition in support of the
bill was a result of intense advocacy by LGBT groups. It unravelled when
the Social Democratic Prime Minister Jiři Paroubek claimed issue owner-
ship just before the December 2005 parliamentary plenary debate. In the
aftermath, some opposition MPs withdrew their support for the bill.
The analysis of the 2005 roll-call data provides important inference
on the nature of the coalition (ad hoc, single-issue) and the dynamics
between and within parties. While the PM cast himself as ‘a friend’,
the Social Democrats experienced internal discord and opposition. No
3The LGBT advocacy adopted an effective strategy—shifting the discourse from a
debate about “adoption in general” to the differentiation between adoptions of a partner’s
child/children from institutional care. The shift positively resonates with the Czech public
opinion (Guasti 2019).
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Social Democratic MP was willing to defy the party leadership by voting
no. Instead, 30% of the Social Democratic MPs opted for abstention—a
way to balance party loyalty and their moral consciousness. The bill was
adopted by a simple majority of 86 out of 200 votes in December 2005
(see Fig. 1). Then-President Klaus vetoed the bill, and the subsequent
vote, which required a qualified majority (101 of 200 votes) to overrule
the presidential veto, was dramatic. The bill was adopted in March 2006
due to cross-party support (social democrats, communists and liberals)
and the imposition of strong party discipline among social democrats
(almost no abstention).
This was a significant success for LGBT advocacy. For some within the
community, mainly the male activists, this was the achievement of a goal.
For many, mostly female activists, this was only the first step. The next was
legal adoption, both adoption of a partner’s child and open adoption.
Furthermore, the adoption legislation, which allows single citizens and
married couples, but not registered partners to foster children, led many
lesbian couples to skip registered partnerships (Guasti 2019).
Adoption and same-sex marriage returned to the parliamentary agenda
in 2016, as an amendment of the 2006 law on registered partnership.
The authors of the bill were members of the governing coalition (a Social
Democratic Minister and an ANO MP). The proposal excluded adoptions
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Fig. 1 Voting on same-sex registered partnership in the Czech Republic 2005
and 2006 (Source Roll-call analysis by the author)
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of partners. In their opening address, the authors of the amendment
highlighted their personal experience with the difficulties encountered
by ‘rainbow families’—in education, health care and dealing with state
bureaucracy (Guasti 2019). This approach, aiming at generating empathy
for the rainbow families, backfired. It provided the conservative force
an additional line of attack. Conservatives and especially the radical
right attacked not only the bill but also its authors as ‘making laws for
their friends’ and ‘conceding their electorate at the expense of ‘normal’
families’ (Guasti 2019).
Unlike in 2006, in 2016, the conservative forces mobilised and success-
fully pushed back against further accommodation. The bill failed to pass
the first stage, and the 2016 debate revealed internal discord within
parties and a lack of willingness to work across party lines. It also
revealed new ad hoc configurations of friends and foes (Guasti 2019;
Guasti and Buštíková 2019). Conservative forces, strongly supported by
the President (Zeman), focused on maintaining institutional inertia. The
President’s opposition to any form of LGBT accommodation signalised
the need for a qualified majority. Given the composition of the Czech
parliament after the 2017 election, this would only be possible with the
support of the mainstream party. However, for ANO, which after 2017
was no longer courting liberal voters, the cost of support became too
high.
The evolution of public support reflects the dynamics outlined above.
In 2006, when the law on the registered partnership was passed, 61%
of Czechs supported the registered partnership. However, only 38% of
Czechs supported same-sex marriage, and only 19% supported adoption
rights for same-sex couples. Over time, as the issue became increas-
ingly debated (also because many countries expanded LGBT rights), the
support for LGBT rights increased significantly. In 2019, 75% of Czechs
supported registered partnership, and 47% supported same-sex marriage
(in 2017, 51% supported same-sex marriage; the four per cent decrease
is due to increased polarisation and success of the conservative campaigns
against LGBT accommodation). Figure 2 shows the evolution of public
opinion on LGBT rights in the Czech Republic over time.
On adoption, the LGBT activists changed their advocacy strategy
around 2012–2013. In order to address acute issues facing rainbow fami-
lies, the advocacy refocused on the adoption of the partner’s child. This
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Fig. 2 Evolution of public opinion on LGBT rights in the Czech Republic
(1998–2019) (Source Data compiled from the press releases of the Centre for
Public Opinion Research by the author)
adoption of the child of the same-sex partner. The support for the adop-
tion of children in institutional care by same-sex couples also increased
(47%). As with same-sex marriage, the support for both forms of adoption
decreased between 2017 and 2019.
Notwithstanding the recent drop in public support, the Czech
Republic is on a path of expansion regarding the rights of sexual minori-
ties. The LGBT accommodation in Slovakia is more contentious and
challenging (cf. Sekerák 2017). Slovakia is socially more conservative and
religious than the Czech Republic (Guasti and Buštíková 2020). Further-
more, the contestation of the rights of sexual minorities politicised the
Slovak Catholic Church. This is reflected in the lack of expansion of
LGBT rights beyond the EU anti-discrimination legislation.4 As a result
of the interplay between transnational and domestic dynamics, Slovakia
recognises same-sex marriages of foreign citizens with residency permits
in Slovakia. However, it does not grant these rights to its own citizens
(since 2018).5
4Slovakia adopted the anti-discrimination law in employment in 2004, the provision of
goods and services in 2008, and the protection from hate speech in 2016.
5In June 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that EU member
states have to recognise a same-sex marriage from member states that legalised same-sex
marriage for a residency permit. The decision applies if at least one partner is an EU
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Similar to the Czech Republic, bills to recognise same-sex partnerships
were introduced in the Slovak parliament repeatedly (1997, 2000, 2012,
and 2018). Unlike in the Czech Republic, where the registered partner-
ship was adopted in 2006, all of the Slovak bills were rejected. The only
(minor) concession was archived in 2017, allowing recognition of unreg-
istered cohabitation. While same-sex couples use this regulation, it was
not explicitly designed as LGBT accommodation.
LGBT advocacy in Slovakia is concentrated under the LGBT umbrella
organisation Otherness Initiative (Iniciativa Jinakost’). The advocacy by
Otherness Initiative focuses both towards lobbying parliamentarians and
raising awareness of discrimination and issues facing the LGBT commu-
nity. Unlike in the Czech Republic, the Slovak LGBT activists were not
able to secure the support of mainstream parties. On the contrary, as
the politicisation along the cultural cleavage grew, the mainstream ruling
party SMER repeatedly traded support for the status quo and backlash
with conservative parties in exchange for concessions on other legislation.
Smaller liberal parties continue to support the expansion of LGBT
rights. The two most recent attempts (2012, 2018) to pass the bill on
registered partnership were spearheaded by the liberal and libertarian
Freedom and Solidarity (SaS) party. In 2012, the draft legislation was
rejected by the ruling SMER. It also produced strong backlash by the
conservative forces. In an attempt to both maintain liberal credentials
and not polarise voters, SMER established a committee to address the
demands of the LGBT community as a forum for public debate in
October 2012. This was straight from the pre-accession playbook. Never-
theless, even this feckless attempt generated backlash by the Christian
Democrats and by the Slovak Conference of Bishops (Santa 2012).
The conservative forces perceived the lack of support by the main-
stream SMER as an opportunity to strengthen the status quo and prevent
future expansion of LGBT rights. The backlash intensified and peaked
in 2014. The conservative group Alliance for Family, with the backing
of the Conference of Slovak Bishops, collected 400,000 signatures for a
petition against the progressive agenda. The petition included demands
for a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage and registered partnership,
adoption and raising of children by same-sex couples. It advocated for the
citizen, and the marriage took place in the EU. Slovak authorities were forced to bend
to the ruling, and Slovakia complied with the CJEU ruling on recognition of same-sex
marriage for granting residency permits.
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rights of parents to prevent their children from receiving sex education in
schools. The petition aimed to trigger a referendum on all four issues.
Upon the intervention of the (independent) President Andrej Kiska, in
the Slovak Constitutional Court removed the registered partnership ban
from the referenda.
Simultaneously, Christian Democrats initiated an amendment to the
Slovak Constitution banning same-sex marriage in the parliament. The
ban succeeded after Prime Minister Robert Fico, the leader of SMER,
offered Christian Democrats a deal. In essence, SMER would support the
same-sex marriage ban; in exchange, Christian Democrats would support
his reform of the judicial system. In June 2014, the deal was sealed
(102 MPs voted for, 18 against), and the following change of the Slovak
Constitution was approved: ‘Marriage is a unique union between a man
and a woman. The Slovak Republic fully protects marriage as it aids
its wellbeing’. This was a significant victory for the conservative forces
(Burcik 2014).
The referendum took place in February 2015. Moreover, Slovakia
became a conservative battleground. Both the progressives and the
conservatives received support from international groups. International
conservative groups from Europe and the United States (US Evangel-
ical donors, Alliance Defending Freedom) financially supported the Slovak
conservatives. The progressives were smaller and less organised than their
conservative Christian counterparts but indirectly supported by European
LGBT advocacy groups (ILGA).
During the campaign, progressives criticised the involvement of foreign
religious groups as well as SMER’s ‘pandering to the populist reli-
gious homophobia’ as a distraction from economic issues. While the
conservatives campaigned to win and freeze the progressive agenda for a
considerable time, the progressives chose another strategy. It was evident
that the support for the progressive agenda was smaller than the support
for the conservative agenda. The strategy of the progressives, there-
fore, was to campaign for abstention in order for the referendum to
fail the legal obligation of the minimum 50% turnout to be binding.
This strategy was successful. The turnout was 21.4%, and the referendum
failed. However, among the 945,000 citizens who voted in the refer-
endum, 94.5% supported the ban on same-sex marriage, 92.4% the ban on
adoption by a same-sex couple and 90% the sex education choice (Statis-
tical office of the Slovak Republic). The evolution of public opinion on
LGBT rights is displayed in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3 Evolution of public opinion on LGBT rights in Slovakia (2008–2017)
(Source Inakost Initiative, Pew Research Center)
In 2018, progressives resubmitted the registered partnership bill. While
the bill was defeated again, this time, Freedom and Solidarity MPs were
joined by other smaller parties, including the Hungarian minority party,
Most-Híd (Bridge). Without the support of the mainstream party SMER,
both progressives and conservatives succeeded in preventing each other
from achieving their goal. Until the 2020 elections, SMER was the
leading political player. However, the Slovak 2020 elections dramatically
changed the party landscape in Slovakia.
In the 2020 elections, the openly homophobic radical right (Kotleba’s
People’s Party—Our Slovakia) and conservatives campaigned on the roll-
back of liberal rights, including restricting access to abortion, but failed
to make significant gains. The governing SMER again strategically shifted
to the right by adopting some of the radical right rhetoric on cultural
issues (on the withdrawal of Slovakia from the Istanbul Convention in
the next section) but paid the price for its recent corruption scandals.
Ethnic Hungarian party Most-Híd did not cross the 5% threshold, and the
liberal parties weakened at the expense of the Party of the Ordinary People
and Independent Personalities (OL’aNO). The Leader of OL’aNO, Igor
Matovič, who ran on an anti-corruption platform, reiterated commitment
to the conservative status quo and excluded any further accommodation
of the LGBT rights. He also rejected the rollback on existing rights.




The Istanbul Convention faces strong opponents in both the Czech
Republic and Slovakia. The Czech Republic signed the Istanbul Conven-
tion on May 12, 2016, but until today (March 2020), it has not been
ratified. The lack of ratification is the result of a lack of broad domestic
support. Women and human rights organisations support the ratification,
while conservative groups and the Catholic Church are vocal opponents.
The same was true in Slovakia. While the European Union has, in the
meantime, accessed the convention as a signatory, both countries (as two
out of 28 EU member states) oppose the EU being part of the Istanbul
Convention.
For the Czech proponents, the Istanbul Convention is a step towards
fighting gender stereotypes and improving prevention mechanisms. For
the opponents, it is a symbol of ‘gender ideology’. The issue is very
salient, and the media attention contributed to improving information
levels about domestic violence (such as that in the majority of rape cases
the victim and the perpetrator know each other), the increase in the
reporting of rape cases (in 2019 by approximately 20%; Hroch 2019) and
the thematisation of persistent stereotypes (such as that a woman under
the influence of alcohol/drugs, or ‘dressed provocatively’ shares the guilt
for her rape (sic!)).6
For the opponents—mainstream Christian parties, Catholic Church,
socially conservative and reactionary fringe groups—the Istanbul Conven-
tion represents a symbol of changes and triggers competition for the role
of the real ‘defender of the traditional order’ and the status quo. Main-
stream political opponents are led by Christian Democratic ex-Ministers
Pavel Bělobrádek and Marian Jurečka. For them, the Czech Republic does
not need the Istanbul Convention, because its legislation is satisfactory.
Furthermore, for Bělobrádek and Jurečka, the Istanbul Convention repre-
sents an ‘attack on traditional family’ and a ‘social engineering attempt
to eliminate the traditional roles of men and women’ (Hroch 2019).
The pushback against these statements came from the Social Democratic
Minister of Labor and Welfare Affairs, Michaela Marksová (before her
political career, Marksová led a large women’s NGO).
6In a 2015 FOCUS survey, one-third of the respondents agreed with this statement
(Geržová 2015).
8 SAME SAME, BUT DIFFERENT: DOMESTIC CONDITIONS … 197
Among the Church opponents, the Catholic Church led by the Arch-
bishop of Prague, Dominik Duka and the Czech Conference of Bishops
is the key actors. However, except for the Evangelical Church of Czech
Brethren, the majority of evangelical churches and smaller Christian
denominations also oppose the adoption of the Istanbul Convention,
which they perceive as detrimental to the ‘natural order’ and a threat to
the family. The May 2018 mass in the St. Vitus Cathedral by Monsignor
Petr Pit’ha provided the following highlights:
This is to be enacted under the Istanbul Convention in the name of a
powerful pressure group of genderists and homosexualists. Your families
will be torn and dispersed. They will take your children and keep you
from where they went, where they sold them, where they are imprisoned.
In a reaction to this sermon, women’s NGO Czech Women’s Lobby
made a criminal complaint about the deliberate dissemination of an
alarming message against Pit’ha. Pit’ha received backing and support
from the Archbishop Duka and the Czech Conference of Bishops. In
May 2018, the Czech Conference of Bishops published a pastoral directly
attacking the Istanbul Convention:
We believe that the so-called Istanbul Convention puts men and women in
a fundamental opposition and wants to see all behaviour towards women
only in the light of the historically unequal balance of power between men
and women. This international convention, the ratification of which will
soon be discussed in the Parliament of the Czech Republic, as well as in
other European countries, has a broad concept of gender identity, which
is not rooted in the natural order and thus creates a space for questioning
basic social conditions. We do not agree with this trend and do not want
the ratification of the Istanbul Convention to be a threat to the life of the
state and its institutions, especially schools, but also to the lives of families
and individuals. (Tomek 2018)
Among the socially conservative groups, the Union of Family Advo-
cates criticised some measures of the convention, which is interpreted
as a danger to the privileged attorney-client relationship. The opponents
often used misinterpretations or claims of faulty translation of the conven-
tion to magnify the threat the convention in their eyes presented to the
status quo—the heteronormative order and the male-dominated public
and political spheres. Socially conservative and conspiratorial media such
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as CounterStream (ProtiProud) warned against the new world order in
which ‘lesbians will strip men of their masculinity, families will be broken
by force and men enslaved’ (Břicháček 2018; Rjabičenková 2018).
Under the mantle of balanced reporting, the public media at times
provided space for the spread of disinformation, by encouraging discus-
sions between the proponents and opponents focusing on conspiracies
and misinformation. To prevent the spread of misinformation, which
amounted to a coordinated campaign across Europe, the Czech govern-
ment and the Council of Europe published information leaflets (in
September and November 2018, respectively).
Notwithstanding the information measure, the majority of the Czech
population remains uninformed about the Istanbul Convention (72% in
2018 and 68% in 2019). It has not formed any opinion regarding its rati-
fication (69% in 2018 and 63% in 2019). Among those who have formed
an opinion, the support for the ratification (18% in 2018 and 24% in
2019) outweighs its rejection (13% in both 2018 and 2019) (Centrum
pro výzkum veřejného mínění 2019).
The coalitions of the proponents and the Istanbul Convention in
Slovakia are, in no small degree, similar, like in the case of LGBT accom-
modation. In the political arena, the radical right, the mainstream right
and the governing SMER compete for the role of ’protectors of the
traditional family’. Mainstream parties—both on the centre-right (Chris-
tian Democrats) and centre-left (SMER)—adopted some of the radical
right rhetoric (Sekerák 2020). This includes backlash against LGBT and
women’s groups and their political allies—liberal political parties.
The conservative forces, such as the Alliance for Family, portray the
Istanbul Convention as a tool in a ‘cultural war’ waged against the ‘natural
order’—i.e. the heteronormative status quo. The Istanbul Convention is
portrayed as enforcing ‘gender ideology’ in areas such as legal framework
and education; the former endangering the rights of parents and religious
freedom, the latter ‘experimenting on children’ (Vasecka 2018 in Sekerák
2020).
The Slovak Catholic Church plays an essential role in the opposition
to the Istanbul Convention. Similar to the Alliance for Family, it adopts
the language of cultural war, waged by liberal forces against religion and
tradition. The following is a quotation from a sermon by the Archbishop
of the Slovak Greek Catholic Church, Mons. Cyril Vasil’, on 2 September
2018:
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The new cultural war of the anti-religious liberal secularism of the modern
West has not yet come to us in full strength, but only in some isolated
peripheral expressions. Here and there, there is a shot, or rather a fad, but
the actual fire and bombing are just about to happen. (Mikula 2020)
The Slovak Catholic Church equates contemporary development with
the persecution of the Church during communism—Western liberalism is
described as the ‘new totalitarianism’. It also portrays Central and Eastern
Europe as the last bastion of defence of ‘real European values’ and calls
for the return to the ‘natural and Christian roots’. In March 2019, the
Slovak bishops and representatives of other denominations called on the
government not only to reject ratification of the Istanbul Convention but
also to withdraw the Slovak signature. In their argument, they portrayed
the Istanbul Convention as a tool for the accommodation of ‘gender
ideology’ and an attempt to further LGBT demands.
In March 2019, the Slovak parliament rejected the ratification of the
Istanbul Convention, hinting at possible conflicts with the Slovak Consti-
tution and the leader of SMER and former Prime Minister Fico claimed
that the government could not adopt an international treaty that ‘does
not respect the beliefs of the majority of Slovak citizens’ (Walker et al.
2019).
In November 2019, the European parliament called on all EU member
states to speed up the ratification of the Istanbul Convention. On
the same day, the Slovak parliament decided not to ratify the Istanbul
Convention and asked the government to inform the European Union,
which in the meantime became one of the signatories that Slovakia
opposes to being part of the Istanbul Convention.
The Slovak vote was both a pushback against Brussels, but more so
a reaction to the domestic pressure. The radical right politicised crimes
against women to paint the government as weak on the ‘law and order’
agenda. In an attempt to adopt a strong stance, the (female) Minister
of Interior called on women to be more considered and ‘socialise with
greater prudence’ (on the similar performance of gender in other ECE
countries cf. Norocel 2018). In a political struggle along the cultural
dimension, victims of gender-violence are further victimised to score
political points. The position of the Minister of Interior reflects Slovak
public opinion, which views rape as justified under certain circumstances
(in 2016, 40% of respondents agreed with this statement) (Gabrizova
2019).
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In the campaign for Slovak parliamentary elections (29 February
2020), the radical right and socially conservative forces continued the
politicisation of the Istanbul Convention. Christian Democrats proposed
to restrict access to abortion. On the eve of the elections (25 February
2020), during an extraordinary session, the Slovak parliament rejected the
Istanbul Convention with the simple majority of 93 of 122 votes.7 The
majority of the governing SMER, Christian Democrats and the radical
right voted against. Liberal parties and some members of the Party of
Ordinary People and Independent personalities, which went on to win
the elections, supported the convention (27 votes). The liberal Presi-
dent Zuzana Čaputová announced she would respect the decision of the
parliament (Meuwissen 2020).
While the opposition of the Slovak conservative parties and the radical
right to the Istanbul Convention is long term and ideologically driven,
for the centre-left SMER, this was a strategy—a final attempt to win
back conservative voters (cf. Malova and Vilagi 2006; Buštíková 2019;
Buštíková et al. 2019; Kazharski 2019). The strategy of the radicalised
mainstream failed—SMER lost the 2020 elections. On the night of his
electoral victory, the leader of the populists’ anti-establishment OL’aNO,
Igor Matovič, who ran mainly on an anti-corruption agenda and avoided
taking a stance on cultural issues, endorsed the status quo. He refused
both the rollback abortion rights, but also the Istanbul Convention.
6 Conclusions
The present chapter has shown that the effect of the expansion of the
universal rights spearheaded by the European Union and the Council
of Europe is contingent upon the type of groups and on configurations
of domestic actors that either align with the policies of accommodation
or seek to reverse them. The accommodation of demands for universal
rights, such as LGBT rights and gender equality, creates a strong reac-
tion. If used strategically by political entrepreneurs, it has the potential
to polarise the electorate. Since the new groups are ‘alien’ to domestic
constituencies at first, it is easy to associate the European Union and the
Council of Europe with the imposition of new cultural norms.
7Analysis of the vote No. 15/2020 based on data of the Slovak National Council,
https://www.nrsr.sk/web/?sid=schodze/hlasovanie/schodze.
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Minority accommodation due to the implementation of the EU anti-
discrimination framework, the CoE’s Istanbul Convention and current
demands by LGBT and women’s advocates spark a backlash. While mobil-
isation around new issues can spike sovereignty anxieties, the lack of
well-established divisions between the progressive and conservative forces
and, in the case of the Istanbul Convention, lack of salience under-
mines the durability of the backlash. Political entrepreneurs are creative
and quickly explore how new divisions can cohabitate with older, more
established configurations of interests (fusing anti-LGBT and anti-gender
equality voices against the Istanbul Convention).
The backlash against universal rights and their (perceived) allies—the
EU, CoE, and civil society organisations—remain in the repertoire of
the radical right (cf. Cianetti et al. 2018; Guasti and Buštíková 2020). The
mainstream political parties are rarely foes of minority accommodation
(Guasti 2019). The extent to which they act as allies or foes depends more
on their political calculus than on their ideological orientation. When the
costs of minority accommodation are high, mainstream parties shy away
from pursuing the progressive agenda (ANO in the Czech Republic) or
join the backlash (SMER in Slovakia).
In both countries, the European Union (and the Council of Europe)
plays a secondary role in the process of LGBT accommodation and
gender equality. It ensures anti-discrimination via hard and soft legis-
lation and provides avenues for redress (litigation at the CJEU and
ECtHR). The primary role belongs to the domestic politicians. Progres-
sives find powerful allies—LGBT advocacy groups, women’s groups and
foes—against conservative groups and the Catholic Church.
In both countries, pragmatic populists strategically align themselves
with what they perceived to be the winning side at a particular point in
time (cf. Buštíková and Guasti 2017; Vachudova 2019; Guasti 2019). In
Slovakia, the mainstream SMER traded support for the same-sex marriage
ban for its proposed judicial reform, and the insurgent OL’aNO reiter-
ated commitment to the conservative status quo. In the Czech Republic,
Andrej Babiš’s ANO used the LGBT issue to strategically appeal to the
liberal voters and, therefore, to expand its voting coalition. When these
efforts proved futile, it abandoned the LGBT agenda. The mainstream
political actors are not driven by ideology, but by situational strategies.
In both countries, the cultural cleavage is here to stay, and the pursuit of
universal rights will be lengthy and continue to face illiberal backlash.
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PART III
EUReactions to Illiberal and Anti-EU Politics
CHAPTER 9
Talking Past EachOther: On Common
Misperceptions in the Rule of LawDebate
Attila Vincze
1 Introduction
Hungary is an enfant terrible of the European Union, an illiberal or
hybrid regime (Krekó and Zsolt 2018), a quasi-Turkey or quasi-Russia
in the EU, and many are perplexed how such a regime could be part of
the EU sharing common values set out in Article 2 of the EU Treaty,
which surely could not join the club today.1 Whereas many analyses have
described the changes experienced during the last decade, some others
1Halmai (2018b, p. 16): “Model case of constitutional backsliding from a full-fledged
liberal democratic system to an illiberal one with strong authoritarian elements”. See
further Kochenov (2017). For a more popular account see The Economist (2019).
A. Vincze (B)
Andrássy University Budapest, Budapest, Hungary
e-mail: attila.vincze@andrassyuni.hu
© The Author(s) 2021
A. Lorenz and L. H. Anders (eds.), Illiberal Trends and Anti-EU Politics




lack basic factual knowledge or misunderstand facts2 which again helps
the Hungarian government to point out that condemnations are baseless
allegations stemming from lacking knowledge or prejudice. Many more
write from a moral high ground, which does not really help to understand
the undergoing processes but instead exaggerates a value-loaded debate
as clashes of cultures,3 and in doing so basically supports the denunciated
regime, which gladly points out that the critique is nothing more than
further evidence of the Spenglerian Downfall of the Occident.
On the other hand, it is also baffling that the EU tolerates this regime
as long as it does, if the latter (as it is alleged) so obviously violates
the fundamental values. While there were surely measures intended to
save the EU’s core values, like the new Rule of law framework, the
Justice Scoreboard and public condemnations, they have not proven to
be effective.4 Many have written about lacking post-accession compli-
ance (Schimmelfennig and Trauner 2009), or the ineffective procedure
of suspending the rights of a member state according to Article 7 TEU
(see also Chapter 1).
The following chapter is intended to show some misconceptions and
misperceptions in the debate around Hungary as well as shortcomings
of the EU policies vis-à-vis the country. It describes the present govern-
ment’s critique that the EU applies double standards when it comes to the
rule of law and explores how the Commission might have contributed to
2Avbelj (2015, p. 51): “Much can get lost in translation across different epistemic
sites between the narrators and the audience. Simultaneously, a lot can be added to the
reports, thanks to normative biases of different sorts, which are especially present in the
politically deeply divisive issues of the alleged cases of systemic defiance”. These factual
misunderstandings happen also in the case of renown institutions, such as the Venice
Commission (cf. Vincze 2012), or in the case of the Sargentini report (cf. Ésik 2018;
Bakó 2018).
3Poptcheva (2015, p. 3): “Some commentators and political actors tend to see the
outrage of particular member states or EU institutions over specific developments in
a given member state as ideologically motivated, as the battle between left-wing and
right-wing convictions, or as a battle between different cultures (Kulturkampf )”.
4 Juncker greeting Orbán as “Hello, dictator” at the Riga Summit of the EU in 2015 is
one of these examples, which showed less condemnation and more made the impression
of getting used to the situation. The suspension of the membership of Fidesz in the EPP
because of the very populistic election campaign against Jean-Claude Juncker depicting
him as a muppet of George Soros, and in doing so recalling anti-Semitic connotations,
seems to be one of the very few examples of effective counter-measures.
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this impression by remaining inactive when previous governments disre-
garded constitutionality and basic values. Moreover, the chapter depicts
the argument that the EU’s diagnosis of illiberal backsliding is too narrow.
When assessing the quality of democracy in the country, the Commission
almost exclusively focuses on recent legal changes and thereby overlooks
other deficits such as corrupt tendering policies or questionable taxing
schemes. Due to this incomplete diagnosis, the instruments currently
being used to combat backsliding tendencies seem ill-suited or half-
hearted. The chapter concludes by highlighting and discussing possible
improvements of EU strategies towards backsliding states.
2 Misperception One: Birth of Illiberalism
One of the prevailing narratives is that illiberalism, whatever the word
might mean, was born after 2010 in Hungary,5 suggesting that the right-
wing parties solely exploited a dissatisfaction with the former socialist
government and the waves of the financial crisis of 2008, built up a
mythos of failed democratic transition in 1989, and achieved a landslide
victory enabling them to get rid of the old elite and to tailor-make the
constitution.6 This narrative moreover suggests that the former consti-
tution of Hungary was an embodiment of liberal values, had basically
no crucial deficiencies,7 that the transition into a liberal democracy in
1989 was a successful one, and that the former socialist-liberal govern-
ments between 2002 and 2010 complied by and large with those very
basic values of a liberal, democratic state governed by the rule of law.
The widespread description of Hungary and Poland as “backsliding” the
rule of law and liberal democracy also relies—albeit unspoken—on the
proposition that the earlier constitution as a legal and a social (factual)
construction complied with the European values. This reasoning is very
tempting and easy to understand. However, the truth, as always, is a more
nuanced one.
5Expressly so, e.g. Halmai (2018b, p. 15): “The weakening of liberal constitutional
democracy in Hungary started after the landslide victory of the centre-right Fidesz party
in the 2010 parliamentary elections”.
6See the argumentation of Halmai with further references who summarises the liberal
narrative, e.g. Halmai (2018b, p. 16) or Halmai (2014). Also see Magyar (2013).
7See Note 8.
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Neither the constitutional transition (at least in Hungary) was as
impeccable as some suggest, nor was the former government a flawless
guardian of the rule of law. The former constitution was a transitory
patchwork, which served satisfactory but was very far from perfect. At
least three basic issues8 of the political transition remained unsolved which
fuelled not only criticism but conspiracy-theories as well: (1) the transi-
tion left the former leaders of the Communist regime basically untouched,
and they were not made responsible for the injustices that occurred; (2)
the files and documents regarding the agents and collaborators of the
former communist secret police were not made public, and the wider
public still has no reliable information in this regard, which not only
fuels rumours, but also legitimate worries of extortion; (3) restoration
of property ownership confiscated during communism was at least very
meagre (Hanley and Treiman 2004). However, this is not the place
to deal with these topics, and especially to answer the question as to
whether a property restoration was viable. These were symbolic issues
stimulating not only well-reasoned criticism but also bogus theories of a
deep state run by former communist networks.9 Maybe economic perfor-
mance like the German Wirtschaftswunder (Westad 2017, p. 217f.) could
have healed the wounds of the transition. Yet the economic mismanage-
ment of Hungary since 2002, leading to an underperformance and to
necessary austerity measures since 2006 without escaping an economic
collapse at the end of 2008, helped very much to blame the shortcomings
of the political transition. According to some observers, and irrespective
of the positive Freedom House scores (Kovács 2012), neither politically
nor economically was the transition a success story.10 (On the other hand,
the relative good economic performance of Hungary since 2010 and
8And there was a legion of further constitutional shortcomings and imperfections. One
of the alleged problems with the new Hungarian constitutional system is the reorgani-
sation of the organisation of the judiciary. Before 2012, there was a Judicial Office, an
“institutionalised backroom” of the Supreme Court of Hungary, which was an indepen-
dent body, and was thought to serve better judicial independence. Nonetheless, there
is research showing that the reality did not live up to these expectations, cf. e.g. Fleck
(2014) and Badó (2014).
9Very likely based on stories about an alleged network of former Nazi officials in
Germany, which was very popularly dramatised, e.g. in The Odessa File by Frederick
Forsyth.
10This was the conclusion of the recognised Hungarian political scientist, Péter
Tölgyessy, see Bíró (2019) and Gergely (2017). Comparative economic data also suggest
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the growth of disposable income may also explain why a larger part of
the Hungarian population considers the democratic decline as a cost of
economic performance.)11
The right-wing government of Orbán is often—and not without justi-
fication—blamed for arbitrariness and lacking respect for constitutional
institutions. This instrumental use of the law,12 a rule by the law and not
that of the law (Chronowski and Varju 2016), is often connoted with
legislative measures adopted in order to appoint the right (politically suit-
able) “chap” for the right job (The Economist 2019), such as packing the
Constitutional Court,13 the premature termination of the mandate of the
President of the former Supreme Court of Hungary (Vincze 2015; Kosař
and Šipulová 2018), or that of the Data Protection Ombudsman14 by
amending the constitutional provisions (see also Chapter 10). Nonethe-
less, this kind of meddling with independent institutions was not alien to
the former socialist governments of 2002–2010 either (Vincze 2018a).
In 2000, a new financial supervisory authority was established during the
first government of Viktor Orbán, and Károly Szász was appointed for
six years as its president. In 2004, the newly elected socialist govern-
ment wanted to dismiss him merely because he was appointed under
the former government, and hence a new law was whipped through the
parliament to this effect, which was also authorised by the Constitutional
Court.15 And in the same year, the socialist government was trying to
amend the law on the central bank in order to push over the governor of
that other CEE countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia or Slovenia) made much
better use of the opportunities after the democratic transition.
11See instructively in this sense with a Central European comparison, Adamski (2019).
12For a broader theoretical understanding of law as an instrument of political aims, see
Tamanaha (2006).
13Vincze (2014), the effects of the packing are clear to see nowadays. The Consti-
tutional Court applies very different standards if a private individual lodges a complaint
and if a government body submits one. A very shocking example was the recognition of
fundamental rights of the National Bank of Hungary in order to quash an uncomfortable
judgement for the Central Bank and the Government, cf. Kovács (2019), Chronowski
and Vincze (2019).
14CJEU, Case C-288/12, Commission v Hungary (ECLI:EU:C:2014:237).
15Decision of the Constitutional Court 7/2004 (III. 24.) AB.
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the National Bank who was also appointed during the first Orbán govern-
ment.16 These measures are essentially not very far from those of Orbán’s
government. The former socialist government simply lacked the necessary
parliamentary majority to enact them on a constitutional level.
Moreover, the socialist PM Ferenc Gyurcsány secretly admitted to his
fellow party members that he knowingly lied during the election campaign
in 2006 and falsified data of the state budget in order to win these very
elections. As this secret speech (The Guardian 2006; BBC 2006) came to
light in the autumn of 2006, thousands demonstrated against the govern-
ment in Budapest because of its flagrant disregard of democracy and the
rule of law. Mainly due to the involvement of radical right groups and
football hooligans, the demonstrations ended in violence, causing in turn
fierce reactions of the police (Ilonszki and Kurtán 2007). During these
events, the EU did not claim any violations of the basic values (such
as democracy or the right to assemble), and therefore, the right-wing
government of Orbán could easily allege that the problem was not the
violation of the values but simply his person.
This narrative would be very similar to the problem of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union: it was built on self-reliance and hard budgetary
constraints. However, they were quickly softened up as Germany and
France broke the rules (Doukas 2005; Amtenbrink and de Haan 2006).
And precisely because the two largest member states got away with rule-
breaking, no one cared all that much until Greece basically went bankrupt
due to the subprime lending crisis.
3 Misperception Two: The
Values of the European Union
As is well-known, Article 2 TEU stipulates some inherent values of the
EU, the violation of which may lead to the suspension of the rights of
the culpable member state. This procedure was introduced by the Treaty
of Amsterdam but refined in the aftermath of the Haider affair (Lach-
mayer 2017; Schmahl 2000) and also in close proximity to the upcoming
Eastern enlargement of the EU. It presupposes either a clear risk of a
serious breach or an actual serious and persistent breach of the values
of the Union, which begs the questions of what these values are, how far
16See nuanced Häde (2005).
9 TALKING PAST EACH OTHER: ON COMMON MISPERCEPTIONS … 215
may the member states determine their meaning for themselves, and what
is the relationship among these values.
The list encompassed in Article 2 TEU consists of a number of
open-ended, value-loaded expressions which oscillate within a very broad
repertoire of possible interpretations. From a law perspective, the termi-
nology of the EU Treaty (freedom, democracy and equality, etc.) is rather
an invocation than a definition, even if they surely make a claim to be of a
prescriptive, and not simply of a descriptive, nature. The vocabulary does
not only evoke different meanings in different languages (von Bogdandy
and Ioannidis 2014), but it also depends on the political attitude and
thinking (Fekete 2016), which makes wishful thinking (attributing the
own individual concept to these values) very easy.
It is questionable, on the one hand, as to whether the political actors
(basically the member states in their capacity as masters of the treaties)
could have agreed on anything more specific (precisely because of the
contested meaning of these words). However, on the other hand, they
have not let the judiciary define them (in contrast to some other open-
textured expressions), because the proceedings in which these values are
of eminent importance are political ones (membership art. 49 TEU,
suspension of membership art. 7 TEU and partnership art. 8 TEU).
Not only freedom, democracy and equality but also the rule of law
have very contested connotations17 even if we can agree what their core
might be. There is a common understanding that rule of law is an
antithesis of arbitrariness. But there is an ongoing debate as to what
arbitrariness means, how determinate and precise legal rules must be
in order to avoid arbitrariness, what the limits of the discretion of any
administration are, and how these requirements are to be reconciled with
other compelling principles such as checks and balances and parliamen-
tary government.18 Very lively is the discussion as to whether the rule
of law is more than obeying the black letter of the law, and if so, what
inherent values does it contain which should have also been protected
17See instructively Tamanaha (2004). Regarding its meaning in the EU-Treaty, see von
Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014, pp. 288–290).
18Significantly, the very same debate goes on in European administrative law without,
however, the emotional slips, see Franchini (2004); for a very similar problem in the
context of the ECHR, cf. e.g. Hwang (2013).
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against constitutional amendments.19 To put it otherwise, there is some
plurality in the EU and different national legal orders embody different
understandings of the substance of these values (Kombos 2010), and
hence there is no value unity or uniformity in the Union despite the
fact that member states share fundamental constitutional values (Avbelj
2015). It is necessary to pinpoint this circumstance as governments might
easily find a definition of the rule of law which would comply with
their own preference, and the alleged violations of the rule of law can
be simply presented as cultural questions resulting from different (but
basically equally acceptable) understandings of these values.
Similarly, one would understand democracy as a government of the
people, but one might easily disagree as to whether democracy would
require a certain form of direct or indirect involvement of the people,
such as referenda (which in some member states does not exist) or a
special kind of electoral system (proportional or majoritarian) (Morrison
2007). As there are many forms of democracy, there are many forms of
the rule of law too (like formal and material, to mention the most obvious
ones). There are also as many arguments in favour of a limited judicial
or constitutional review as there are in favour of broader judicial powers
(Griffith 1977; Tomkins 2005; Itzcovich 2015). Putting it more plainly,
it is demanding to challenge the cut back of powers a constitutional
court possesses as long as many member states have no such institutions
at all.20 And it is precisely because of this particularity that EU actors
should have put much more emphasis on what exactly is contrary to the
19Without going into details, the Rechtsstaatlichkeit (the German equivalent of the
rule of law) is part of the Austrian and German constitutional thinking, having a more
formalistic content in the first case and more substantial one in the second, cf. Jakab
(2009). Likewise, Di Gregorio (2019) points out how the rule of law was differently
understood in the different Central and Eastern European countries during the democratic
transition. The different understandings of the common constitutional values appear vividly
in the administrative law which effectuates the constitutional values at a very operational
level, and the member states seem to have several permutations of the same values.
20Scheppele (2013) and Vincze (2014). This argument emerged in Hungary in 2019
during the Finnish presidency of the EU as, among others, the Prime Minister put forward
that Finland should not criticise Hungary for the adopted model of the Constitutional
Court because Finland has no such institution (Boffey 2019). This simplistic argument
does not take into account the contextual differences between Central European and
Scandinavian countries (see methodically, e.g., Kischel 2019). But precisely because of
its simplicity, it is a very effective populist argument. Müller (2015), for instance, offers
serious counter-arguments.
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common European core of the rule of law: the lacking independence, the
diminished ambit of powers or the governmental bullying.21
As there are many theoretically possible variations of how to imple-
ment the rule of law, the question is to what extent member states are
allowed to apply their own definition or operationalisation.22 Taking into
account that the EU was built upon the principle of conferral (art. 5
TEU), the first question is as to whether the EU may object to any
shortcomings of the law of a member state if that particular issue does
not belong to its competences, as these remain with EU countries. As
it follows from Art 4(2) TEU, fundamental political and constitutional
structures belong to the identity of the member states which are to be
respected. The very uneasy piece is to define the limits of the consti-
tutional identity referred to in Art 4(2) TEU, as this is an essentially
contested and disputed concept (Rosenfeld 2012; Jacobsohn 2006; van
der Schyff 2016). Nonetheless, it has turned out to be an effective
ideological tool to express defiance as pluralism and non-compliance as
identity (Kelemen and Pech 2018; Mader 2019), especially because the
phrase was not coined by the rebellious rogue states to protect their
disobedience from overwhelming power of the EU law, but by the
German Constitutional Court in order to protect the allegedly higher
German constitutional standards from the European ones (Mayer 2015).
A massive body of case law evolved describing and clarifying the meaning
of the German constitutional identity, and the circumstances under which
it may justify an eventual disobedience, which nonetheless also inspired
the Hungarian Constitutional Court to borrow this expression. In doing
so, it stylised the protection of illiberalism as basically doing the same
21This is not an easy undertaking if, for example, the European Court of Human Rights
declares the remedies available at the Hungarian Constitutional Court to be an effective
one, cf. Szalontay vs. Hungary, ECtHR Judgement of 12 March 2019 Application no.
71327/13. A similar question arose in the case of Poland, as an Irish court questioned
generally the independence of Polish courts and the effectiveness of judicial protection
because of a reasoned proposal of the European Commission adopted pursuant to Article
7(1) TEU, indicating that there is a real risk of a breach of the fundamental right to a
fair trial in Poland, see Judgement of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) of 25 July 2018 case
C-216/18 PPU, LM ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. As Lenaerts (2020) points out instructively,
the CJEU crystallised many aspects of the rule of law, especially regarding the judiciary
during the last decade.
22The European Court of Human Rights also accepts many different understandings of
a “democratic society” and possible variations regarding the understanding of fundamental
rights, see, e.g., Brems (1996).
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as the well-renowned and esteemed German institution (Vincze 2018b;
Halmai 2018a).
The pluralism argument of the many national variations of common
European values is often coupled with a resourceful and shrewd exploita-
tion of comparative reasoning. The Hungarian government is usually
very keen on pointing out that nearly every legal provision it enacted
is borrowed from another country, implying that a critique of the
Hungarian legislation is only fair if the country of origin of the contested
provision is also blamed. Thus, “Frankenstein legislations” are born,
which, like the wretched creature in Mary Shelley’s book was a composite
of body parts grafted together from cadavers, are cobbled together from
different national laws of the member states into a monster which never
originally existed (Scheppele 2013). The argumentation is, however, very
simple: if the Hungarian rules are bad, then those other rules must be bad
as well. The argumentation of the Hungarian government is at least super-
fluous and rather often manipulative, as evidence also suggests.23 But the
real question is as to whether the nuanced and technocratic comparison
can effectively counterbalance the simplistic communication.
There is a further strategy of softening up values, namely neighbour-
hood policy. The values of the EU according to Article 2 TEU are not
only important for accession according to Article 49 TEU, but also for
the neighbourhood policy (Bachmann 2019; Kellerhals and Baumgartner
2014). That is the reason why the Hungarian government is determined
to point out how Ukraine violates the rights of the Hungarian ethnic
minority (Gorondi 2018; McLaughlin 2018). Because the rights of the
minorities are among the values enlisted in Article 2 TEU, a violation of
them should require some steps of the EU in order to counter them. If
the EU does not undertake these steps, Hungary can easily point out that
the EU is not even-handed and the alleged violations of the rule of law
are nothing else but a political witch-hunt.
A further (mainly neglected) dimension of values among those listed in
Article 2 TEU is the conflict of hierarchy (Schorkopf 2016, p. 158). Art
2 TEU encompasses several equally weighted prima facie values beyond
the rule of law, which, at least to some extent, have an uneasy relation-
ship. Democracy and the rule of law, democracy and human rights (Jowell
23See regarding the media regulation Brouillette and van Beek (2012).
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2007; Saunders 2010), as well as freedom and equality, are concur-
ring values, which nonetheless presuppose each other to some extent
(complexio oppositorum). Democracy is basically a form of government
by the people where decisions are made by the majority. The rule of law
and human rights limit this freedom of the majority to decide whatever
it finds proper,24 but on the other hand democracy presupposes equality
(Pöschl 2014, paragr. 18), and we accept only the rule of a democrati-
cally enacted law (Müller 2015). Preferring the rule of law as a yardstick
of the violations of EU values might be explained by the circumstance
that the rule of law has a less contested meaning than the other values
mentioned in Article 2 TEU (Schorkopf 2016, p. 158). But the prioriti-
sation also opens up the opportunity for populistic politicians to even go
so far to say that the EU highlights the rule of law and cares much less
about democracy, precisely because it has serious challenges with its own
democratic legitimacy, as the bulk of literature on its democratic deficit
suggests.25
4 Misperceptions Three: Violations
From very early on, the European Parliament was especially keen to
point out that the Orbán government violates basic values of the EU.
As the new Hungarian media legislation was to be passed in 2011,
many members of the European Parliament protested against it by taping
their mouths with band-aids and holding up signs reading “censored”,
suggesting that the modifications were evidence of an “authoritarian
decay” (Schult 2011). Two years later, Rui Tavares, a Portuguese MEP,
put forward a detailed report on Hungarian constitutional developments,
which was approved by the European Parliament on 3 July 2013 (the
Hungarian government claimed that the report was merely a conspiracy
24UK House of Lords, A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2004] UKHL 56, para 237 by Baroness Hale of Richmond: “Democracy values each
person equally. In most respects, this means that the will of the majority must prevail.
But valuing each person equally also means that the will of the majority cannot prevail
if it is inconsistent with the equal rights of minorities”. Finding an appropriate balance
is not easy, as the Swiss referendum of 2009 on a minaret ban very persuasively shows.
Also very (in)famous is the headline of the Daily Mail of 4 November 2016, describing
the judges of the High Court as enemies of the people because they denied making use
of the royal prerogative to trigger Brexit.
25Müller (2015) offers serious arguments against these allegations.
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of the left). In 2017, Judith Sargentini submitted a detailed report about
Hungary and a proposal to call on the Council to determine the exis-
tence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on
which the Union is founded (Sargentini 2017). In January 2020, Euro-
pean Parliament voted for more vigorous actions against Hungary and
Poland.
This eagerness is in sharp contrast to the reluctance of the Commis-
sion to initiate those proceedings (at least against Hungary; in the case
of Poland, the Commission is much more proactive).26 Article 7 TEU
requires a serious breach of the values of the Union, which must go far
beyond a simple violation of the treaties, such as a not implementing a
directive, which raises a number of questions.
A serious breach of the EU’s foundational values is not necessarily
equivalent to a series of breaches of EU law. Nonetheless, a certain
number of judgements of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) or the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) finding a EU
member state continuously violating values of the EU may indicate that
the given member state has seriously breached those values, and hence
they may trigger a procedure according to Article 7 TEU (Gormley 2017,
p. 75). This is a very tempting idea, explaining a serious breach precisely
in this way, as it relies on court judgements which by definition are stem-
ming from a neutral institution. That is why this argument deserves a
closer look.
One serious objection—and this will rouse every “rogue govern-
ment”—is that an infringement procedure according to Article 258
TFEU sufficiently deals27 with an alleged violation of EU law, and that a
further procedure according to Article 7 TEU is not only unnecessary but
also illegal.28 The government in question is obliged to “take the neces-
sary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court” (art. 260(1)
TFEU). If the government complied with the judgement of the CJEU, it
will (like Hungary did) object to the consideration of these infringement
26The reluctance might also be explained by rational calculation based upon expected
behaviour, Closa (2018). Moreover, the general perception is that the Commission seems
to have learned the lesson from the Hungarian case and is much tougher in the case of
Poland, see e.g. with further references Adamski (2019, p. 652).
27Kochenov and Pech (2015) allege the leniency of the Commission.
28For serious counter-arguments for a parallel applicability, see Schmidt and
Bogdanowicz (2018).
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procedures as evidence of a serious breach of the fundamental values of
the EU.
Firstly, a typical argument is that the Commission was satisfied with the
compliance, and hence there is no reason to bury the hatchet. Secondly,
it can be argued that taking these infringement procedures into account
would violate the “ne bis in idem” principle, in not being prosecuted or
punished twice for the same offence. Ne bis in idem is rather an indi-
vidual right and therefore less applicable to states. But this distinction
might not be as relevant as the relationship between Article 258 TFEU
and Article 7 TEU. Even if both of these procedures aim to point out that
a member state does not comply with the requirements of the European
acquis, their relation to each other is much less like a second punishment
for the same crime (as it is the core of the ne bis in idem principle), but
rather punishing a reoffending recidivist. Thirdly, it can be asked how
many successful infringement procedures within which period of time
indicate a serious breach.29 Going beyond the question of quantity, there
is a harder nut to crack: the question of quality of EU law violations.
In the case of Hungary, the forced retirement of judges was qualified by
the Commission as a mere violation of the anti-discrimination directive30
(the judicial independence was not even mentioned). Not only that, the
Commission saw the reorganisation of the data protection ombudsman
as an infringement of the independence of the data protection authorities
according to the data protection directive, the vexation of the NGOs as
a violation of the freedom of capital,31 and the dismissal of the President
of the former Supreme Court of Hungary as no reason for an infringe-
ment procedure. Thus, the former President had to seek remedy before
the European Court of Human Rights himself.32 Nevertheless, Hungary
is not the only member state with compliance problems. Germany, for
instance, infringed the same anti-discrimination directive in the case of
29Taking the example of Hungary, it might be argued that the forced early retirement
of judges (CJEU, Case C-286/12, Commission v Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687) or the
violation of institutional independence of Hungary’s data protection ombudsman (CJEU
Case C-288/12, Commission v Hungary. ECLI:EU:C:2014:237) would not necessarily
be enough.
30Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in
employment and occupation (OJ 2000 L 303, p. 16).
31Case C-78/18, Commission/Hungary, not yet decided.
32ECtHR, 23 June 2016, Baka v Hungary, no. 20261/12.
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prosecutors as Hungary did,33 and was also found to be violating the
independence of the data protection authorities. However, this alone does
not qualify for an Article 7 TEU procedure.
Illiberal politicians very gladly apply these two arguments in case of any
accusations: relativism and a very formal understanding of the rule of law.
First, they highlight that the governments prosecuting and condemning
them are not better at all, as they themselves are liable for similar infringe-
ments, so they simply pick and choose the newer or smaller member states
to demonstrate some undeserved moral high ground,34 but otherwise
pursue transactional Realpolitik (let us call this argument Quod licet Iovi
non licet bovi). Secondly, rogue governments claim that accusations are
unfounded because their opponents are not able to define why the so-
called rule of law was infringed, and therefore, no opportunity is given to
discuss the accusation.
5 Ill-Suited Responses
As it was pointed out, the European Parliament was very eager to
condemn the illiberal tendencies of the Hungarian government, and to
activate Article 7 TEU. The Commission, on the contrary, was much
more restrained. It did not push Article 7 TEU too much, and one
is under the impression that the infringement procedures initiated by
the Commission were rather half-hearted responses.35 On the one hand,
European institutions are engaged in shadow-boxing around the basic
values of the EU and have adopted a Rule of law framework to prevent
emerging threats to the rule of law (but have nonetheless abstained from
a similar tool kit for the several other values enshrined in Art 2 TEU).36
On the other hand, they have been rather shy engaging in a direct conflict
33CJEU Case C-159/10 and C-160/10, Gerhard Fuchs and Peter Köhler v Land
Hessen (ECLI:EU:C:2011:508).
34Very similar was the situation in the case of Austria, which was severely condemned
for the participation of Mr. Haider and his Freedom Party (FPÖ) in the federal govern-
ment. But Italy, governed at the same time by the very controversial Mr. Berlusconi, was
not condemned, see, e.g., Hummer (2013, p. 136).
35Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018) also argue that the Commission has not made
best use of the available remedies.
36Or one might thus express ambivalence that there is a preference for the rule of law,
Schorkopf (2016, p. 158).
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in those areas where the Commission has real investigative powers and
resources,37 and could have achieved real success (at the cost of a real
conflict, of course).38
In fact, the European Commission missed the opportunities to shorten
the Hungarian regime’s money supply, which could have been much more
efficient than some Rule of law frameworks and assessments which are
good for condemning a regime morally. But these kinds of exercises do
not help all that much if a regime itself is morally very flexible. It is
built on crony capitalism (Rubin 2015), business thriving due to a nexus
between the business and the political elite. The political elite narrows
the field of real market economy and tilts the conditions in order to build
monopolies or oligopolies, and the rent-seeking39 business elite profi-
teering from these conditions becomes a generous partner of the political
class and supports the political struggle. One speaks of a “symbiotic rela-
tionship between big government, big business, and big labor aligned in
a cooperative enterprise in which the government picks economic winners
and losers and subsidizes and protects particular favored industries, firms,
and interest groups, has come to be known as crony capitalism” (Zywicki
2015, p. 78). This description would more or less fit Hungary, and many
say that Hungary has shifted to a model where “business success is inter-
twined with political power” and is “becoming a miniature version of
Vladimir Putin’s Russia” (Buckley and Byrne 2017).
Crony capitalism and rent-seeking business oligarchs can only work
if there are some political barriers for entering the market40 precisely
37The Commission is much more eager in the case of Poland than in the case of
Hungary, since the bullying of the CEU and the NGOs the Commission seems to
have become more rigorous (Case C-66/18, Commission/Hungary and case C-78/18,
Commission/Hungary, respectively, none of them decided yet). Nonetheless it would be
an overstatement to say that it made use of all available tools. Closa provides a rational
explanation for the strategy of the Commission, see Closa (2018).
38As the Commission achieved some success in the case of the forced retirement of the
Hungarian judges by requesting accelerated procedures.
39The concept of rent-seeking is basically an invention of Tullock, see Rowley and
Houser (2012).
40During the last decade, there was a massive CJEU case law regarding newly enacted
state monopolies in Hungary which restrict market access, cf. e.g. case C-179/14,
Commission/Hungary, regarding state monopoly on leisure and meal vouchers, case
C-171/17, Commission/Hungary, regarding national mobile payment system; or the
national tobacco concession, ECtHR Judgement of 13 January 2015, Vékony v. Hungary
(Application no. 65681/13). Instructively Varju and Papp (2016).
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because the rent-seeking makes the goods and services more expensive.
Hence, under normal circumstances, the rent-seekers are less innovative
and therefore less successful. Barriers to entering the market are in logical
contradiction to the concept of the internal market without frontiers
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured, as it is required by the TFEU. Moreover, the internal market is
the area where the Commission is the most powerful and could take—
though politically less spectacular—more effective measures than have
never-ending debates about the values of the Union.
Nevertheless, a series of dubious measures was not sanctioned by the
EU. If the rapid enrichment of the son-in-law or the neighbour of Mr.
Orbán is really the result of corrupt tendering practices, bid-rigging and
anti-competitive behaviour, as many suggest, the Commission has all the
power to investigate, even to launch infringement procedures. Even if the
OLAF cannot launch a criminal investigation, it can produce a dossier for
the Commission in order to facilitate an investigation, which again can
make use of different tools should EU rules ever be violated, especially if
EU funds were misused.
The same is true for the Hungarian sport subsidising tax scheme,
through which, as many suggest, the business and political elite is very
well connected. This scheme enables business to support even profes-
sional team sport instead of paying the same sums as taxes and explains
how a football stadium appeared in the village of Viktor Orbán. Although
the Commission investigated this tax scheme, because professional sport
teams are under normal circumstances business undertakings, and to them
the rules of the internal market are applicable (Parrish 2003), it was found
to be compatible with state aid rules of the EU (European Commission
2011).
Very suspicious was also the Hungarian Golden Visa scheme (Martini
2018), which not only enabled one to get permanent residence in this
Schengen country, but also profited handsomely for some close friends of
the regime. The new Hungarian nuclear power plant to be built in the
town of Paks could have raised not only environmental but also compe-
tition and security policy issues as well. Instead of being very scrupulous
regarding Hungary’s intention to involve Russian nuclear technology, the
Commission, according to some sources, lent a hand to the Hungarian
government on how to find a loophole in the EU public procurement
regime (Valero 2017) and also approved Hungary’s financial support for
the construction of them (European Commission 2017).
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A further issue was the creation of a gargantuan media holding in the
summer of 2018, as many rich businessmen close to Orbán created a
foundation (Közép-Európai Sajtó és Média Alapítvány—Central European
Press and Media Foundation), and very generously donated their media
undertakings for this entity. In doing so, they produced the largest media
company in Hungary owning a number of print newspapers and maga-
zines, TV and radio stations and news websites, which not only questions
media plurality but that of competition law as well. Although national
legislation created a loophole for this construction, being freed from the
scrutiny of the competent national authorities, this should not stop the
Commission from taking a closer look.
The recent initiative by the European Commission to protect the
Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of
law in the member states (European Commission 2018) rather satisfies
the demands of old member states. Seeing as it might have a disci-
plinary effect, it can be seen as a step in the right direction. But there
are still some caveats. The generalised deficiencies are at the very least
unclear, which hampers its effectiveness. Moreover, it sharpens the conflict
between new and old member states, because the new ones do not neces-
sarily see the financial support as a generosity but as a bargained price
for opening their infant markets for the developed Western countries by
the accession, with EU funding simply offsetting the losses. Cutting these
sources would mean an impetus, at least for the new member states, to
introduce measures to protect their own markets, and, of course, to capi-
talise on them politically (describing them as punishment for defending
the national interest) (Adamski 2019, pp. 645–649).
6 Conclusion
Since 2010, there has been an ongoing discussion in Europe as to whether
Hungary is violating the fundamental values of the European Union, and
if so, what to do with it. For some, Hungary is a deterrent example; for
others, it is a guidebook on how to exploit the benefits of the membership
and getting away with it.
The Hungarian government has a very transactional position in relation
to the EU and is rather immune to discussions on its core principles.41
41Well-documented by Kelemen (2017).
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It often describes them as pointless moral debates on diverging polit-
ical philosophies.42 There are several circumstances supporting this value
relativism. There is, on the one hand, no value unity in the EU, and no
authority to define the so-called common values. The conceptual core of
these values might be common, but there are so many niceties and partic-
ulars that it is very hard to establish a canon of these values. This inherent
inhomogeneity of the European Union (united in diversity, as the motto
goes) can be very easily exploited in a postmodern world of philosoph-
ical deconstruction by highlighting natural contradictions and variations,
which might result also in the destruction of these values. This is being
attempted by the Hungarian government.
Therefore, the EU should make an effort to neutralise the dispute43
and to make the best use of those competences, powers and procedures
which are rather immune to the sophistry of the Hungarian government,
such as the internal market, competition rules. The Commission, while
making some progress, has not effectively used its powers.
The conclusion comes very close to Kennan’s long telegram: “We
must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and
conceptions of human society. (…) The greatest danger that can befall us
in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow
ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping”. One way out
is the even-handed application of EU law for all member states, new and
old, big or small.
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CHAPTER 10
Does It Help to Call a Spade a Spade?
Examining the Legal Bases and Effects of Rule
of Law-Related Infringement Procedures
Against Hungary
Lisa H. Anders and Sonja Priebus
1 Introduction
In view of the “rule of law crisis” (Reding 2013), politicians and scholars
started discussing the EU’s tools to defend the rule of law and democ-
racy in its member states. This chapter focuses on one of these tools, the
infringement procedure.
Scholars agree that infringement procedures are generally an effec-
tive instrument to induce compliance with EU Treaty obligations and
secondary law (Börzel 2003). Whether they are also a suitable means to
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enforce the EU’s foundational values and to combat rule of law back-
sliding in EU member states is, however, still contested. Some regard the
instrument as “too narrow to address the structural problems” of back-
sliding (Scheppele 2016, p. 109), fearing that it forces the Commission
to misconstrue rule of law problems as instances of non-compliance with
EU secondary law (Pech and Kochenov 2019, p. 5). This would allow the
targeted governments to downplay the severity of the problems at hand,
react with minimal legal changes to satisfy the Commission’s require-
ments and then proceed with their illiberal agenda. Some suggest that rule
of law-related infringement procedures induce symbolic compliance at
best (Batory 2016) and might even be counterproductive if the targeted
governments succeed in framing the Commission’s criticism as an ille-
gitimate interference into domestic politics (Schlipphak and Treib 2016).
Others, in contrast, are more sanguine, deeming infringement procedures
a “powerful alternative” to the procedure under Article 7 of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU) and expecting them to contribute to depoliti-
cising conflicts concerning the rule of law (Schmidt and Bogdanowicz
2018, p. 1062). The Commission has also recently shown a renewed
interest in the instrument, announcing that it would continue to use it
in rule of law related cases (European Commission 2019b).
Our empirical knowledge about the deployment and actual effects of
infringement proceedings in rule of law related cases is, however, still
limited. So far, scholars have focused predominantly on the most promi-
nent cases, while systematic studies are lacking. Thus, we do not know on
what legal basis the Commission introduces these proceedings, whether
it always refers to concrete breaches of EU secondary law as assumed in
literature or whether it also cites more fundamental values. Furthermore,
we lack knowledge about the targeted government’s legal and public
reactions. To contribute to closing this gap, we empirically examine all
infringement procedures with rule of law significance launched against
Hungary since 2010. Hungary is an ideal case to study since it has already
faced seven rule of law-related infringement procedures. This relatively
high number of cases enables us to examine the legal bases and effects of
these proceedings and explore patterns over time.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section briefly takes
stock of research on infringement procedures and discusses the argu-
ments for and against the deployment of this tool in rule of law related
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cases. Section 3 examines the legal bases of the infringement proce-
dures with rule of law relevance launched against Hungary since 2010,
while Section 4 briefly sketches the Hungarian government’s reactions.
Section 5 is devoted to exploring the interplay between Brussels and
Budapest over time. The concluding section summarises and discusses the
main findings.
2 Infringement Procedures
as an Instrument Against Rule of Law
Backsliding in EU Member States?
The meaning of the rule of law is notoriously contested (see Chapter 9).
A thin concept simply equates the rule of law with the rule by law.
More common are thicker concepts relating the rule of law to checks
and balances, the independence of the judiciary as well as the guar-
antee of basic human rights (Merkel 2012). It is exactly these principles
that are being systematically attacked in Hungary. Since Fidesz and
its coalition partner KDNP won a two-thirds majority in parliament
in 2010, the country’s constitutional order has been changed dramati-
cally. The government has centralised power within the executive, turned
the National Assembly into a rubber-stamp parliament and consider-
ably weakened the Constitutional Court. Besides, it adopted an electoral
law designed to favour Fidesz and passed several laws to strengthen the
government’s influence over the media and to curb the activities of civil
society organisations (Ágh 2018; Priebus 2016). As a result, the former
democratisation frontrunner is considered a prime example of rule of
law backsliding1 or even autocratisation (see Chapter 12). Against this
backdrop, and in view of similar developments in other member states, a
growing body of research discusses the EU’s political and legal tools to
tackle backsliding in its member states.
Compared to other tools, such as the “nuclear option” of Article 7
TEU, the infringement procedure has several advantages. Most notably,
its decisional thresholds are much lower and the defiant member states
1Rule of law backsliding is defined as the process “through which elected public author-
ities deliberately implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken,
annihilate or capture internal checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal
democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party” (Pech and
Scheppele 2017, p. 10).
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enjoy “a full set of procedural guarantees and rights” (Schmidt and
Bogdanowicz 2018, p. 1065). The procedure starts with informal consul-
tations between the Commission and the state suspected of violating EU
rules. Then, the Commission can send a “letter of formal notice” to the
member state concerned. If dissatisfied with the reaction to the letter, it
can give a “reasoned opinion”, and, if non-compliance prevails, bring the
case before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Relying
on informal consultations and persuasion, the Commission usually tries
to tackle non-compliance in the early stages of the procedure and avoids
open conflicts with non-complying member states (Closa 2019). In fact,
the vast amount of cases are settled in the early stages of the proce-
dure (Börzel 2003, p. 207), showing that the Commission’s enforcement
actions are generally quite effective in inducing compliance with EU law
(Panke 2010).
Infringement procedures can be initiated by the Commission if it “con-
siders that a member state has failed to fulfil an obligation under the
Treaties” (Article 258 TFEU). The Commission must base its proceeding
on clear legal EU norms. The EU’s foundational values of democracy
and the rule of law, however, are legally undetermined as Article 2 TEU
mentions but does not further specify these terms (Magen 2016, p. 1051;
Müller 2015, p. 147). This does not mean that the EU’s foundational
values are explicitly excluded from the supervisory remit of the Commis-
sion (Hillion 2016). Yet, as these values do not provide a clear legal basis
for their enforcement, the Commission has to look for a “more tech-
nical but more clearly established legal basis to prosecute the action”
(Blauberger and Kelemen 2016, p. 325).
Whether the resulting indirect and piecemeal approach can restrain
backsliding is questionable. As also stressed by the Commission, it is
only a viable route when the concerns of the rule of law at hand “con-
stitute, at the same time, a breach of a specific provision of EU law”
(European Commission 2014, p. 5). Besides, critics underline that it
misconstrues or miscategorises the problems at hand. Broader backsliding
tendencies are not named as such but are reframed by the Commission
as concrete breaches of EU law in individual proceedings (Scheppele
2016). This enables backsliding governments to respond “satisfactorily
to the outstanding complaints without having to change anything essen-
tial about its illiberal reforms” (Jenne and Mudde 2012, p. 150). Others
even posit that the targeted governments merely engage in symbolic
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compliance and simply create the appearance of norm-conform behaviour
(Batory 2016).
Besides, scholars debate how rule of law-related infringement proce-
dures can be rhetorically exploited. Some contend that if the Commission
sues backsliding states on more technical grounds and reframes rule of
law problems as breaches of secondary law, it allows backsliding govern-
ments to downplay the actual conflicts by publicly presenting rule of law
related problems as ordinary compliance difficulties (Jenne and Mudde
2012). Some scholars, therefore, suggest that the Commission should
engage in systemic infringement actions and bundle “a group of specific
violations together” (Scheppele 2016, p. 107) to highlight the systemic
and persistent character of rule of law backsliding. Then, cases would
not be miscategorised, providing the Commission with “greater options
and a clearer message of response to rule of law backsliding” (Pech and
Kochenov 2019, p. 5). Others, moreover, warn that rule of law-related
infringement procedures might invite the errant governments to play a
“blame game” (Schlipphak and Treib 2016). Governments could frame
any EU intervention as a politically motivated, illegitimate interference
“in policies beyond the remit established by the EU Treaties” (Dawson
and Muir 2012, p. 473) and themselves as defenders of their nation,
which, as a consequence, could alienate citizens from the EU. Whether
governments really succeed with these strategies is doubted by others.
Highlighting the high levels of public trust in the Commission and the
CJEU, they suggest that infringement procedures might be welcomed
by citizens and help to depoliticise current conflicts over the rule of law
(Blauberger and Kelemen 2016; Schmidt and Bogdanowicz 2018).
In short, the concrete effects of infringement procedures as instru-
ments against democratic backsliding remain unclear. Up until now,
scholars have mainly focused on the most prominent infringement proce-
dure (which addressed the lowering of the retirement age of judges) and
generally concluded that infringement procedures are ineffective in reme-
dying rule of law problems (Müller 2015; Scheppele 2016). Systematic
empirical studies on the deployment and the legal effects of infringement
procedures in all cases with rule of law relevance as well as on the govern-
ment’s communication in these cases are still lacking (see Szente 2017
for an exception). This chapter contributes to fill this gap by analysing
all rule of law-related infringement procedures launched against Hungary
since 2010 (see Table 1). So far, studies on Hungary have identified six
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Table 1 Rule of law-related infringement procedures against Hungary. Source
authors’ compilation
No. Beginning IPa Subject triggering IP
1 12/2010b Title: Media legislation
Trigger: Act CIV of 2010 on the Freedom of the Press and
the Fundamental Rules on Media Content + Act CLXXXV of
2010 on Media Services and Mass Media
2 01/2012 Title: Independence of Central Bank
Trigger: Fundamental Law of Hungary + Act CCVIII of
2011 on the Hungarian National Bank
3 01/2012 Title: Independence of Judiciary: Retirement age of judges,
prosecutors and public notaries
Trigger: Fundamental Law of Hungary
4 01/2012 Title: Violation of Independence of Data Protection
Supervisory Authority
Trigger: Fundamental Law of Hungary
5 04/2017 Title: Violation of EU law by amendments to the Hungarian
Higher Education Law
Trigger: Act XXV of 2017 (“Lex CEU”)
6 07/2017 Title: Violation of EU law by the Act on the Transparency of
Organisations Supported from Abroad
Trigger: Act LXXVI of 2017 (“NGO-law”)
7 07/2018 Title: Violation of EU law by means of the Act VI of 2018
amending certain acts with respect to measures against illegal
immigration and the 7th amendment to the Fundamental Law
of Hungary
Trigger: 7th Amendment to Fundamental Law of Hungary
(“Stop-Soros”)
Act No VI of 2018
aDate of letter of formal notice
bThis case was closed before a letter of formal notice was issued. We take the letter written by
then-commissioner Neelie Kroes to the Hungarian government as the starting date
such cases; we additionally consider another recent case, the infringement
procedure launched against the so-called “Stop Soros” legislation.
Drawing on Commission press releases and public statements of
Commissioners, we first examine the legal basis referred to by the
Commission when starting infringement action in rule of law related
cases. In particular, we analyse whether the Commission bases its infringe-
ment actions solely on “technical” Treaty obligations and secondary law
or if it also refers to the rule of law or other fundamental values connected
to it. Besides, using a database of Hungarian legislation (https://net.
jogtar.hu) as well as the Official Gazette of Hungary (Magyar Közlöny),
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we analyse Hungary’s legal reactions to these infringement procedures.
Furthermore, we take a closer look at the government’s public reactions,
relying on official press releases, summaries of government members’
public appearances and full transcripts or summaries of interviews with
government members issued within two weeks after each Commis-
sion’s announcement of action against Hungary and published on the
government’s official website.
3 Miscategorising the Problems? The Legal Bases
of Rule of Law-Related Infringement Action
In all cases under examination, the Commission did not refer directly to
Article 2 TEU, the EU’s foundational values of democracy or the rule
of law, but based its infringement actions on other EU law violations
(see Table 2 in the Appendix for an overview). In most cases, however, it
complemented technical references to breaches of Treaty provisions and
secondary law with references to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union (CFR).
In this vein, the Commission framed the media legislation package
of 2010 (case 1) primarily as an incorrect transposition of the EU’s
Audiovisual Media Services directive, but also stressed that “fundamental
media freedoms such as freedom of expression and media pluralism” as
enshrined in Article 11 of the CFR were endangered (European Commis-
sion 2011; Kroes 2011). This was in line with general criticism voiced by
observers that the media legislation threatened the freedom of the press
by establishing a politically biased Media Council, altering appointment
procedures to ensure political influence on the public broadcasting service
and demanding “balanced coverage” (Polyák 2015; Várnagy 2011).
Similarly, in the infringement procedure triggered by the restructuring
of the Hungarian ombudsmen system (case 4), the Commission referred
to both violations of secondary law and CFR provisions. Noting that the
former data protection ombudsman’s functions had been transferred to
a new agency without the former guarantees of independence (Bánkuti
et al. 2012, p. 266) and that the incumbent ombudsman for data protec-
tion had been prematurely removed from its office, the Commission
argued that these provisions violated Article 16 of TFEU as well as Direc-
tive 95/46/EC codifying the EU rules on data protection. Additionally,
it referred to Article 8 of the CFR guaranteeing the independence of data
protection supervisors (European Commission 2012a).
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In the case of the Lex CEU (case 5), which changed the rules for
non-Hungarian universities and obviously targeted the private Central
European University (CEU) founded by George Soros, the Commission
primarily referred to violations of internal market principles. It argued
that the law was incompatible with the freedom to provide services and
the freedom of establishment as enshrined in Articles 56 and 49 TFEU,
respectively, as well as in Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the
internal market. At the same time, it also stressed violations of Articles 13,
14 and 16 of the CFR, namely academic freedom, the right to education
and the freedom to conduct a business (European Commission 2017b).
Also in case 6, the infringement procedure launched in reaction to the
“NGO law” (Act LXXVI of 2017 on the Transparency of the Organi-
sations Supported from Abroad), the Commission communicated that it
saw several fundamental principles of the CFR violated. The new legisla-
tion obliges NGOs receiving over 7.2 million HUF (about 24,000 Euros)
per year from abroad to be registered by a court and to be officially
labelled as “organisations supported from abroad” in any publications and
on their websites. As for the Commission, this does not only constitute
a violation of the free movement of capital, but also of the freedom of
association as well as the rights to protection of private life and personal
data (European Commission 2017c).
Reacting to the “Stop Soros” legislation (case 7), which further intensi-
fied pressure on civil society organisations by specifying that organisations
or people who “support or promote illegal immigration” (Act VI of 2018,
§ 11) can be sanctioned with up to one year of imprisonment or even
expulsion from the country, the Commission identified a violation of the
Asylum Procedure Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive, a
breach of Articles 20 and 21 (1) TFEU as well as the Free Movement
Directive and the Asylum Qualifications Directive. Yet, just as in the afore-
mentioned infringement procedures, it also saw a violation of the CFR,
as the “Stop Soros” legislation introduced new non-admissibility grounds
for asylum applications not regulated by EU law, thus restricting the right
to asylum guaranteed in Article 18 (European Commission 2018).
In only two cases did the Commission frame rule of law related
concerns solely as breaches of concrete Treaty obligations and secondary
law. In the case of the Hungarian National Bank (case 2), an infringe-
ment procedure was launched because the new Hungarian Constitution
in connection with Act CCVIII of 2011 on the Hungarian National
Bank had introduced several provisions threatening its independence.
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The Commission justified the infringement action by referring to Article
130 TFEU on the full independence of the national central banks and
to Article 127(4) requiring consultation with the ECB “on any draft
legislative provision in its field of competence” (European Commission
2012a). In the case of the lowering of the judges’, prosecutors’ and public
notaries’ retirement age (case 3), which caused the premature retire-
ment of several hundred judges, enabling the government to fill vacant
positions with new and loyal candidates (Scheppele 2016, p. 109), the
Commission framed the obviously politically motivated replacement of
judges exclusively as a breach of Directive 2000/78/EC on equal treat-
ment in employment, which prohibits age discrimination in the workplace
(European Commission 2012a). In this case, rule of law related concerns
were treated as a matter of age discrimination.
Overall, this demonstrates that even though the Commission did not
justify the rule of law-related infringement procedures with violations of
the rule of law or democracy as such, and even though it never directly
mentioned Article 2 TEU, it also did not simply miscategorise the under-
lying problems by presenting them as being only breaches of technical
legislation. Instead, in most of the cases, it stressed various rights and
freedoms constitutive of a democracy, such as the freedom of expres-
sion and information (case 1), the freedom of assembly and association
(case 6), the right to protection of personal data (cases 4 and 6) and
academic freedom as well as the right to education (case 5). Obviously,
the Commission made a clear effort to link its rule of law concerns to
fundamental democratic prerequisites.
4 From Limited Cooperation to Resistance:
The Hungarian Government’s Reactions to Rule
of Law-Related Infringement Procedures
The Hungarian government’s reactions to rule of law-related infringe-
ment procedures underwent a fundamental change, both in substance
and rhetoric. In the beginning, the government presented the infringe-
ment procedures as regular, policy-related procedures addressing ordinary
transposition problems. It stressed that the Commission never directly
referred to fundamental values or rule of law problems (Hungarian
Government 2011) and reasoned that there was no conflict concerning
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fundamental values such as the freedom of the press or the indepen-
dence of the judiciary (Hungarian Government 2012a, b). Disagreements
between Brussels and Budapest were explained in terms of differing
perspectives on compliance problems, e.g. that the former saw the retire-
ment age of judges as a judicial matter while the latter viewed it as a
matter of pensions policy (Hungarian Government 2012d; Orbán 2012).
The government underlined that apart from these slightly differing inter-
pretations and smaller technical problems, the Hungarian legislation was
overall compatible with EU law and that it just had to be properly
explained to the Commission. In this vein, it framed the infringement
procedures as a chance for dialogue and an opportunity to resolve
conflicts (Hungarian Government 2012a, b). It also displayed its opti-
mism regarding the Commission’s “objective, impartial evaluation, which
excludes double standards and is founded on a judicial and professional
basis”2 (Hungarian Government 2012c). Last but not least, it stressed
Hungary’s willingness to comply with the Commission’s requirements
and CJEU rulings (Hungarian Government 2012a, c).
In accordance with these conciliatory public statements, the Hungarian
government changed some parts of the new media legislation package
after bilateral talks and enacted these changes through Act XIX of
2011. It also complied with the Commission requirements in case 3,
but only after a ruling by the CJEU had confirmed the Commission’s
position (EU:C:2012:687). In reaction to the Commission’s criticism,
Act XX of 2013 re-increased the judges’, notaries’ and public prose-
cutors’ retirement age gradually to 65 within ten years and also made
provisions for reinstating unlawfully dismissed judges unless the posi-
tion had not been filled yet. In these cases, the former judges should be
entitled to financial compensation. Measured solely against the Commis-
sion’s concrete requirements, these two infringement procedures induced
complete compliance.
In contrast, the government’s reaction in the cases of the National
Bank and of the independence of the data protection authority were
mixed, yielding only partial compliance with the Commission’s require-
ments. The Hungarian government deleted some provisions that would
have curtailed the National Bank’s independence but did not withdraw
the criticised changes in the governor’s remuneration scheme. Despite
2All quotes are own translations.
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this obvious partial compliance, the infringement procedure was closed in
April 2012 even before the legislative changes were enacted (European
Commission 2012b). The government’s legal reaction to the infringe-
ment procedure on the independence of the data protection authority
provides another example of partial compliance. The government changed
the dismissal rules, but left the issue of the data protection ombudsman
unresolved. Even though the Commission’s position had been confirmed
by the CJEU in April 2014 (EU:C:2014:237), the former ombudsman
András Jóri was not reinstated, but only given financial compensation.
Nevertheless, the Commission silently closed the case in October 2014.
In all four cases mentioned above, however, the underlying rule
of law problems have not been resolved. Despite the changes to the
media legislation, the government’s direct influence on the public broad-
casting service has been maintained, as the Media Council’s composition
remained unchanged. As a result of this direct political influence, indepen-
dent or left-leaning media were put under severe financial pressure, while
a new government-friendly media staffed with public money was estab-
lished (Várnagy 2017, p. 127). The National Bank’s independence has
also been severely jeopardised. By appointing the minister of economics
György Matolcsy as new governor in 2013, the government managed to
install a Fidesz-loyalist as head of the bank (Buckley and Kester 2013),
thus ensuring government control despite the legislative changes made in
response to the infringement procedure. The same year, the fifth amend-
ment to the constitution merged the Central Bank with the Financial
Supervisory Authority, increasing the government’s influence on financial
and monetary matters. Concerning the independence of the judiciary, the
altered legislation remained rather ineffective in practice as the majority
of positions had already been filled by then. Many judges, especially in
high-ranking positions, therefore, could not return to their former posi-
tions. While formally complying with the Commission’s requirements, the
Hungarian government could still at least partly realise its objective of
filling positions with new judges (Scheppele 2016, p. 109f.).
The communication on cases 5, 6 and 7, in contrast, was highly
confrontational, with the government showing hardly any inclination of
cooperation or willingness to comply with the Commission’s demands.
Increasingly, it presented the rule of law-related infringement procedures
as political attacks on Hungary due to its resistance against migrants
and the EU’s migration policy (Orbán 2017a, b). Especially in cases 5
and 6, the government linked the two rule of law-related infringement
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procedures with two asylum related infringement procedures launched
in parallel (see the contribution of Beger in this volume). Reacting to
the infringement procedure on the “Stop Soros” package, the govern-
ment’s spokesman put forth that “those who protect Europe are punished
while those who send for migrants are praised” (Hungarian Govern-
ment 2018). Besides, from case 5 onwards, the alleged prominent role
of Soros in orchestrating migration across Europe, the “Soros plan”,
became the government’s dominant narrative. As the Prime Minister
explained in summer 2017, “bureaucrats of Brussels want to take revenge
on Hungary” as the country “is doing its job, is protecting its borders,
is defending its citizens” (Orbán 2017a). He added that the bureaucrats
“play by Soros’s music. There is a Soros plan” (Orbán 2017b). Now,
Soros’s name figured in almost all public statements on the rule of law-
related infringement procedures. EU institutions were repeatedly depicted
as being infiltrated by “Soros’s people” and, therefore, as acting according
to his plan. As the Secretary of State for Justice argued, “according to
leaked data, George Soros has more than 200 reliable people in the
European Parliament alone” (Völner 2017a; also Völner 2017b). Orbán
argued similarly that “Brussels is under his influence” and that the “Brus-
sels machinery is executing his plan” (Orbán 2017c). In short, all rule of
law-related infringement procedures after 2015 were officially depicted as
Soros’s “revenge” executed by EU institutions: “We see that the issue of
the university, the issue of the ‘fake civil society organisations’ […] as well
as the issue of quotas lead us to one person called George Soros” (Orbán
2017d). The government has not changed this line of reasoning since;
rule of law related criticism by EU actors is regularly depicted as an act to
punish Hungary for its migration policy (Hungarian Government 2019;
Varga 2019).
In line with its public rhetoric, the Hungarian government refused to
change the objectionable legislation even slightly and let the Commission
refer them to the CJEU. Regarding the Lex CEU, it insisted that there
was no necessity to change the law (Hungarian Government 2017). The
complaint against the “Lex CEU” was therefore lodged before the CJEU
in December 2017. Similarly, in the case of the NGO law, the Hungarian
government did not implement any changes after the Commission’s letter
of formal notice and its reasoned opinion. Orbán called the Commission’s
criticism “ridiculous” and far-fetched, saying that an “intelligent lawyer”
would not even touch the Commission’s document (Orbán 2017c).
Therefore, this case was also referred to the CJEU in December 2017
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(European Commission 2017d), being without a ruling thus far. In the
so-called Stop Soros case, the Hungarian government not only insisted
on its position, rejecting legislative changes even if the case was referred
to the CJEU (Hungarian Government 2017; Völner 2017b), the Prime
Minister also proclaimed that the Hungarian government was not paying
much attention to the matter, as due to the upcoming EP elections, the
Commission’s days were numbered (Orbán 2018). As a consequence, the
Commission referred the case to the Court in July 2019, where it awaits
its ruling.
5 Escalation and Learning Effects: The Interplay
Between Brussels and Budapest Since 2010
As demonstrated above, the limited cooperative stance of the Hungarian
government between 2010 and 2013 has turned into grim resistance.
While the first four rule of law-related infringement procedures were at
least partly successful in legal terms, the last three procedures met fierce
opposition. Starting with case 5 in 2017, the Hungarian government has
decidedly refused to even slightly change the provisions violating EU law,
causing the referral of all cases to the CJEU.3
It seems that during this ongoing escalation of conflicts, the Hungarian
government’s increasingly confrontational stance in the rule of law related
cases led the Commission to reconsider its conventional approach of
conflict avoidance. In line with previous studies, cases 2 and 4 demon-
strate that the Commission first avoided going through all the stages of
the infringement procedure. Despite the obvious partial compliance, it
closed both cases and did not bring them before the court. However,
this hesitant position yielded adverse effects. First, it gave the Hungarian
government the chance to downplay the rule of law problems. As the
cases were officially closed, it could argue that it had “a confirmation
of our freedom of the press being okay, our media regulations being
3Hungary’s overall compliance record has not deteriorated and referrals to the court
remain an exception as a closer look at all infringement procedures launched against
Hungary since 2010 reveals European Commission (2020). This corroborates earlier find-
ings. Scholars have repeatedly pointed out that the new member states comply even better
with EU law than the older member states (Börzel and Sedelmeier 2017). While the EU’s
influence on “hot topics” decreases, the member states’ compliance performance in less
controversial areas remains strong (Grabbe 2014, p. 42; see also Schimmelfennig and
Sedelmeier 2019).
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okay, our electoral law being okay, our constitution being okay” (Orbán
2017d). Similarly, and despite the ongoing deterioration of the media
situation which resulted in the “effective take-over of once-independent
media” (Joint International Press Freedom Mission 2019), the Secretary
of State for International Communication and Relations Zoltán Kovács
recently claimed, “if there’s a country that holds a certificate showing that
its media regulatory system conforms to EU law, it’s Hungary” (Kovács
2019).
Secondly, it became obvious that governments can use the long time
span between the lodging of a complaint and the court ruling to buy
time and meanwhile continue to dismantle democracy and the rule of
law. The Lex CEU is just one case in point. When the Hungarian Parlia-
ment adopted the law, the Commission acted swiftly and more decisively
than before, sending a letter of formal notice to Budapest in April, just a
few days after the adoption, followed by a reasoned opinion in July and
a referral to the Court in December that year (European Commission
2017a, b, d). Since then, the court ruling is pending, while the govern-
ment has achieved its goal of driving the university out of the country.
Although the CEU fulfilled the new requirements for foreign universi-
ties, the government did not sign the document that would have allowed
the university to run a campus in Budapest. In response, the university
partly moved to Vienna (Bárd 2018).
Obviously responding to these adverse effects of recent rule of law-
related infringement procedures (and without doubt also inspired by
the Polish experience), the Commission has announced its intention
to deploy the instrument in a more decisive manner and to pursue
a “strategic approach”. According to the Commission, this strategic
approach includes the request for expedited proceedings and interim
measures “whenever necessary” (European Commission 2019a). This
resonates with scholarly opinions according to which the Commission
should “explore the untapped potential of increasing and interconnected
infringement actions” (see also Bárd and Śledzińska-Simon 2019; Pech
and Kochenov 2019, p. 5).
In addition, the Commission declared that it will “further build on the
recent case law of the Court” (European Commission 2019b). In fact,
case law is an important source to further determine the meaning of the
EU’s foundational values and thus to make it a legal basis for rule of
law-related infringement procedures. For example, with Case C-64/16,
the CJEU developed clear yardsticks to assess the independence of the
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judiciary in EU member states. This might further reduce the risk of
miscategorising rule of law problems.
6 Conclusion
To contribute to the burgeoning body of research on the EU’s tools
against rule of law backsliding, this chapter has set out to systematically
analyse all rule of law-related infringement procedures launched against
Hungary since 2010. Our analysis reveals that even though the Commis-
sion did not once directly refer to democracy and the rule of law as
enshrined in Article 2 TEU, it did not simply miscategorise the rule of law
problems as ordinary instances of non-compliance either. In most of the
cases, it referred to fundamental democratic prerequisites, namely rights
and freedoms incorporated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union.
Secondly, in all cases under investigation, the Hungarian government
downplayed the Commission’s rule of law concerns. In early cases, it
repeatedly talked down the severity of the Commission’s complaints by
presenting conflicts with Brussels as differences of opinion on technical
problems. In later cases, it did so by playing a blame game and adopting
a victim narrative, according to which the EU was infiltrated by “Soros
people” and going against Hungary because it wanted to punish the
country for its restrictive asylum policy. This demonstrates that despite
their legal character and formalised procedures, infringement procedures
could not contribute to depoliticising the conflicts and thereby ease the
strained relations between Budapest and Brussels. On the contrary, as
things currently stand, the rule of law-related infringement procedures
obviously bear the risk of politicising the judiciary by bringing highly
controversial conflicts before the CJEU. It remains to be seen how
Hungary will react to the CJEU judgements on the Lex CEU, the NGO
law and the “Stop Soros” package.
Thirdly, especially the Hungarian government’s open resistance in the
last three cases casts doubt on the premise that the correct identifica-
tion of rule of law and democracy problems could induce compliance
with the Commission’s requirements. These cases clearly demonstrate that
the most important prerequisite for the procedures’ effectiveness is the
targeted government’s willingness to comply. If this is lacking, the cate-
gorisation of cases—references to fundamental rights such as freedom of
association, academic freedom and the right to asylum—cannot make a
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difference. Nevertheless, the Commission seems determined to draw on
recent case law and to establish a clearer link to the rule of law in future
cases.4
Last but not least, our findings cast doubt on the suitability of another
prominent suggestion, namely the creation of a new neutral institution
or a “committee of independent experts” (Weber and Di Fabio 2019)
as a “democracy watchdog” (Müller 2015, p. 143). If the Commission,
the guardian of the treaties, is systematically presented as an agent of
Soros, and if its infringement procedures are systematically framed by the
Hungarian government as political attacks, there is no reason to expect
that the same fate would not befall a new institution of neutral experts.5
The same seems true for systemic infringement procedures. While they
enable the Commission to approach rule of law problems more system-
atically, they seem to be even more prone to politicisation and blame
games by governments. By starting systemic infringement procedures, the
Commission would focus exclusively on the rule of law as well as democ-
racy issues, and the targeted government could easily present these as
systematically orchestrated political attacks.
Overall, our analysis shows that the infringement procedures as a legal
instrument against rule of law backsliding are not only futile but even
counterproductive. It furthermore casts doubt on the premise that a
proper application of the instrument will make a difference and yield the
desired effects.
Appendix
4For a critical discussion of this, see Chapter 14.
5For the potential of supporting NGOs as watchdogs of democracy and EU
membership, see Chapter 11.
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CHAPTER 11
Safeguarding Democracy and the Rule of Law
by Civil Society Actors? The Case of Poland
Claudia-Y. Matthes
1 Introduction
The judicial reforms which the party Law and Justice (Prawo i Spraw-
iedliwość, PiS) started directly after being elected into government in
November 2015 targeted four institutions: the Constitutional Tribunal
(Trybunał Konstytucyjny, TK), the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy, SN),
the National Council of the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, KRS)
and the common courts. While there had already been a debate for years
about the workload and efficiency of Polish courts, the content of changes
shows that the government’s goal was primarily to exert political control
on them. Both the SN and the TK had gained a reputation as inde-
pendent actors and defenders of civil rights and therefore, according to
the government’s blueprint to reorganise the state, courts were the first
target. In line with these changes, the government re-merged the offices
of the attorney general and the minister of justice who received additional
powers of discretion. While the European Commission had waited a while
until it took some action against similar changes in Hungary, it raised its
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voice very quickly in the Polish case and asked the government to rework
the legislation.
However, considering the time that has passed since the European
Commission launched the Rule of Law Framework and the Article 7
procedure against Poland in January 2016 and December 2017, respec-
tively, and the meagre results that were achieved, these two instruments
are generally assessed rather negatively and the EU does not perform well
as a normative power in terms of rule of law principles (Ágh 2018; for
a similar view regarding Hungary, see Chapters 9 and 10). Explanations
reach from party politics and power plays inside the European institutions
to the ineffectiveness of the EU’s legal measures (Kochenov 2018, p. 4;
Pech and Scheppele 2017). There are no legal mechanisms to enforce
the values mentioned in Article 2 TEU and no effective means to fine
member states that do not comply by the rules out of ideological reasons
(Kochenov 2018, p. 10; Mader 2018). In addition, Commission, EP and
Council often do not act along similar lines (Oliver and Stefanelli 2016;
Bárd and Carrera 2017, pp. 7–9), and the requirement for unanimous
voting on the question of if a member state shall lose its voting rights in
the Council (plus the two-thirds majority in the Parliament) proves to be
too high a hurdle to take a decision (Closa 2019).
Hence, in academia new forms of conditionality, such as a rule of
law clause in the multi-annual financial framework (Halmai 2018), and
a purely legal approach that trusts in the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (CJEU), are discussed (Kelemen and Blauberger 2017; De
Schutter 2017; Niklewicz 2017, p. 286). Sedelmeier (2017) is one of the
few authors who see some potential in the social pressure that the Rule
of Law Framework exerts on member states if its formal, transparent and
public nature were applied more consistently. A similar process of reflec-
tion is currently occurring in the Commission. In April 2019, it asked for
responses from stakeholders on how to strengthen the rule of law (Euro-
pean Commission 2019a) and published a communication in July that
lays, among other issues, an emphasis on civil society actors (European
Commission 2019b, p. 6).
Now, the question is to what extent civil society actors in post-socialist
countries are ready for such an active role. On the one hand, literature on
the topic is relatively hesitant to assign them the ability to act across the
levels of decision-making in the European polity (Kutter and Trappmann
2010). On the other hand, there are civil society actors in Poland that do
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speak out loudly against the decline of the rule of law at numerous anti-
government and pro-EU demonstrations (Mycielski 2016; Bień-Kacała
2017; O’Neal 2017).
The focus of the following chapter is to understand how and to what
extent civil society, especially the civil rights movement, can serve as a
further hinge for the Commission into a member state society1 by articu-
lating its protest on the domestic and the EU level. The next section sets
out a theoretical framework for the analysis of civil society operating in the
multi-level system of the EU. It is followed by a look into the domestic
opportunity structure in which civil society actors operate in Poland and
an analysis of their protest repertoire based on these groups’ publications,
websites and secondary sources. The last section discusses the relevance
of the findings for a possible improvement of the procedures to protect
the rule of law.
2 Theoretical Framework---Civil Society
and Its Potential for a Watchdog Function
The involvement of civil society in EU governance and policy-making in
general has become a widely investigated topic. Research on the issue can
be divided into two strands of literature: one analyses the openness of
the EU’s institutional setting for NGOs (Heritier 2003; Börzel 2010);
the other, the domestic conditions under which NGOs operate and how
these allow them to engage in the multi-level-governance game (Kohler-
Koch and Buth 2011; Pleines 2010). Inside the European Union, the
inclusion of civil society has become a topic since the implementation of
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. In order to increase the legitimacy of the
EU, so-called soft-modes of governance that include civil society actors
into policy-making were discovered as a solution to many of the then
existing problems. Accordingly, civil society needs to have some organisa-
tional features that facilitate collective action, something that loose social
movements or random gatherings of people in public are hardly able to do
(Saurugger 2006). As Heidbreder (2012, p. 9) summarises, civil society
on the EU level can have three functions: to complement existing modes
of decision-making, to help to provide better policy-solutions and to
1Considering that PiS received just a relative majority of votes at the elections in 2015
(Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016, p. 62) and 70–80% of the Polish population is constantly
positive about EU-membership (CBOS 2019), see Chapter 1.
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increase the legitimacy of the EU polity. Here, the focus is not on policy-
making, but on action against the decline of the rule of law, and both
sides, civil society and European institutions, can increase their legitimacy
through problem-solving.
Regarding the capacities of NGOs and interest associations in the
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) previous research
showed that legacies of socialist times hinder them to act as watchdog
organisations. Kutter and Trappmann (2010) and Pleines (2010) provide
quite critical assessments of the ability of interest groups to use the EU
system for their needs. According to their findings, legacies understood as
social institutions, habits and discourses from the (post-)socialist period,
compared with experiences made during the EU accession period and the
various stimuli the EU provides to civil society, produce an ambiguous
situation: some interest groups were able to adapt to the EU’s exper-
tise and bureaucracy-driven style of governance, while others still struggle
with a new opportunity structure, an ongoing transformation of domestic
state structures, clientelism and politicised bureaucracies. They also lack
knowledge about the political process, the EU decision-making struc-
tures, language competencies, the ability to network in a multi-level arena
and have only limited personnel.
Hence, on the one side, there are very outspoken civil society actors,
in Poland and the region (Guasti 2016) that may have an impact. But on
the other side, a fruitful EU-NGO relationship in the field of rule of law
backsliding may be difficult to achieve. NGOs have to develop specific
strategies in order to be able to handle the challenges of the multi-level
system of the EU and they have to mediate two, partly contradicting
tasks: to be professionalised Brussels-activists on the one side, and to be
rooted in their national, regional or local stakeholder context on the other
side (Heidbreder 2012, p. 11). Therefore, the idea to include civil society
actors in order to achieve better or more legitimate policy outcomes is a
normative goal and the realisation of which requires a very pragmatic and
professionalised approach by civil society actors.
For the analysis, these reflections are operationalised by taking cate-
gories from the study of social movements: The civil society actors address
an issue of grievance, the decline of the rule of law, and they have to
operate in a domestic and European political opportunity structure (Kriesi
et al. 1992) that has an influence on how they shape their protest reper-
toire and impact. The question is therefore, how the civil society actors
respond, and how they are able to mobilise resources (McCarthy and Zald
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1977) in terms of attention, supporters and access to decision-makers. So,
under which circumstances did NGOs operate, which strategies or activi-
ties did they unfold between 2015 and 2019, and how did they approach
the EU and the public?
3 Civil Society in Poland---Its Shape
and Current Political Opportunity Structure
Civil society in Poland has sometimes been described as weak, but has also
been considered as vivid and resistive due to the legacy of Solidarność
and civil disobedience practiced in socialist times. After 1989, during
the economic transformation, trade unions, despite their tremendous
decline in membership, remained an important actor that has frequently
organised strikes or demonstrations in the course of privatisation and
reconstruction (Ekiert and Kubik 2014, p. 51). The civil rights branch of
Solidarność has survived as well, and today, several organisations operate
in this field. Next to organised civil society, many less formalised grass-
root initiatives and private networks exist (Jacobsson and Korolczuk
2017, pp. 4–5). The sector is characterised by a certain concentration
since four per cent of NGOs account for 80% of the sector’s income, and
being engaged in a formalised organisation is an activity mainly conducted
by urban, well-educated people. The reason for that being low levels of
social trust and lack of resources (Matthes 2016, p. 295).
Rymsza (2016, p. 439) stresses the effects of this for formalisation and
organisational advancement of civil society. She highlights the trend that
Polish associations lose members and, at the same time, have to look for
more professional employees, so they are forced to focus on donors and
funding rather than collaborators. In addition, NGOs are struggling to
get more positive media coverage and their dependence on close rela-
tions to public administration, especially on the local level, creates further
obstacles for a more autonomous non-state sector.
Since PiS came to power, these opportunity structures for NGOs have
become more restrictive. The government controls the state media, and
thus, their reporting on NGOs that do not match the goals of the PiS,
such as feminist, LGBT, environmental or human rights groups, is very
negative. Smear campaigns in the media aim to create mistrust against
the work of NGOs, making donors turn away from them. Then, the
government introduced several structural changes that hamper the NGO-
sector’s work. Firstly, it established the Office of the Plenipotentiary for
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Civil Society in early 2016. It was introduced as an institution to facilitate
government-society relations and to assist with and channel state funding
to the civic sector. Yet, in practice, it rather proved to be a body of control
than support (Rymsza 2016, p. 444). Secondly, the hasty mode of law-
making that PiS is practicing shows that it has no interest in true and
intensive consultation with civil society actors, experts or stakeholders.
This is possible because bills are often introduced by individual MPs,
not the government, which allows to circumvent these hearings (Matthes
et al. 2019). Thirdly, assembly rights were restricted because the mode of
registering and permitting demonstrations now follows a certain hierarchy
and two demonstrations at the same time may be forbidden.
The government also changed to the mode of financing the NGO
sector. Since 2016, several cases of stopped or reduced public funding
to NGOs were reported for organisations that work on topics such as
domestic violence, migration or integration (Szuleka 2018, p. 16). The
National Institute of Freedom, established in autumn 2017 with the
task of distributing public funds, is another tool to regulate civil society
(Matthes et al. 2019, p. 24).
Finally, the political constraints of the court system have implications
for NGOs. Since December 2016, the Constitutional Tribunal, through
changes of its internal procedures of decision-making and the composi-
tion of its judges, is no longer an independent institution. Many courts in
Poland do not recognise its rulings, since they claim there would be no
legal security, hence it is also no option to seek for domestic protection
of the rule of law there. Rather, the minister of justice threatens those
judges who do not accept the primacy of the TK (Davies 2018, p. 4;
Sadurski 2018b; Czarny 2018). The Supreme Court is still struggling to
maintain its independence, since the CJEU declared the governments’
attempts to introduce a new retirement age unconstitutional and is now
about to deliver a judgement on the introduction of two new cham-
bers, the Disciplinary Chamber and the Public Affairs and Extraordinary
Control Chamber2 (Buras and Knaus 2018; Sadurski 2018a; Śledzińska-
Simon 2018). All in all, the independence of the judicial system is
2These chambers can decide upon disciplinary measures against judges and reopen
cases from the last 20 years. Their members are appointed by the Minister of Justice.
The National Council of the Judiciary, responsible for the nomination of judges to fill
void seats in any court, is now dominated by judges who are close to the government
(Sadurski 2018a).
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clearly curtailed, and so far the ruling party adopted only very cosmetic
changes of the respective legislation, despite critical reports by the Council
of Europe’s Venice Commission (Venice Commission 2016a, b, 2017)
and the European Commission’s Rule of Law Framework. Hence, the
ability of civil society actors to operate as watchdog organisations or to
contribute to protest actions of social movements has been cut back by
legal, structural and financial conditions.
4 Civil Society’s Protest Repertoire---Actions
Taken Between Warsaw and Brussels
After the elections in October 2015, when the plans of the new PiS
government to dismantle the rule of law and take control of the state
media became more visible, civil society was unprepared at first but
quickly became able to speak out in public. Existing watchdog organ-
isations like the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (HFHR) or
the Stefan Batory Foundation, both already established in 1988/1989,
started to monitor the government, and a new movement emerged that
gathered the protesters and called for demonstrations, the Committee
for the Defence of Democracy (Komitet Obrony Democracij, KOD).3
The call for KOD as a movement that would defend democratic values
came from the activist and writer Krzysztof Łoziński. An unknown IT-
specialist, Mateusz Kijowski, launched a Facebook group in November
2015, which three days after its initiation, already had around 30,000
followers (Eriksson 2016). These different groups, NGOs and KOD,
started to engage in several protest activities.
Demonstrations were the first, spontaneous reaction and KOD was
very effective in mobilising many people in the larger cities of Warsaw,
Craców, Poznań and later elsewhere, also outside Poland. The first large
demonstration with 50,000 participants took place in December 2015
and all the following ones were held each time after a new law or action
by the government or other relevant incidents occurred or on special
dates, such as June 4, to commemorate the first half-free elections from
3KOD was named after the Committee for the Defense of Workers (Komitet Obrony
Robotników, KOR) which was established in 1976 and advanced the larger Solidarność
movement. It had helped imprisoned workers by raising money from Western institutions,
providing legal support and organising protest and solidarity events (Karolewski 2016,
p. 260).
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1989 and to create a link between the freedom struggles from these years
to today’s situation. In February 2016, 80–100,000 participants gath-
ered; on March 12, after a visit and report by the Council of Europe’s
Venice Commission, tens of thousands of people convened, as well as
after their next visit in June 2016 with 250,000 participants and again
in September. In July 2017, people even demonstrated for around ten
days when amendments to the law on the Supreme Court were discussed
(Amnesty International 2017).
At the demonstrations, direct references to the EU were made and
people held European flags as well as symbols of the Polish Constitu-
tion, showing posters in defence of the latter. Nowicka-Franczak (2016,
pp. 2–3) distinguished four different types of slogans: (1) liberal and
democratic slogans, referring to democratic principles such as rule of
law or free media; (2) historical and symbolic slogans that refer back to
the opposition movement in socialist times; (3) anti-government slogans;
and (4) slogans that have an ironic, pop-cultural connotation and again
aim to create a bond with liberal, European values. The PiS-government
responded with very polarising language, calling the protesters traitors of
the Polish nation and tried to deprive them of their right to protest.
The participants in the demonstrations were somewhat middle-aged
and older people with a memory of the previous authoritarian regime.
For quite a while younger people were less visible. As election results and
surveys show, a certain number of them were rather conservative or unpo-
litical and not interested in rule of law issues, or more leftist and therefore
not attracted by KOD’s more centrist approach (Nowicka-Franczak 2016,
pp. 3–4). The leftist youngsters rather follow the movement Razem
(Together) that was established in 2015 and was, opposite to KOD, more
critical of the previous government, which Razem blames for its social
policy failures (Pehe 2016).
Spreading information and rising attention about the decline of the
rule of law was another means of protest. The civil society groups and the
KOD movement issued press statements, used social media for different
purposes and published their own judicial analyses on their websites that
address the respective changes in each of the courts and show their impact
on the work of judges (Szuleka 2018; Amnesty International 2017, 2019;
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights 2019; Batory Foundation 2018).
All organisations also issue petitions and open-letters to Polish politicians,
MPs in the European Parliament and the European Commission (Fleger
2017). At the peak of the demonstrations against the changes of the
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TK, KOD-spokesperson Mateusz Kijowski gave plenty of interviews to
many foreign newspapers in order to make this issue known to the world
(Karolewski 2016, p. 260).
The tool of strategic litigation and the provision of pro bono legal
support had been especially used by lawyers in the field of human rights
in previous years, e.g. by the HFHR. Their strategic litigation programme
has operated since 2004 and joins or initiates court cases that are of
strategic importance to obtain fundamental judgements that can make a
change in the field of human rights. Since 2015, this practice has become
less relevant in Poland because of the political control of courts. However,
HFHR is very active in referring cases and asking for preliminary judge-
ments by the CJEU; several Polish lawyers are actively defending judicial
personnel against accusations by politicians in Polish and European courts
and they submit complaints to the relevant bodies of the UN (Helsinki
Foundation for Human Rights 2018).
All these activist groups operated very internationally from the very
beginning, although their framing of the situation aimed to highlight
the similarities to the struggle against the communist regime back in
the 1970s and 1980s (Fleger 2017, p. 13). They actively sought contact
with the European Commission and the European Parliament. In January
2016, KOD had already met with the European Green Party to discuss
the development in Poland. Shortly after, it published a letter to the
European Parliament on its website and met with representatives of the
Greens and the Liberals in the EP (Karolewski 2016, p. 263). When KOD
received the European Parliament’s European Citizen’s Prize in June
2016, this was an occasion to meet with several notable individuals: Frans
Timmermans, then First Vice-President and European Commissioner for
Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights; Martin Schulz, then-President of the EP,
and Donald Tusk as then-Representative of the Council. Finally, KOD
opened a representation with an office in Brussels. In 2017, several other
civil society actors sent an open letter to the Commission (Fleger 2017,
p. 8) and human rights groups continued to lobby the Commission.
They supported the idea to launch the rule of law procedure in January
2016 as well as the Article 7 procedure in December 2017 (Open Letter
2017). Several Polish and international NGOs met with Frans Timmer-
mans and/or his aides on several occasions between 2016 and 2019 and
discussed rule of law issues.
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The collaboration between KOD and political parties inside Poland
is somewhat ambivalent. On the one side, KOD was the main organ-
iser of the demonstrations, at which opposition politicians, especially
from the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), the .Modern
(.Nowoczesna), as well as from Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stron-
nictwo Ludowe, PSL) also participated. On the other side, it was not
always clear where to draw the line between movement and parties. There
was some debate if KOD should turn into a political party, or become
part of PO or .Nowoczesna. Critiques of the movement were arguing
that KOD was simply the prolonged, extra-parliamentary arm of the
political opposition that used the streets to exert pressure on the govern-
ment or where previous politicians were able to get some new attention
(Karolewski 2016, p. 260, Nowicka-Franczak 2016, p. 5). On May 10,
2016, KOD, PSL, .Nowoczesna and leftist parties outside parliament
formed the coalition “Freedom, Equality, Democracy”, while PO did not
join the network.
Considering these debates and the increased restrictions for civil society
inside Poland, networking within the civic sector became more impor-
tant. On June 4, 2018, first eight, then 12 organisations agreed to form
a common platform, the Justice Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony
Sprawiedliwości, KOS). They chose June 4 as a founding date to refer
to the day when the first half-free elections in Poland had taken place in
1989. Their common aim is to protect judges, prosecutors and other legal
professionals when they come under political pressure by reporting about
such cases to the wider public, presenting opinions, holding press confer-
ences and by providing legal support for them. KOS also sends letters
to relevant Polish politicians and EU institutions (KOS 2019). This has
become especially important, according to KOS, after the introduction of
the new disciplinary chamber in the Supreme Court, and the new Law
on the Ordinary Courts from April 3, 2018 that introduced a system of
disciplinary liability of judges. In addition, the media, which is close to
the government, came up with invented stories that aimed to discredit
the reputation of judges in general or some judges as persons, including
the billboard campaign “Just courts” (KOS 2018, p. 20).
KOS consists of associations of five legal professionals (Themis,
Iustitia, LEX Super Omnia, Forum Współpracy Sędziów, Ogólnopolskie
Stowarzyszenie Sędziów Sądów), three civil rights organisations (Helsinki
Foundation for Human Rights, Amnesty International Poland, Forum
Obywatelskiego Rozwoju), a think tank (INPRIS), two archives of legal
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scholars that also consider themselves as actors having to secure the
rule of law (Stowarzyszenie im. Prof. Zbigniew Hołdy and Archiwum
Osiatyńskiego) and an activist movement of four lawyers, Wolny Sądy
(Free Courts), that caught the public’s attention through small films
they post online showing the importance of free courts (https://de-de.
facebook.com/WolneSady/). Convening KOS was also a reaction to the
decline of KOD after its founder Kijowski faced some quarrels due to
paying himself out of KOD’s budget, billing it for computer services.
Later, he stepped down as a chairperson (Cienski 2017); KOD lost some
momentum but is still active in and outside of Poland (http://www.ruc
hkod.pl/).
5 Impact and Resonance of the Civic Activities
The existence of the protest movement did mobilise Polish society since
plenty of people attend the demonstrations and support KOD’s and other
organisations’ actions. According to a poll by TNS, 1.5 million (or 5%)
of Poles took part in at least one protest event organised by KOD. 40%
said they would support the movement, while 28% were against it and
the rest had never heard of it (Eriksson 2016). Despite the restrictions
in terms of personnel, money and capacities the associations are actu-
ally quite successful in their access to the public and do receive a lot
of attention. Firstly, one of the reasons for their ability to overcome the
structural restrictions was their intensive use of social media that helped
them to disseminate their messages more easily and to react to the framing
of a topic in the public sphere by the Polish government. Since it uses
different types of public media and poster campaigns to spread nega-
tive messages about NGOs with the intention to produce a rally around
the flag effect (Schlipphak and Treib 2017), communication against these
defaming messages was relevant.
Secondly, the civil society actors built networks with different domestic
NGOs that can reach out to different segments of society and there-
fore produce a certain snowball effect regarding public attention. This
networking enables the associations and movements to meet the challenge
of being locally rooted and having networking-knowhow about the EU
polity in an efficient way. Plus, NGOs based in Poland, such as the Stefan
Batory Foundation that have access to European funding and networks,
provide knowhow inside the country as well as material support for publi-
cations and maintenance of websites. Civil society actors also managed to
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make use of broader networks, such as Civil Society Europe, or globally
operating NGOs like Amnesty International.
This networking helped the Polish NGOs to become more known in
Brussels, so that they were invited to hearings at the CJEU, meetings with
Commissioner Frans Timmermans and the committees of the European
Parliament, especially the LIBE committee that deals with rule of law
issues. The NGO networks also use the Commission’s representation in
Warsaw as a shortcut to Brussels; they provide information, assessments
on the legal situation and evidence about disciplinary procedures against
judges and prosecutors.
Although the Polish government made only very few changes to the
legislation on the court system, the actions of the civil society were not
at all useless, neither in formal terms, regarding the material policies, nor
in an informal way, regarding the mobilisation of the domestic public
and the European decision-makers. The decision of the Commission to
launch the infringement procedures, as well as the Article 7 procedure,
can also be considered as successful agenda-setting of the Polish NGOs
that were able to upload their demands into EU structures. Meetings with
Commission representatives working around Mr. Timmermans will have
at least reinforced the intention of the Commission to push forward with
the respective measures.
Opposite to the more sceptical findings in the majority of the literature,
following Wunsch (2016) and her analysis of Croatian NGOs, the Polish
human rights groups are also not necessarily marginalised actors but could
navigate strategically inside the EU’s multi-level system. Now, it is the
task of the new Commission, elected in autumn 2019, to continue the
procedure.
However, despite these achievements, and although KOD claims to be
politically neutral, it is a movement of urban, liberal-minded and politi-
cally centrist people. Some leftist politicians did participate because they
felt the urge to speak out against the changes of the court system, but
others did not. Hence, a considerable amount of working class people, or
people who had not yet profited sufficiently from the system change since
1989, felt attracted by PiS’s generous social policy, something that the
previous PO and PSL government had neglected. So, while the collabora-
tion between the liberal parts of civil society and the European institutions
seems to be a fruitful tool in order to address and tackle the decline of the
rule of law, there is an important message to learn: the European institu-
tions should not only close ranks with like-minded NGOs, but should see
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and address the society of a member state as a whole, in all its political
facets and social needs and political attention; in addition, financial and
other support should not only concentrate on one group of people.
6 Conclusion
The chapter explored the question if NGOs have the capacity to lobby
EU institutions in order to uphold pressure on the Polish government
and if they are strong enough to act as one of the counterforces against
the decline of the rule of law. The expectation was that, considering
the structural difficulties for civil society organisations to engage in the
multi-level system of the EU, they may need to develop specific strate-
gies to compensate for the challenges of this task, especially since the
domestic opportunity structure for NGOs became even tighter due to
the constraints implemented by the current government in the judicial
and media sector. This means that the changes of the judiciary against
which the NGOs act, at the same time, affect the opportunity structure
in which they operate. The results found so far confirm the difficulties that
NGOs have to struggle with, but also show that civil society gained quite
some agency. By networking among each other and an early and intensive
reach out not only to the national but also to the European level, along
with the usage of social media and the collaboration with NGOs that
already have a European network and can open access to the Commis-
sion, they were able to overcome shortcomings in national resources and
opportunity structures.
The analysis also shows that social pressure from national interest asso-
ciations is important to lift and to keep a topic on the European agenda.
While it is a challenge for the Commission to find a working tool against
a non-complying government when political majorities allow to simply
ignore the “blaming and shaming”, civil society actors can serve as an
alternative to political opposition parties inside member states as the
Commission wants to stay impartial politically. Although only legal pres-
sure through infringement procedures has stopped democratic backsliding
on some occasions, and also in Poland, it is nevertheless crucial to engage
with and invest in civil society associations that support and defend Euro-
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Bień-Kacała, Agnieszka. 2017. Poland within the EU—Dealing with the Populist
Agenda. Osteuropa Recht 63 (4): 428–443.
Börzel, Tanja. 2010. Why You Don’t Always Get What You Want: EU Enlarge-
ment and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe. Acta Politica 45:
1–10.
Buras, Piotr, and Gerald Knaus. 2018. Where the Law Ends: The Collapse
of the Rule of Law in Poland—And What to Do. Batory Foundation,
European Stability Initiative. https://www.esiweb.org/index.php?lang=en&
id=156&document_ID=190. Accessed 10 August 2019.
CBOS. 2019. Fifteen Years of Poland’s Membership in the European Union.
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PART IV
Theoretical Reflections and Conclusions
CHAPTER 12
Contesting the EU, Contesting Democracy
and Rule of Law in Europe. Conceptual
Suggestions for Future Research
Luca Tomini and Seda Gürkan
1 Introduction
Over the past several years, a number of EU member states as well
as some candidate states have experienced political transformations in a
direction opposite to that of democratisation. In most of these cases,
this phenomenon has been accompanied by the progressive detach-
ment of these countries from the political, administrative and normative
influence of the European Union (EU) and/or by a more overt and
growing contestation over the EU or its policies. While these develop-
ments amounted to the EU’s ‘autocracy crisis’ (Kelemen 2019, p. 35),
multiple crises that hit the Union since 2009—ranging from the finan-
cial crisis and Brexit to the refugee crisis—limited the EU’s ability to deal
with these instances of autocratisation, that is, a political change towards
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autocracy, in and around the EU. And when the EU intervened to defend
democracy and the rule of law in member states or candidates, this inter-
vention into domestic affairs was met with a new form of contestation
over the EU altering these countries’ relationships with the EU.
These developments have led many scholars to question the puzzle
of turning authoritarian while being a member or a candidate of the
EU (Müller 2013) or to analyse the inherent problems related to the
EU’s instruments to address post-accession non-compliance (Sedelmeier
2014; Szente 2017). These studies have implicitly assumed that auto-
cratisation and turning away from the EU are interconnected. However,
the relationship between these two processes has largely remained under-
studied. Although it is well-known that both the contestation over the
EU and autocratisation are multi-causal in nature, there is ample empir-
ical evidence to suspect the existence of a causal relationship between the
two as they occur simultaneously not only in acceding countries (Turkey
being probably the most notable example) or potential candidates in the
Western Balkans (Serbia under President Vučić) but also in some member
states such as Hungary or Poland. Against this background, this chapter
explores and questions this possible interaction and causal link between
these two processes in times of a supposed declining quality of democracy
in Europe.
It is argued that the profound crisis of fundamental values of the EU
in and around the EU can only be grasped by studying two distinct
but closely interconnected phenomena. The first process is ‘autocratisa-
tion’, which refers to the political changes that move countries towards
autocracy. The second process is ‘de-Europeanisation’, which refers to
the progressive detachment of some countries from the political, admin-
istrative and normative influence of the Union. Although these two
phenomena occur simultaneously, they remain distinct and mutually
impact on each other. Autocratisation is closely related to the internal
dynamics of member states, and autocrats’ domestic preferences, whereas
de-Europeanisation refers to the changing relationship of a state with
the EU, and it is largely about member state governments’ response to
the EU’s impact in national politics. While autocratisation helps us to
understand governments’ declining commitment to the EU’s values and
norms, de-Europeanisation explains autocrats’ changing attitudes to the
European integration. It is the contention of this chapter that conceptual
clarification between autocratisation and de-Europeanisation provides a
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powerful explanation of why autocratic leaders in Hungary, Poland or
Turkey contest the EU more and more.
In order to substantiate these arguments, in this chapter we first shed
light on the distinction between autocratisation and de-Europeanisation
by discussing both concepts, presenting their origin and tracing their
development in the relevant scholarly literature. We then, secondly,
discuss the type of relationship existing between the two and, in the
final section, we discuss the theoretical and policy implications of these
findings.
2 Autocratisation in Central
and Eastern Europe
The analysis of the politics of East Central European countries clearly
shows the shift that has taken place within democratisation studies in
recent years, from the traditional perspective focused on the challenges
of democratic transition and consolidation to the current focus on the
opposite phenomena of autocratisation.
These different phenomena can be causally interrelated, as various
studies in the literature demonstrate (Tomini 2015; Bánkuti et al. 2012;
Ágh 2016): paths of problematic democratic consolidation are reliable
indicators of the likelihood of an autocratisation process. Nonetheless,
although connected, these processes remain distinct, and it is clear that
in the current debate, the question is no longer ‘What are the causes of
the difficult democratic consolidation?’ in some of the countries of East
Central Europe, but rather and more explicitly, ‘What are the reasons and
the modalities of the beginning of the authoritarian turn?’.
The event that unquestionably changed the political and scholarly
debate, as far as East Central Europe is concerned, was without any doubt
the landslide victory of Fidesz in Hungary in 2010 and the birth of the
second Orbán government, along with the constitutional and legislative
transformations that followed in the subsequent years (Kornai 2015; Ágh
2016; Buzogány 2017) and with the influence that the Hungarian trans-
formations had on other countries in the region and even beyond. Since
that time, Hungary, and later other EU member states (Poland, above all,
see Przybylski 2018) have become explicit examples of autocratisation, in
addition to cases already studied in other regions of the world, such as
Venezuela, or Thailand, among others.
288 L. TOMINI AND S. GÜRKAN
There are multiple reasons to adopt the concept of autocratisation in
order to define these processes of political change in an authoritarian
direction. Even before moving on to the analysis of causes, modalities,
actors and paths, it is necessary to address the ontological question of the
very nature of the phenomenon under examination.
When it comes to analysing the phenomena opposed to democratisa-
tion, the literature is full of conceptual proposals: democratic breakdown,
regression, collapse, backsliding, deterioration or demise, erosion, de-
democratisation, loss of democratic quality and even more. The list is
long (see Cassani and Tomini 2018), and the flourishing of often contra-
dictory concepts is a good indicator of recent interest in this type of
phenomenon. In this fragmented context, the use of the concept of auto-
cratisation, which makes the exercise of political power more arbitrary and
repressive and that restricts the space for public contestation and political
participation in the process of government selection (Cassani and Tomini
2018), provides significant advantages.
First of all, it is a comprehensive concept that allows us to categorise,
within the same framework, different phenomena brought together by
the same direction of change (i.e. autocracy). Mirroring democratisation
as a process of ‘moving towards this not entirely fixed future (democratic)
state’ (Whitehead 2002, p. 3), autocratisation as a process of change
can begin within very different political regimes (democratic and non-
democratic1) and end in the same way with the installation of different
types of regimes in an ideal continuum ranging from liberal democracy to
defective democracy, to electoral autocracy up to a closed autocracy. In
this framework, processes of change that transform a country from liberal
democracy to defective democracy, although different in many respects,
can be compared and assessed against more radical transformations such
as, for example, the transition between a defective democracy to a closed
autocracy. This advantage is particularly useful in the case of East Central
European countries, which historically have been the subject of exer-
cises of comparison (both internal and with other regions). Therefore,
1Although it may seem counterintuitive that a process of autocratisation may also
concern a non-democratic regime, this in reality can take place, for example, in the
transition from a so-called electoral autocracy to a closed autocracy in which the dimension
related to political participation is further limited or suppressed, for example, through the
tout court elimination of elections (as in military coups) or through manipulations such
as the illegal extension of term limits that eliminate de facto the possibility for citizens to
choose their representatives.
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the possibility of using the same concept to analyse phenomena, albeit of
different intensity, in Hungary, Serbia, Russia, Poland and even Turkey,
must be considered as an added value.
Secondly, as defined above, it is a concept ready for empirical analysis.
The presence of a negative change within one of the three constitutive
dimensions (participation, contestation and executive limitation) is suffi-
cient to identify a potential case of autocratisation. As a comprehensive
concept, autocratisation is broad enough to capture developments—such
as the attacks on independent media or to civil society organisations,
as well as limitation to the political opposition—that go beyond the
narrow erosion of rule of law. Furthermore, the extent of the change is
easily assessed by examining which of the dimensions are involved in the
process. A change from liberal democracy to defective democracy essen-
tially concerns the dimension of executive limitation, in relation to the
erosion of the boundaries within which an incumbent ruler exercises the
political authority. In a different way, a change from defective democracy
to closed autocracy also ends up involving the dimensions of contesta-
tion (the presence of a free and fair electoral process and the possibility of
criticising and replacing the government in office) and participation (the
capacity and possibility of citizens to actually choose the government of
the country allowed by the guarantee of political rights).
Thirdly, the concept of autocratisation clarifies a certain normative
ambiguity that characterises concepts such as democratic backsliding,
regression or de-democratisation, which are defined in a negative way, as
the loss of something positive (democracy), or as a backwards movement.
In most cases, these processes do not restore previous regimes. Take, as
an example, the case of Hungary: the process of change implemented by
Fidesz does not constitute a backsliding or a regression towards some-
thing that existed in the past, but instead represents the creation of
something new—a different type of regime.
Fourthly, the conceptualisation of autocratisation as a ‘regime change’
constitutes an explicit methodological and theoretical choice in favour of
a case-oriented approach in which the selection and classification of the
cases is made through a qualitative approach and each potential case of
autocratisation is examined in-depth. This choice has the disadvantage of
discarding political transformations that might represent a shift towards
autocracy but do not amount to an outright change in the formal and
informal institutions regulating how political power is assigned and exer-
cised. On the other hand, this allows us to focus the analysis on real
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cases of autocratisation, eliminating possible false positives. It is there-
fore a more selective approach that allows a more in-depth investigation
of the selected cases, in which minor changes (which do not produce
a change of regime, but only a change within the regime) are inter-
preted as warning signs of a process of autocratisation that may or may
not occur. This approach is particularly useful, especially in the case of
Central and Eastern Europe characterised by frequent institutional and
political changes (e.g. the instability of the party systems of the region,
the rise and fall of populist parties and leaders), because it separates the
wheat (the real cases of autocratisation intended as a change of regime)
from the chaff (the cases of political change to be interpreted in another
sense, such as democratic performance deficit, see Fukuyama 2015, or de-
consolidation phenomena, see Foa and Mounk 2016, including growing
disaffection towards the elite).
The ongoing debate on the ‘rule of law crisis’ or ‘autocracy crisis’ in
Central and Eastern Europe is, in its essential nature, a debate on the EU’s
foundational values in which the stake is the contestation of a normative
conception of liberal democracy based on participation, competition and
rule of law intended as a guarantee of citizen protection against the state
and as a balance and control between constitutional powers. The debate
does not take place merely for academic reasons: it depends on the fact
that, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, some governments
of EU member states have embarked (for the reasons and causes that
have been analysed in this volume) in a path of institutional, legislative
and political change that moves them away from the values and founding
principles of liberal democracy as understood above, and which can be
effectively summarised with the concept of autocratisation.
3 De-Europeanisation in Contemporary Europe
While autocratisation helps us to capture the changes related to both
the exercise of political power and the spheres of public contestation
and political participation, a more recent concept—namely, the de-
Europeanisation process—sheds light on a new kind of contestation over
the EU. Although most scholars defined this concept as the ‘reversal
of the reform process’ or the ‘divergence from the EU norms and
prescribed models’ (Yilmaz 2016; Wódka 2017), from a more sociologi-
cally sensitive perspective, we suggest conceptualising de-Europeanisation
as a broader and deeper process, whereby de-Europeanisation takes place
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not only in relation to a specific policy field or at the level of the recipient
government and institutions but in the politics and society at large. This
broader phenomenon is manifested in the form of a growing ‘indiffer-
ence or scepticism’ in the society or among the political elite towards the
EU (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016, p. 6). In this understanding, de-
Europeanisation includes not only the reversal of the reform process, but
also those instances where reform is ‘incurred without the need or even
obligation to attain alignment with the EU, or where actors deliberately
refrain from referring to the EU in justification of the reforms under-
taken’ (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber 2016, p. 6; Onursal-Beşgül 2016). In
other words, the EU ceases to have an influence on a given state because
the nature of the relationship between the EU and state/society switches
from a mutual engagement to a disengagement. Against this backdrop, we
define de-Europeanisation as a process of mutual or unilateral disengage-
ment between the EU and national level whereby normative reference to
the EU and the EU’s political influence become increasingly irrelevant
in the logics of domestic politics, formal and informal institutions, and
public policy choices.
This definition has the following advantages. Firstly, by transcending
the conceptualisation of de-Europeanisation as a mere backsliding in the
reform process, the definition provides conceptual clarification. While
scholars used autocratisation and de-Europeanisation interchangeably,
our suggested conceptualisation highlights the distinction between de-
Europeanisation and autocratisation, which, we argue, remain distinct
processes. De-Europeanisation involves the changes in the relationship of
the EU with the state or a given society, whereas autocratisation concerns
changes in the relationship between the state and the society.
Secondly, de-Europeanisation understood as the reversal of the reform
process might be easily confused with the terms used in the classical
Europeanisation literature. In this respect, Radaelli’s typology,2 which
includes four different degrees for the measurement of the impact of
the EU, might equally capture the idea of the reversal of the reform
process through inertia or retrenchment (Radaelli 2003, pp. 37–38).3
2Radaelli’s typology draws on Börzel (1999) and Cowles et al. (2001). On the question
of measurement of Europeanisation, see also Börzel and Risse (2007).
3These outcomes of Europeanisation include inertia, absorption, transformation and
retrenchment (Radaelli 2003, pp. 37–38). Absorption refers to change as adaptation,
which implies a low degree of changes without real change or transformation in the logic
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Inertia happens in cases where the EU-level policies diverge from national
ones, and there is a considerable resistance to adopt EU rules or poli-
cies (no change). Retrenchment refers to a paradoxical effect implying
that national policies become less Europeanised than before (reversal).
Whereas, in our conceptualisation, de-Europeanisation does not only
encompass a mere backsliding in the reform process, but also a broader
and deeper process of detachment from the EU affecting the society
and state level. In other words, while retrenchment implies a negative
change in policy, polity and/or politics, our conceptualisation of de-
Europeanisation includes also the erosion of the normative attractiveness
of the EU as a reference point for the political elite and among the society
at large.
Thirdly, our suggested definition refers to a disengagement between
the EU and the national level. Therefore, it can be applied to different
empirical realities, including member states, candidate countries or states
involved in the EU neighbourhood policy, with only one prerequisite:
that the process takes place where previously there was some form of
Europeanisation. It would not make sense to talk about disengagement
if there had not been a process of progressive approach and mutual
influence between the two levels before.
Fourthly, according to this definition, the de-Europeanisation process
may take place in one or all of the three classic dimensions in which the
impact of the EU on the national sphere unfolds: politics, policies and
polities. In this perspective, de-Europeanisation may regard the process
of reform of public policies, the institutional dimension, but also the
normative and value-related dimension, thus integrating institutionalist
and sociological approaches into a single analytical framework. Finally,
our suggested definition conceptualises de-Europeanisation as a process
(instead of an outcome). In this way, the definition shifts attention from
the negative impacts (outcome) of the mutual disengagement at national
level to a more incremental change in the relationship between the EU
and state/society levels.
In accordance with our suggested definition, we expect to observe de-
Europeanisation at two levels: as a result of a change either at the EU-state
level or at the EU-society level, or at both levels. At the EU-state level,
de-Europeanisation might take the form of the EU’s disengagement from
of political behaviour. Transformation, on the other hand, indicates a fundamental or
substantial change in the logic of political behaviour.
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domestic politics, and/or a retreat of a state from the EU. As for the EU-
society level, de-Europeanisation is expected to occur when support to the
EU decreases in the society, and the society overwhelmingly turns away
from the EU. For the purposes of the analytical focus of this chapter, we
devote particular attention to the cases where the state deliberately turns
away from the EU and its normative influence. In these cases, where the
state (either a member or a candidate) disengages from the institutional
structure of the EU or even contests the EU, we theorise that the main
indicator of de-Europeanisation at the EU-state level is the political elite’s
declining commitment to the EU, and this is manifested in the form of
a lack of or negative reference to the EU in the political elite’s discourse.
On the basis of these theoretical insights, and in the light of recent devel-
opments in Central and Eastern Europe, an essential question that needs
to be answered is the relationship between these separate but supposedly
interlinked phenomena: Does autocratisation trigger de-Europeanisation
at the EU-state level or does distancing from the EU bear an impact
on a given country’s autocratisation process? In other words, what is the
relationship between these two phenomena?
4 The Link Between De-Europeanisation
and Autocratisation: The Primacy of Domestic
Politics as the Driver of De-Europeanisation
Since de-Europeanisation and autocratisation are different processes,
there may be situations in which there is de-Europeanisation in the
absence of a process of autocratisation. The most relevant example is
perhaps that of the UK after the Brexit referendum. In this country, de-
Europeanisation unfolds as a result of the choice made by British citizens
in the 2016 referendum on the permanence of the UK in the Euro-
pean Union. The unilateral disengagement of the UK from the EU will
probably result in the weakening of EU normative reference and political
influence on UK domestic politics, policies and polity. At the same time,
as de-Europeanisation unfolds, at the moment there are no empirical
signs of forms of autocratisation, in the direction of reduced opportu-
nities for public contestation, political participation and the erosion of
the mechanisms of executive limitations.
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On the other hand, empirical evidence shows that there are situations
in which a process of autocratisation unfolds without a concomitant de-
Europeanisation process. Serbia under Prime Minister Vučić is a good
example of this occurrence, where a process of autocratisation is not
accompanied by a disengagement between the EU and the national level.
Several studies have shown how Serbia under Vučić’s government has
embarked on a process of autocratisation (Castaldo and Pinna 2018;
Kapidzic 2020). At the same time, the government repeatedly restated
its formal commitment to European accession and integration, although
this approach has been considered instrumental to cover the ongoing
autocratisation process. And thus, de-Europeanisation and autocratisation
seem in no way mutually necessary to the other. There are cases of de-
Europeanised countries that do not show evident signs of autocratisation,
as well as cases of autocratisation without tangible signs of departure from
the commitment to join, or remain part of the EU.
However, there is a third option, which is the most interesting for the
purposes of understanding the puzzle of turning autocratic while being
a member or a candidate of the EU: that the two processes occur rela-
tively in the same span of time. By way of example, the cases of Hungary
and Turkey are representative of the combined presence of these two
phenomena. Despite the differences, both cases show a process of auto-
cratisation. In the case of Hungary, this happens through a weakening of
accountability and checks to executive power, while in the case of Turkey,
through a reduction of civil and political rights, and the accountability of
the executive. Both countries also show a de-Europeanisation process; in
the case of Hungary, through a detachment mainly related to the dimen-
sion of some public policies and European values, while in the case of
Turkey, through a gradual phasing-out of the perspective of member-
ship, a detachment from European values and normative influence, and a
hostile discourse of the government vis-à-vis the EU.
In these specific situations, in which we observe both processes in
action, the question should be ‘What type of connection is there between
de-Europeanisation and autocratisation?’. Post-enlargement and post-
2008 financial crisis Central and Eastern Europe is the ideal laboratory
to examine the connection between the two phenomena, and to overturn
the mainstream perspective of Europeanisation studies that focuses, in a
more or less explicit way, on the EU as a starting point for any explanation
of domestic changes.
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The numerous empirical cases available in the region show that the
‘autocracy crisis’ experienced by the European Union in the last years has
primarily domestic causes. Numerous studies show the mainly domestic
origins of Viktor Orbán’s rise to power and of his anti-liberal political
project (see Buzogány 2017 among others). The same home-made roots
can be found in the explanation of the AKP’s rule and Erdogan’s author-
itarian turn in Turkey (Somer 2016); regarding the political crises related
to the corruption scandals in Romania and the institutional tensions
between president and government (Iusmen 2015); in the authoritarian
turn of Vučić in Serbia (Castaldo and Pinna 2018); in the attempts to
put the judiciary under the control of the executive in Poland by the
government led by PiS (Przybylski 2018); or further back in the past,
in Vladimír Mečiar’s authoritarian attempt in Slovakia in the late 1990s
(Haughton 2003). These are phenomena that are distinct in scope and
outcome, but similar for the mostly domestic origin of the causes. One
more thing that is also similar, and which often leads to confusion in the
analysis of these processes, is the context in which these domestic changes
took and continue to take place; that is, the context of a process of Euro-
pean integration and of an increasing role of the EU in the domestic
politics of these countries. However, the argument here is that the fact
that these phenomena occur in the context of a growing role of the EU
in national policies does not necessarily mean that the cause of them is
somehow related to, or originated from the EU.
Autocratisation, in this perspective, logically and empirically precedes
de-Europeanisation. As a consequence, the relationship with the EU (and
the EU’s impact on these countries) is shaped as a function of leaders’
interests to pursue an authoritarian turn. This is the substantial difference:
de-Europeanisation is not the result of a retrenchment or an inertia in the
face of a stimulus, but it may be the consequence of endogenous processes
within national political systems (such as autocratisation) which, only in
the second step, has implications for the state’s relationship with the EU.
In other words, when the two phenomena occur together in a given state,
the nature of the European Union’s relationship with that state is not the
cause of domestic level changes (the EU is not the explanatory variable).
But the reaction or eventual inaction of the EU to the autocratisation
contributes (among other factors) to define the outcome and the path of
the process of domestic autocratisation (hence the EU is an intervening
factor). And in this perspective, it should be emphasised that the EU’s
crisis decade (Brack and Gürkan 2020) has arguably limited its ability to
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respond to these authoritarian transformations, further aggravating their
magnitude.
The EU intervenes in the cost and benefit calculation of domestic
actors willing to turn authoritarian for domestic reasons, who have
therefore already developed a normative preference antithetical to liberal
democracy. In many cases, the more the political elite follow an authori-
tarian path, the more these countries’ relations with the EU deteriorates
because complying with the EU normative requirements in terms of
democracy and rule of law becomes too costly for their project of
authoritarian transformation. Hence, these worsening relations are also
accompanied by a more hostile discourse of the ruling elite on the EU,
especially when (and if) the European Union takes initiatives or measures
to counter these domestic authoritarian turns, as shown by Hungary,
Poland and Turkey. In these cases, the EU’s reaction to authoritarian
transformation may also become a tool in the hands of national actors
and leaders who use it defensively to further strengthen their discourse,
legitimising further authoritarian choices in the name of the defence of
national interest and/or sovereignty.
5 Conclusions
The main contention of this chapter was twofold: firstly, it argued that
autocratisation and de-Europeanisation remain two distinct processes,
although in most of the empirical cases, they occur together and affect
each other. Secondly, the recent phenomenon of contesting the EU and
its values can only be grasped through a closer examination of the internal
dynamics of a given state. Even in the case of a member state, a case
where a state’s legal and institutional system is closely integrated to the
EU, the autocratisation occurs mainly because of domestic dynamics and
is driven by domestic (autocratic) agents. However, once the autocratisa-
tion process starts taking place, turning against the EU or contesting its
normative influence becomes the preferred option for autocrats as main-
taining a value-based relationship with the EU becomes a highly costly
option for autocratic leaders.
These observations on the puzzle of contestation over the EU in
and around Europe have theoretical, methodological and policy impli-
cations. Firstly, these findings provide theoretical insights into the
de-Europeanisation research agenda. Theoretically, the analysis of the
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de-Europeanisation phenomenon needs to shift attention from EU-
level explanations to domestic level actors because the driver of the
de-Europeanisation process is ultimately the domestic political elite.
Secondly, any study that aspires to analyse the phenomena of contesta-
tion over the EU or its values should carefully integrate in its explanatory
framework two analytically separate phenomena (autocratisation and de-
Europeanisation) as well as various levels that simultaneously interact with
each other (international, EU as well as domestic levels).
Thirdly, these observations, in turn, have methodological implications.
In the light of our main argument which suggests that domestic actors
remain essential in driving the de-Europeanisation agendas of authori-
tarian states, the analysis of distancing from the EU in contemporary
Europe needs to devote a particular attention to domestic agents. In order
to explain autocrats’ hostile attitude vis-à-vis the EU, carefully designed
small-N comparative studies or single case studies need to trace separately
both phenomena (autocratisation and de-Europeanisation), and bring in
qualitative methods, such as discourse analysis or process-tracing.
Turning to the policy implications, as autocrats’ declining commitment
to the EU is mainly shaped and driven by their domestic agenda, the EU’s
ability to intervene in autocrats’ cost and benefit calculus remains limited.
And in cases where the EU criticises autocratisation in member states or
candidates, this is usually backfired by autocratisation agents. As observed
in the cases of Turkey or Hungary, EU’s negative evaluations of autocrati-
sation in those countries usually nurture a more nationalistic discourse by
the political elite and an anti-European backlash in the society. There-
fore, unless the EU can offer new incentives that will persuasively engage
autocrats into a more democratic path, the EU’s ability to mitigate the
autocratisation process will be marginal. In other words, while restoring
a firm political conditionality based on close monitoring, clear conditions
and credible incentives appear to be the main panacea for deviating the
autocratisation process in candidates. In addition, a similar post-accession
compliance monitoring mechanism backed by incentives (or the with-
drawal of incentives) remains essential for changing the incentive structure
of autocratic leaders in member states.
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CHAPTER 13
Towards a Political Theory of Democratic




Since December 2015, Poland has been considered the second East
Central European (ECE) country, after Hungary, to be in the process
of sliding back from democracy into authoritarianism. This assessment
followed a series of reforms implemented by the national-conservative
PiS (Law and Justice) government despite protests in the country and
critique abroad. The most controversial reforms aimed at a radical recon-
struction of the court system in Poland and mimicked similar develop-
ments that have taken place in Hungary under the national-conservative
Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) government since 2010. Scholars of
democracy have been convinced that both Viktor Orbán and Jarosław
Kaczyński—the dominant political figures in both countries—abandoned
liberal democracy, dismantled checks and balances and hoarded power in
the hands of their party loyalists and cronies to exert partisan control over
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public institutions (e.g. Sadurski 2018; Pech and Scheppele 2017). At the
same time, both Fidesz and PiS have been able to generate high electoral
support in national and European elections despite the recent authori-
tarian changes. The systemic changes have been accompanied by populist
discourse promising to give the power back to “the true people” (Mudde
and Kaltwasser 2017), claiming that liberal democracy after 1989 was an
elite project amounting to a treachery of the Hungarian and Polish people
by post-communist elites in league with the new liberal aristocracy and
international bodies, such as the European Union (Sata and Karolewski
2019).
This strain of research suggests that the developments in East Central
Europe are—due to the specifics of the transition process from commu-
nism to democracy—particular. However, similar developments, even
though without the same degree of institutional change or the similar
context of postcommunism, have been taking place in a number of other
countries, both in Europe and beyond. Particularly striking are the cases
of the US and the UK, that is, advanced and long-established democracies
experiencing democratic backsliding themselves (Porritt 2019; Przeworski
2019; Dunleavy 2018; Huq and Ginsburg 2018). In both countries,
populist post-truth rhetoric and disregard for liberal-democratic norms
and institutions go hand in hand with attacks on checks and balances
(Kaufman and Haggard 2019). Also, in the UK and the US, the once
catch-all parties—the hitherto bearers of representative democracy—the
Tories and the Republicans were able to secure majoritarian electoral
support by embracing divisive and exclusionary policies (Huq and Gins-
burg 2018).
In this perspective, Hungary and Poland can be regarded as part of
a larger trend, rather than specific cases of democratic backsliding in
weakly consolidated democracies where proper democracy has never really
taken root. Against this background, this chapter argues that a general
approach to democratic backsliding should be aimed for, rather than a
strategy to identify only regional peculiarities, even though such certainly
exist. I therefore suggest that a putative (rather than complete) theory of
democratic backsliding should consider three aspects: (1) the societal one
(what type of changes are underway with regard to the citizenry?), (2)
the institutional one (what has been happening with the institutions of
democratic government?) and (3) the processual one (what kind of process
is democratic backsliding?).
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Firstly, after a brief literature discussion on democratic backsliding as
a universal trend, I problematise the changed role of citizens from active
and engaged ones towards spectatorship favouring authoritarian responses
from leaders. Secondly, I argue that in institutional terms, democratic
backsliding can be identified as state capture that occurs in different forms
and might not always be properly reflected in the indices of democratic
quality. Thirdly, I focus on the process of democratic backsliding itself
which I call retrogression to semi-democracy.
2 Democratic Backsliding as a Universal Trend
At first glance, democratic backsliding could be understood as a reverse
development to democratic consolidation, intensely discussed in the early
1990s, when ECE countries were on their road towards democracy. A
number of transitologists argued at that time that the democratic consol-
idation in the transition countries could be simply measured by a number
of democratic elections held in the transition country in question. For
instance, according to Samuel Huntington, two consecutive democratic
elections would be a reliable sign of a consolidated democracy (Hunt-
ington 1991, p. 266). However, the debates of the 1990s paid little
attention to the possible breakdown of democratisation processes in ECE
(and if they did, they focused on possible military or executive over-
throws), as they were heavily influenced by the arguments put forward
by Samuel Huntington (1991) and Francis Fukuyama (1989). Hunt-
ington argued that democratisation comes in waves which are observable
throughout history and for that reason reflect a macro-historical pattern.
This logic of history finds its Hegelian “end of history” in Fukuyama
(1989), according to whom democracy is the ultimate telos of history
with no alternatives. Fukuyama (1992, p. XI) argued that liberal democ-
racy represents the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and
the “final form of human government”. Consequently, to many authors—
even those with less of a Hegelian leaning—democracy became a sort of
default position of any political system, towards which all types of regimes
would naturally lean sooner or later. Additionally, modernisation theo-
rists have come to believe that modernisation processes would support
democratisation.
Even in the 1950s, Seymour Lipset (1959) believed in a causal rela-
tion between modernisation—measured by the number of telephones in
a country—and the chances of democratic consolidation, while Samuel
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Huntington (1991, p. 313) determined a pro capita income of $500–
1000, which would promote democratisation. In the modernisation
perspective, the transition from the defunct real existing socialism and
its “economy of shortage” towards a market economy might also propel
modernisation processes, thus stabilising democracy (for the opposite
view see, for instance, Przeworski 1991). Against this background,
democratisation in newly established democracies would—even if initially
in some cases—constitute a self-reinforcing rocky process. While focusing
on new democracies, this understanding of authoritarian change largely
ignored the very possibility of democratic backsliding in consolidated
democracies of North America and Western Europe that were continu-
ously regarded as the normative standard to be aspired to.
These linear ideas about democratic consolidation came under criti-
cism in the light of recent challenges to democracy (e.g. Bustikova and
Guasti 2017), which are, according to some authors, not only typical for
the countries in ECE but rather reflect a global trend (e.g. Diamond
2015; Levitsky and Way 2002). In this view, the peculiarities of the
post-communist transition to democracy—or even perhaps its historical
uniqueness—do not necessarily imply that the democratic backsliding in
the region has to be specific as well. As mentioned above, this global trend
also includes the so-called advanced democracies like the US and the UK,
which renders democratic backsliding almost a universal problem (Mounk
2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). The 2020 Democracy Report of the
V-Dem Institute markedly highlights this general trend as follows:
For the first time since 2001, there are more autocracies than democracies
in the world. Hungary is no longer a democracy, leaving the EU with
its first non-democratic Member State. India has continued on a path of
steep decline, to the extent it has almost lost its status as a democracy. The
United States – former vanguard of liberal democracy – has lost its way.
(V-Dem Institute 2020)
The causes for global democratic backsliding are still being researched
and the explanations include a number of hypotheses such as the growing
polarisation of Western societies (Przeworski 2019), defunct political
institutions (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Haggard and Kaufman 2016)
and the failure of the political elites to address representation deficits of
their political system (Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt
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2018). Recently, Krastev and Holmes (2020) offered a rather counterin-
tuitive explanation for the global democratic decline by using the concept
of imitation. In this view, illiberalism in Eastern Europe (first of all in
Russia, but afterwards in Hungary and Poland) is a “resentment-fueled”
response to “the presumptively canonical status of Western political
models after 1989” (Krastev and Holmes 2020, p. 13). However, it does
not remain an Eastern European phenomenon, as the election of Donald
Trump changes the direction of imitation. Now, the US is emulating
Eastern illiberalism, whereas the rise of China seals the fate of liberal
democracy as a global normative standard.
I argue that the democratic decline is to be found across the globe
due to the fragility of liberal democracy itself, rather than, for instance,
as a result of a sequential imitation process. The “authoritarian diffu-
sion” thesis has been falsified with regard to its inspirational movement
from Russia to Hungary (Buzogány 2017) and seems to be doubtful
of the US under Donald Trump being inspired by the developments in
ECE. On the contrary, the oldest and (arguably) most advanced democ-
racies—the UK and the US—have fallen prey to chauvinist populism,
post-truth politics and attacks on institutions of liberal democracy (Huq
and Ginsburg 2018; Freedom House 2019; Przeworski 2019) regard-
less of the developments in ECE. The UK and the US have been long
viewed as the democratic standard for countries in transition to democ-
racy, for instance, in the seminal civic culture study of the 1960s (Verba
and Almond 1963). Systemically, this development is more remarkable
than the progressing authoritarianism of Russia or Turkey, since it goes
against the basic assumptions of research in democracy theory.
While the illiberal developments in the US and the UK have been
a surprise to many observers, one can find certain clues about a prin-
ciple fragility of democracy in some political theory writings. For instance,
Gabriel Almond in his early work in the 1950s expresses serious doubts
about some Western democracies (he calls them “continental democ-
racies” in contrast to “Anglo-Saxon democracies” and means mainly
France and Italy as opposed to the UK) remaining democratic, as he
ascribes “Caesaristic breakthroughs”, that is, authoritarian tendencies,
to these countries (Almond 1956, p. 408). Almond claims that “frag-
mented political cultures” and “immobilism” in Western countries make
these democratic regimes less stable and prone to authoritarian or even
totalitarian fractures:
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[…] These systems tend always to be threatened by, and sometimes to be
swept away by, movements of charismatic nationalism which break through
the boundaries of the political sub–cultures and overcome immobilism
through coercive action and organization. In other words, these systems
have a totalitarian potentiality in them. The fragmented political culture
may be transformed into a synthetically homogeneous one and the stale-
mated role structure mobilized by the introduction of the coercive pattern
[…]. (Almond 1956, p. 408)
In this view, some democracies are principally prone to break down and
others are structurally stable. Nowadays, Almond’s optimistic belief in
the Anglo-Saxon democracies is certainly unjustified. Whether democratic
backsliding is a result of a specific “fragmented culture”, as Almond
suggested, is also disputed, since he apparently viewed culture as an
unchangeable dichotomous structure, either endangering democracies or
stabilising them. However, political developments can also affect cultures,
rather than just reflecting them. Peter Wilkin argues in exactly this vein,
when he says that “Hungary’s current Orbánisation reflects an on-going
tension between liberal and illiberal tendencies, the latter being part of the
foundations of the modern world-system” (Wilkin 2018, p. 5). Moreover,
Almond’s differentiation of democracies that are structurally endangered
and those that are stable by nature is of limited use. Instead, I would
argue that we should identify democratic backsliding as a process, which
can occur in every democracy but not necessarily to the same degree. In
this sense, democratic backsliding would be a category of degree, rather
than a category of kind. If democratic backsliding means gradual weak-
ening of democracy, Hungary, for instance, can be viewed as an example
of a more general trend, albeit one of the more pronounced cases thereof
(Ágh 2016).
The degree/nature of democratic backsliding is also highlighted in
more contemporary literature in political theory. For instance, Nadia
Urbinati (2014, 2019) points out that all democracies (including the
advanced ones) are subject to three potential disfigurations while the
formal institutions of democracy can remain more or less intact: the
epistemic disfiguration, the populist disfiguration and the plebiscitary
disfiguration (Urbinati 2014, p. 8). The epistemic disfiguration frames
democracy as a system of knowledge, in which mainly competent elites
can make political decisions according to specific knowledge, and by
doing so, they treat politics as a quasi-technical area to be removed from
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mass politics. The populist disfiguration claims the will of the people
for one specific group while excluding others (Urbinati 2014, p. 131).
The plebiscitary disfiguration means that representative democracy is
reduced to plebiscitary forms of citizens’ participation. In this view, citi-
zens become an audience observing the political decision-makers, rather
than controlling them at the ballot box. These three disfigurations can
occur to various degrees and even stop short of democratic backsliding, in
case there is no change in the institutional set-up of a democratic regime.
While I am not going to discuss Urbinati’s “disfiguration approach” in full
detail, I do take her “audience democracy” (or plebiscitary disfiguration)
as a point of departure to argue that a political theory of democratic back-
sliding should consider three aspects: the societal (changes in the society),
the institutional (changes in the institutional set-up of democracies) and
the processual (the process of democratic backsliding itself).
3 The Societal: The Rise of Audience Democracy
Political leaders do not always “hijack” democratic institutions generating
democratic backsliding; they often modify them within the constraints
imposed by institutions and with the support of voters. In this sense,
political backsliding can thrive on how the citizenry behaves. To Nadia
Urbinati, one of the key issues thereof is that citizenry becomes an audi-
ence acting through plebiscites on the popularity of politicians. Politicians
are “in the eyes of the people”, but at the same time, the citizens become
passive by watching their leaders. This audience democracy replaces
democratic accountability with popularity and the citizens are often likely
to fall under the spell of authoritarian leaders who make the citizens react
to political decisions in a yes or no manner: “The Roman plebiscitum was
a yes-no decision by the plebs to a proposal that came from the tribune
of the plebs” (Urbinati 2014, p. 176).
Audience democracy results from the alteration of traditional forms of
political participation, such as party membership, engagement into party
politics and electoral voting. Sadurski (2018) points this out with regard
to Poland with the following argument:
Poland has one of the lowest numbers of party membership in Europe
(only approx. 1 percent of the adult population, compared to 2.3% in
Germany and 3.8% in Sweden); party loyalties by voters are extremely
shallow and devoid of strong value meanings (e.g. 18% of those who
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voted in 2011 for a left-wing SLD transferred their votes in 2015 to a
right-wing PiS), and the dominant phenomenon of societal mobilisation
in recent years was about single-issue protests, which were often episodic
and non-institutionalised (e.g. about ACTA or the anti-abortion legislative
initiative). (Sadurski 2018, p. 111)
This resonates with the current debate on citizenship, in which changes
to how citizens see their role in politics are highlighted. In his widely
discussed book “The People vs Democracy”, Yasha Mounk (2018,
p. 100) argues that the crisis of democracy is (among others) corre-
lated with citizens’ low interest in politics—particularly visible in young
people—and their growing support for non-democratic regimes in the US
(Mounk 2018, p. 105). Even though the picture is more complicated in
Europe, Mounk suggests that increasingly more citizens are more open
to non-democratic regime alternatives including military, technocratic
and technological solutions. Particularly young people are more likely to
wish for a technocratic dictatorial figure like Steve Jobs who would treat
politics like a software problem—a sort of “Silicon Valley syndrome”—
enforcing the best solutions. In this view, politics is perceived to be a
question of a proper technical design, rather than citizens’ participation,
the latter being a problem of finding optimal solutions. In this vein, the
European Tech Insights (Center for the Governance of Change 2019)
found that 25% Europeans favour letting an artificial intelligence make
important political decisions about their own country. In countries such
as the Netherlands, Germany and the UK, the percentage is even higher,
as it reaches 30%. Interestingly, this preference is stronger with people
who have university degrees (Center for the Governance of Change 2019,
p. 11).
As John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2004, p. 4) argue,
the citizenry as a whole tends to be quite indifferent to policy-making
and therefore are not eager to hold the government accountable for its
policies. Still, the people want to control the government but only under
rare circumstances when they think politicians might benefit from citizens.
Citizens just want to have the feeling that they can potentially control
the government but the bulk of citizens do not have any “current inten-
tion of getting involved in government or even of paying attention to
it”. In sum, citizens dislike sustained public involvement but want to
have the illusion of control. Thus, Hibbling and Theiss-Morse refute the
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widespread assumption that participatory democracy is the ultimate goal
and preference of citizens.
Instead, we might be witnessing a transformation towards an audi-
ence democracy. Some authors think that this type of “ocular democracy”
allows for a better control of the leaders. For instance, Jeffrey Edward
Green (2010) stresses that citizens as spectators can effectively control
the everyday performance of the politicians. While Green developed his
argument prior to Trump’s ascent to presidency (with Trump being
the perfect embodiment of celebrity-cum-politician), he clearly misap-
prehended the consequences of citizens being spectators. While Greene
agrees that citizens are disinclined to rule themselves and want to be ruled
instead, he claims that the spectatorship of “ocular democracy” can be
an alternative form of democratic power, as leaders placed in conditions
of publicity are more likely to reveal the truth about their intentions—a
colossal misjudgement in times of post-truth politics.
On the contrary, I would argue that we can observe less democratic
control of the leaders and more audience democracy (Mishra 2017).
The spectators can be easily manipulated into politics of insecurity and
exclusionary identity politics, which in fact occurs during democratic
backsliding (Sata and Karolewski 2019). Citizens as spectators watch
politicians in their spectacles organised specifically for the people. The
spectacles operate through scandalisation and propaganda, in which the
questions of political accountability are replaced by media interest in the
private lives of politicians, their family matters and other trivia. This is
not a new insight, as already in the 1990s (long before a Reality TV
celebrity became US President) Thomas Mathiesen coined the concept
of “the viewer society” (Mathiesen 1997). It is a further power mecha-
nism supplementing the panopticon (the few people watch the many). But
other than panopticon, synopticon seduces people into watching, rather
than coercing them. In this way, citizens are replaced by spectators.
However, watching the leaders is not necessarily a mechanism of
controlling politicians by the masses, as it promotes leaders who in
fact strive for mass support through television and other forms of mass
communication, such as Twitter. In an audience democracy, leaders often
seek direct contact with the spectators, while undercutting power limi-
tation and the division of power (Urbinati 2014, p. 174). As Urbinati
points out, Hugo Chávez spent apparently 1500 hours criticising capi-
talism on a TV show, while Silvio Berlusconi was present on various TV
channels on a daily basis during his years as Prime Minister. Moreover,
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the audience is not only seduced into watching their leaders. They are
also subjected to politics of insecurity and exclusionary identity politics,
which are crucial for the support of democratic backsliding. In the poli-
tics of insecurity, the citizen-cum-spectator is often confronted with threat
scenarios highlighting his/her shared destiny and group belonging. This
promotes neurotic citizens (Isin 2004) who define politics in terms of its
permanent insecurity and threat scenarios. Their preference for liberty and
participation becomes surpassed by fears of survival in view of organised
criminality, possible terrorist attacks, treachery and international conspir-
acies (e.g. Mancosu et al. 2017). As a consequence, citizens focus more
strongly on reporting potentially dangerous situations and spying on
other citizens, rather than on elections, public space and ensuring the
accountability of the government (e.g. Douglas and Sutton 2018; Moore
2016). Furthermore, the audience democracy favours demarcation and a
juxtaposition of the in-group in relation to the “other”. Through mass
communication, leaders activate the “others” in the perception of the
spectators, since the binary construction of “us” versus “them” allows
for blaming and scapegoating strategies.
These developments might not constitute democratic backsliding itself
and do not exclude traditional political activity by citizenry. An exact
turning point of citizens’ democracy into spectators’ democracy is rather
difficult to establish and it needs to be explored empirically, rather than
a priori. However, a progressing audience democracy favours democratic
backsliding, as the transformation of citizenry into audience promotes the
plebiscitary democracy, in which citizens watch their leaders and accept
their prior decisions. This is in tune with what Joseph A. Schumpeter
(2006/1942, pp. 284–285) claimed democracy really is: “Democracy
means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refuting
the men who are to rule them”.
4 The Institutional: Looking for State Capture
While audience democracy seems to facilitate democratic backsliding by
transforming parts of the society into spectators, state capture is the main
institutional feature of democratic backsliding. Fukuyama (2014, p. 54)
describes state capture as “the capture of ostensibly impersonal state insti-
tutions by powerful elites”. It occurs in many democracies to a varying
degree. State capture occurs when political and economic actors take over
13 TOWARDS A POLITICAL THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING? … 311
the institutions of the state and misuse them for their own narrow political
and economic interests.
The government ceases to represent the societal interests and becomes
a tool of influence in favour of vested interests subverting democratic
decision-making processes. This can be viewed already as problematic in
the case of corporate lobbying, particularly when it lacks accountability
and transparency. It becomes even more problematic when, for instance,
courts are used for the harassment of political opponents, anti-corruption
agencies are disabled to undermine investigations against corrupt politi-
cians in power or tax authorities are ill-used to secure tax deductions for
oligarchs (who also exist in advanced democracies). This goes beyond
simple clientelism (prevalent in many democracies), as the “hollowing
out” of state institutions ensues and economic rents or partisan power
are extracted from them (Grzymala-Busse 2008). The concept has largely
been used in the research on financial-political networks in Russia and
Ukraine, where economically powerful actors during the transition time
colonised state institutions to promote their private business interests
(e.g. Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya 2006). A prime example of state capture
was the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (2010–2014), during which
oligarchs’ interests thrived symbiotically in league with the kleptocratic
regime, until the Euromaidan revolution ended it.
Against this backdrop, Abby Innes (2014, p. 88) identifies two clus-
ters of state capture in ECE based on two modes of dominance over
state institutions: the party state capture (monopoly of a party exploiting
significant state institutions for partisan gain, including courts, office of
the general prosecutor and government agencies) and corporate state
capture where public power is exercised mainly for private gain. In this
regard, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria present cases
of corporate state capture, whereas Hungary and Poland stand for party
state capture—a re-monopolisation of the political system in favour of a
party in power (Sata and Karolewski 2019; for an alternative typology, see
Stanley 2019). Certainly, party state capture does exclude corporate state
interests encroaching political institutions and vice versa. Parties can (and
they do) become vehicles for personal enrichment (Hungary and Poland)
and corporate interests can form political parties (the Czech Republic).
Still, these two ideal types of state capture show distinct features that
can explain specific behaviour of governments in democratic backsliding.
A corporate capture aims at weakening or disabling policies, as it wants
to suppress the activity of the state. It is also less likely to be interested
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in changing the ideological core of policies but rather seeks institutional
and policy stability, reflecting static corporate demands (e.g. the “the
state as a firm” ideology by Andrej Babiš in the Czech Republic, see
Bustikova and Guasti 2019). In contrast, party state capture intensifies
policy implementation and responsiveness because party preferences are
immediately turned into policies (e.g. the controversial decommunisa-
tion policies of PiS) (Sata and Karolewski 2019). The distinction between
party state capture and corporate state capture can also explain why party
state capture is more visible in the public space, because the institutional
set-up of the state is subject to radical change. For that reason, interna-
tional actors like the EU or the Council of Europe react mainly to the
party state capture, rather than to the less visible corporate state capture.
The corporate state capture attempts to avoid the limelight, as it is
based on problematic networks between economic and political interests,
which do not want to be discovered. The party state capture under-
mines the independence of state institutions in the open, while backing it
up with the propaganda of identity politics. The corporate state capture
prefers secrecy to the public space, as it undercuts state institutions
through their adaptation to the oligarchic interests. This is not only the
case in ECE as we can observe plenty of examples of corporate state
capture in the US since 2016. For instance, Donald Trump has been
using state resources extensively to advance interests of his firm and his
family, by placing his daughter and her husband in the White House
system of decision-making and compelling state employees and foreign
leaders to spend money in his hotels and resorts (e.g. Fahrenthold et al.
2020). Trends of party state capture are visible in the UK under the
Boris Johnson government, for instance, with regard to the plans of the
government to strip the BBC (as an independent source of information
for citizens) of its funding (Cowburn 2020). This goes hand in hand with
the support for Brexit and the Johnson government by Rupert Murdoch
and his media empire.
While one of the differences between both types of state capture lies in
their public visibility, they do not necessarily differ in their challenges to
democracy. However, with corporate state capture, the relevant democ-
racy quality indices (e.g. Freedom House) appear to be helpless, as they
are unable to entirely reflect it. This also goes for the European Union
that deals mainly with the institutional changes in Poland, Hungary and
Romania (albeit not very successfully), while ignoring corporate state
capture in other countries. As Hanley and Vachudova (2018, p. 276)
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show, in contrast to Hungary and Poland, democratic backsliding in the
Czech Republic lacks a powerful nationalist narrative, but there are crucial
similarities with regard to tactics and forms of power concentration. Babiš
and his party ANO use a technocratic rationale (“state as a firm”), but
the goal is the same—hoarding state power and abolishing checks and
balances. In the Czech Republic, it happens in the name of efficiency and
modernisation, rather than in the name of bringing the power back to the
people (Hanley and Vachudova 2018, p. 289).
5 The Processual: Retrogression
Towards Semi-democracy
De-democratisation does not have to occur as a result of a military coup
or a revolution. In many cases, it is a consequence of actions by demo-
cratically elected actors (Luo and Przeworski 2019). In this perspective,
the challenges to democracy are likely to arise from the political elites
themselves, even from the political mainstream (see Hungary, Poland and
the US), rather than the military (like in Argentina in 1976) or foreign
powers (like in Iran in 1953). As opposed to abrupt de-democratisation,
democratic backsliding takes place in the process of little steps including
political changes of formal and informal nature. As a result, civil rights,
democratic elections and democratic accountability are eroded, rather
than abolished overnight, which can take years, rather than days. This can
apply to unwritten norms of democratic decision-making, such as absten-
tion of the executive branch from influencing court decisions or limiting
the rights of the opposition in law-making by using fast-track decision
procedures under actual exclusion of opposition. All these changes have
the goal of limiting political competition and hoarding power with the
goal of skewing the political system to increase the chances of remaining
in power for the incumbent actors (Waldner and Lust 2018).
Since the process of backsliding is not as abrupt as a military or
executive coup, it is difficult to determine the tipping point, at which
democracy ceases to be democracy. Usually, it takes a number of contro-
versial laws and changes in the constitutional set-up—mainly the court
system—that propel the process of democratic backsliding; the damage to
liberal democracy can be seen only after these changes took an aggregated
effect (Sadurski 2018, p. 5). The issue here is not an incremental constitu-
tional change in democracies, which is the rule, but a series of problematic
laws that are already individually controversial. Still, none of these laws
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constitute regime changes comparable to, for instance, the Enabling Act
of 1933 that gave Hitler plenary powers to enact laws without the involve-
ment of the Reichstag (and which, together with the Reichstag Fire
Decree, abolished most civil liberties in the interwar Germany).
As opposed to authoritarian overthrows based, for instance, on rigged
elections or intimidation of political opposition through unlawful impris-
onment or show trials (see Russia or Turkey), democratic backsliding
often occurs as a result of systematic attacks on the rule of law and/or
sweeping reforms of the court system, whereas elections still take place
and opposition is free to organise itself. In this perspective, constitutions
cannot protect democracies from democratic backsliding, since the very
functioning of the constitutional institutions such as the constitutional or
supreme courts are undermined without the need of formally changing
constitutions. For instance, the functionality (or rather dysfunctionality)
of a constitutional court can be achieved through court packing , that is, a
modification in the number of judges allowing friendly judges and party
loyalists to be put on the bench. Should independent courts come under
the control of the government, they are often turned into tools for further
democratic erosion, which can be labelled “oppressive constitutionalism”.
In 2004, the number of judges of the Supreme Court in Venezuela was
increased from 20 to 32, with the goal of changing the majority in favour
of the government. In Bolivia, the president initiated an impeachment
procedure against three judges of the Constitutional Court in 2014. The
procedure was based on trumped-up charges but the president succeeded
in removing the judges in question (Landau and Dixon 2019). In this
regard, the development towards oppressive constitutionalism (Tushnet
2014) is likely to be a further central feature of democratic backsliding—
quite the opposite of what the hopes of democratic constitutionalism in
the early 1990s were (e.g. Elster 1991).
Freedom House has identified similar developments in the US since
2016, where the president and his supporters consistently attacked inde-
pendent courts, the judiciary and law enforcement, while eroding public
trust in independent media and the rule of law:
The [US] president has since urged the Department of Justice to prosecute
his political opponents and critics. He has used his pardon power to reward
political and ideological allies and encouraged targets of criminal investiga-
tions to refuse cooperation with the government. (Freedom House 2019,
p. 20)
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While such developments alone might not constitute a breakdown of
democracy, they can be understood as retrogression in contrast to rever-
sion, the latter being a rapid collapse of democratic institutions. The
concept of retrogression has been introduced by Huq and Ginsburg
(2018) to describe “a more subtle, incremental erosion to three insti-
tutional predicates of democracy occurring simultaneously: competitive
elections; rights of political speech and association; and the administrative
and adjudicative rule of law”. The key issue here is that no democracy
is perfect and there are sometimes some violations of democracy, such as
political corruption or problematic corporate lobbying. However, a series
of such incremental violations in their aggregate effect can constitute a
qualitative regime change subverting the very functioning of democracy
without abolishing formal democratic institutions, such as cyclical elec-
tions. As Huq and Ginsburg (2018, p. 118) argue: “The precise point,
however, at which the volume of democratic and constitutional back-
sliding amounts to constitutional retrogression will be unclear—both ex
ante and contemporaneously”. Against this backdrop, I argue that the
outcome of such development can be called semi-democracy, which is a
regime that uses constitutional and democratic forms but in fact operates
through significant violations of democratic rule, in particular the rule of
law.
Semi-democracies guarantee free elections and refrain from the impris-
oning of political opponents (even though the opponents can be harassed
by use of court trials, politically motivated prosecutor’s measures and
targeted controls by tax authorities). In this sense, semi-democracies
are distinguishable from electoral autocracies, in which elections are
subject to severe manipulation and opposition politicians undergo system-
atic repressions (Schedler 2013, p. 3). In semi-democracies, opposition
forces still have a chance of winning elections and regaining the power,
which is impossible without a revolt or a regime breakdown in electoral
autocracies.1
1There are a number of adjacent concepts, such as defective democracy (e.g. Merkel
2004) or semi-consolidated democracy (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2001). They all
suffer from problems of “democracy with adjectives”, broadly debated in the transition
theory some time ago. One of the conceptual problems of “democracy with adjectives”
is that this notion implies that we deal with imperfect democracies (probably on their
way towards fully fledged democracy), rather than distinct and stable regimes, such as
semi-democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Knobloch 2002).
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Of all transitologists, Guillermo O’Donnell (1992, p. 19) and Samuel
P. Huntington (1996) pointed to the possibility of the “slow death” of
democracy, which was described as “a progressive diminution of existing
spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness of the classic
guarantees of liberal constitutionalism”. This democradura could still be
able to secure electoral support, in particular through usage of plebisci-
tary instruments, such as referenda (see also Schedler 1998). Samuel P.
Huntington also agreed that gradual democratic erosion would be more
likely than an abrupt democratic breakdown in the third-wave democ-
racies: “Threats to third-wave democracies are likely to come not from
generals and revolutionaries who have nothing but contempt for democ-
racy, but rather from participants in the democratic process. These are
political leaders and groups who win elections, take power, and then
manipulate the mechanisms of democracy to curtail or destroy democ-
racy” (Huntington 1996, p. 8). Still, Huntington did not see any similar
dangers of democratic backsliding in advanced democracies nor did he
explore the conditions or paths of this type of democratic backsliding.
6 Conclusions
I have argued in this chapter that a putative theory of democratic back-
sliding should consider the societal, the institutional and the processual
aspects. Regarding the societal aspect of democratic backsliding, I have
pointed out that changes in the nature of citizenship towards spectator-
ship, passivity and plebiscitary understanding of democracy favour demo-
cratic backsliding, even though they might not constitute democratic
backsliding on their own.
Considering the institutional aspect, I have focused on state capture,
which I argue is the central feature of democratic backsliding. I have
here applied the two-type differentiation: the party state capture and the
corporate state capture, the latter discernable, for instance, in the Czech
Republic and the US, while the former is more typical for Poland and
Hungary. Even though these are ideal types, the difference between the
party state capture and corporate state capture is not only of conceptual
value, as some indices of democratic quality have difficulties reflecting the
corporate state capture.
With regard to the processual aspect, democratic backsliding does not
necessarily lead to fully fledged authoritarianism but rather constitutes
a retrogression to semi-democracy, in which the dismantling of relevant
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liberal-democratic institutions such as the rule of law goes hand in hand
with cyclical elections preserving democratic standards in a broader sense
(see also Chapters 1 and 14). This semi-democracy draws its legitimacy
from electoral support but it can also lose it, paving a way for a return to
liberal democracy.
I have also argued that democratic backsliding can occur in advanced
democracies, which has actually been happening, for instance, in the US,
though not to the same degree as in Hungary and Poland. In sum, I
posit that we need to look at democratic backsliding as a category of
degree, rather than kind, with a turning point between democracy and
autocracy that is difficult to identify. Nevertheless, democratic backsliding
can lead to semi-democracy as a stable outcome, rather than electoral
authoritarianism.
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CHAPTER 14
Illiberal Trends and Anti-EU Politics in East
Central Europe:Major Findings and Avenues
for Future Research
Astrid Lorenz and Lisa H. Anders
1 Introduction
When, in April 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) ruled that Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic had violated
EU law by ignoring the refugee relocation quota, the reactions did not
take long and followed the pattern typical of all recent confrontations
between East Central European governments and the “rest of Europe”.
On the one side, the Hungarian Minister of Justice Judit Varga
commented that the relocation scheme was “dead” anyway and found
it shocking that only the three East Central European countries were
sentenced while almost no EU member state had fully implemented the
2015 quota decisions (Stevis-Gridneff and Pronczuk 2020; Ministry of
Justice 2020; Varga 2020). The Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and
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his Interior Minister Jan Hamáček stated that the ruling was “not that
important”. Babiš insisted that Czechia “will not accept any migrants”
and concluded that “the quota system was cancelled mainly thanks to
us” (Stevis-Gridneff and Pronczuk 2020; Prague Morning 2020). The
Polish Minister Zbigniew Ziobro criticised that “some EU institutions
are completely detached from reality” and proceeded that “Poland was
right not to accept refugees” as it had to defend its “sovereignty against
the foreign culture of Islam that they wanted to impose” on the country
even though the European treaties would not oblige member states to
accept refugee quotas (Tilles 2020). Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki
added that Poland definitely will not accept any refugees (Tilles 2020).
On the other side, when recommending the ruling to the court, CJEU
Advocate General Eleanor Sharpston drew similarly far-reaching conclu-
sions and declared that disregarding EU obligations “is a dangerous
first step towards the breakdown of the orderly and structured society
governed by the rule of law”. She continued that the “principle of soli-
darity necessarily sometimes implies accepting burden-sharing” (Janicek
et al. 2019). When the CJEU issued the ruling, the President of the
European Commission Ursula von der Leyen stressed its importance.
Contradicting the ECE government officials, she underlined that “all
member states were required to participate in a temporary relocation
scheme”. The court’s decision, she concluded, “will give us guidance to
the future” (TVN24 2020).
Once again, these statements reproduced the general scheme of the
public conflicts between EU officials and the ECE governments: the latter
accuse the EU of applying double standards, of stretching EU law to
promote left-liberal values, of instrumentalising courts for politically moti-
vated rulings and of imposing its particular interpretation of EU law on
member states against the will of their people. In their eyes, they are
the true guardians of European values and European democracy. In the
meantime, EU actors insist on their interpretation of EU law and the
legitimacy of the Union’s decision-making procedures, and they criticise
the ECE countries for destroying the rule of law as such and reproach
them for lacking European solidarity while benefiting from generous EU
financial aid.
The list of such conflicts is as long as the list of questions emerging
from them: Are East Central European member states really increasingly
or even generally unwilling to accept EU decisions and to adhere to Euro-
pean law? Do these countries really have less solidarity? Are the anti-EU
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rhetoric and politics in ECE systematically related to the growing illiberal
measures against counter-majoritarian institutions in the region? Do the
governing parties follow their own ideological agenda when confronting
the EU and liberal values, or do they respond to voters’ preferences? And
do the national publics in the four states share common perceptions of the
EU and illiberalism or are regional commonalities less pronounced than
politicians, media coverage and stereotype conflict narrations suggest?
To address these questions around the domestic causes and context
conditions of illiberalism and anti-EU politics, the volume comprises qual-
itative and quantitative contributions from scholars of different disciplines
with broad expertise in East Central European politics and comparative
European sociology. Translating the aforementioned questions into more
general tasks, the chapters aimed to explore the national contexts of illib-
eral trends and anti-EU politics, compare and contrast the dynamics in
all four EU member states and analyse, especially with regard to the soci-
etal roots, if the differences between East and West are as sharp as often
claimed. As laid out in the introduction of this volume, the overall aim
was to capture the different facets of the illiberal trends and anti-EU poli-
tics in ECE countries to arrive at a more encompassing understanding of
these phenomena. This concluding chapter summarises and discusses key
findings of the volume as well as their implications for future research.
2 Individual Chapter Findings
and Cross-Chapter Linkages
The first part of the book dealt with the societal background of illiberal
trends and anti-EU politics. The chapters show that the four states are
quite similar in some aspects but clearly different in others. The quanti-
tative analyses found no empirical evidence of a general lack of European
solidarity (as suggested by the persistent refusal of the Visegrád govern-
ments to participate in the resettlement system). Nor did they provide
proof that support for the EU would be particularly low in ECE coun-
tries. This is consistent with the observation made in our introduction to
the book that the share of people who trust the EU either exceeds the
EU average (Poland, Slovakia) or is comparably high (Czech Republic,
Hungary). The study on anti-Muslim attitudes uncovered deviations from
the “rest of Europe” while the general linkage between anti-Muslim
attitudes and Euroscepticism is present all over Europe.
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Based on the European Elections studies data from 2004 to 2019,
Lars Vogel shows in Chapter 2 that the share of Eurosceptics, especially
of hard Eurosceptics, is rather low in ECE. Despite the EU financial and
migration crises, diffuse support for the EU has even increased within the
last years while it decreased in the remaining EU countries. Policy-specific
support, in contrast, is rather volatile. It decreased significantly in all ECE
countries and also in the average of the other EU countries in 2014 and
then rose again in 2019. Cultural issues, e.g. nationalist orientations or
conceptions of democracy, were only in two of the ECE countries statis-
tically related to public Euroscepticism, namely, in Poland and Hungary.
Differences between countries are also apparent concerning the factors
that explain Euroscepticism. The analysis of Euroscepticism determinants
reveals country-specific rather than regional patterns, indicating that citi-
zens base their evaluation of European integration on country-specific
criteria.
In Chapter 3, Gert Pickel and Cemal Öztürk demonstrate that in many
EU countries, voters of right-wing populist parties are the main bearers of
the aforementioned linkage between anti-Muslim attitudes and Euroscep-
ticism. They often support a Muslim ban and perceive that European
unification has gone too far. In Eastern Europe, however, anti-Muslim
sentiments are generally more widespread and shared by both voters of
right-wing populist and mainstream parties. The authors highlight the
risk of governments instrumentalising anti-Muslim attitudes to mobilise
against the EU by claiming that it orchestrates a “Muslim invasion”. Their
data demonstrate that even if governments refrain from such campaigns,
a liberal-universalist European asylum and migration policy obviously
collides with the deeply rooted Islamophobia of the electorate in ECE
and probably results in EU criticism in this sphere.
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates solidarity as
one of the founding principles of European societies. Analysing citi-
zens’ attitudes towards European solidarity, Florian K. Kley and Holger
Lengfeld show that East Central Europe does not generally stand out
from patterns in other EU countries. As Chapter 4 reveals, a majority of
Slovak, Hungarian and Polish people support the idea of financial assis-
tance for indebted EU countries as well as redistributive measures among
EU member states. As in Southern countries, levels of support for an
EU-wide reduction of territorial disparities in the three ECE countries
even exceed the support of such measures for reducing differences within
the country. The authors attribute this to the rational calculation of the
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respondents as ECE countries might benefit from such a redistribution
policy. All in all, the chapter reveals that the widespread assumption that
ECE countries generally lack solidarity is not substantiated. Moreover, the
approval of the ideas of solidarity differs across East Central European
countries. This finding indicates that regional affiliation is not a relevant
category for explaining attitudes towards European solidarity.
Taken together, the contributions of the first part of the book show
that, on average, people in ECE are not more Eurosceptic than people
in other member states. It seems, however, that the majority of citizens
in the region have an instrumental understanding of European policy-
making. According to such an understanding, European policies should
serve the will and fit the values of the (national) majority. The chap-
ters suggest that people in ECE countries accept further integration
when expected gains are high. Accordingly, redistributive measures, which
potentially benefit these countries, would generally be supported by a
majority of people in East Central Europe. In contrast, any plan to further
integrate asylum and migration policy in a liberal-universalist version
will probably cause critique, while—just as a fictive scenario—a common
European walling-off strategy towards Muslim migrants combined with
a less restrictive policy towards non-Muslims might find support. As has
been shown, the majority of people in East Central Europe are hostile
towards Muslims and politicians exploit this deeply rooted Islamophobia
to stir anti-EU sentiments. The instrumental approach to EU policies and
institutions, therefore, is not only related to financial gains but also to how
they fit to perceived values and attitudes.
The contributions of the second part of the volume explore the
complex domestic processes around illiberal and anti-EU politics in East
Central Europe. In contrast to the first part, they focus more on the
agents of the current illiberal trends in the region, analysing the illib-
eral rhetoric and practice of politicians, parties and their linkage to voters,
and the politicisation of administrations. They thereby show that illiberal
trends are neither uniform nor determined by fixed regional characteristics
but initiated and realised by domestic actors with diverging, sometimes
flexible positions in varying political configurations. Despite some similar-
ities, such as the politicisation of certain policies and attempts to increase
executive power at the expense of the legislature, the countries do not
form a coherent group with respect to illiberalism and relations with
the EU. Often, illiberalism is not rooted in a strict and manifest illib-
eral agenda but can be attributed to pragmatic attempts to secure certain
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policy goals or to generate electoral support by addressing voters’ atti-
tudes. In other cases, rhetoric and action do only partly overlap and
illiberal rhetoric has little impact on actual policy.
In Chapter 5, Vratislav Havlík and Vít Hloušek shed light on the
various facets of illiberalism in East Central Europe by studying the
different ideologies underpinning the illiberal rhetoric and by comparing
how ruling parties put more or less pronounced illiberal ideologies into
political practice. Fidesz (Hungary) is assessed as having a flexible illiberal
doctrine and PiS (Poland) a coherent illiberal ideology. In contrast, ANO
(Czech Republic) and SMER (Slovakia) do not have an explicitly illiberal
programme, meaning that their illiberal stances are a result of pragmatic
choices. With regard to illiberal practices, the contribution shows that
in all four countries, the ruling parties strengthened the executives while
eroding checks and balances.1 Concerning the other dimensions of illib-
eralism (e.g. measures towards media, courts and NGOs) practices vary.
This clearly demonstrates that there is no coherent pattern of illiberalism
and illiberal political practice in East Central Europe.
Focusing on Hungary and the Czech Republic, Chapter 6 by Paula
Beger provides new insights into the politicisation and compliance of
asylum and migration policy—a policy field which induced massive
changes in party systems all over Europe. As the contribution shows,
in both countries, the policy was shaped by pre-accession Europeanisa-
tion, when national administrations adopted EU standards in a technical
and uncontested downloading process. Not until 2015 did questions of
asylum and migration become politicised in the partisan and public sphere
of both countries. Then, the comparable levels of politicisation in the
two countries yielded different effects. In Hungary, the Fidesz-KDNP
government exerted influence on the asylum-related administration which
resulted in decreased compliance with EU law. The Czech administration,
in contrast, has remained rather unpoliticised and therefore continued to
comply with EU law. This suggests that an administration can—if it is able
to act autonomously—secure the implementation of EU policies even if
domestic governments are at loggerheads with the EU.
In Chapter 7, Michał Dulak also exploits the advantages of case study
methodology. He delves into the details of Polish party politics from
1Another similarity is that in none of the four countries did the authors detect politically
motivated interference with private property and the autonomy of proprietors’ actions in
the economy expropriation measures, which is one of their ten indicators of illiberalism.
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2004 to 2019 to explain the phenomenon that an increasingly coherent
illiberal party programme must not necessarily lead to programmatic de-
Europeanisation. In fact, the manifestos of the main governing party PiS
did not contain calls to leave the EU or other signs of hard Euroscepticism
(the refusal of introducing the Euro currency is the only exception). This
strategy is explained by PiS’s intention to be responsive to the different
positions on EU issues among its electorate. While the main opposition
party PO also took a pro-European position, PiS declared itself as being
“Euro-realist”. This self-positioning of PiS in EU issues deviates from
the observation by Pickel and Öztürk in that the party has not—at least
in its programme—tied its restrictive preferences in asylum policy with
general Euroscepticism. However, it is in line with the observations made
by Vogel, Kley and Lengfeld regarding the general EU support which is
partly based on instrumental or benefit-oriented calculations.
In another qualitative study, Petra Guasti illustrates the illiberal back-
lash against universal rights in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Her
contribution shows that the transnational legal context is marked by a
liberal development and pro-universal rights, including LGBT rights and
gender equality. This influences domestic opportunity structures, but it
cannot guarantee the self-enforcement of these rights. Many domestic
actors from the radical right to radicalised mainstream politicians are
increasingly adopting a populist socially conservative rhetoric around the
notion of sovereignty and reject attempts to increase minority rights as
being imposed by the EU or the Council of Europe. This contributes
to domestic polarisation. Despite similar levels of domestic polarisation
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, European norms concerning LGBT
rights and the Istanbul Convention were accommodated to different
degrees. Depending on the configuration of domestic party competition,
mainstream parties partly transposed norms but resisted further accom-
modation due to fear of polarisation (Czech Republic) or, in a more
religious society, radicalised to fend off radical right challengers (Slovakia).
Thus, in summary, it depends on strategies of domestic politicians if
and how far the opportunities of the European legal framework are used
in the national policy arena. Also, in the light of the findings of the first
part of the book, this suggests that perceived deviations of European
policies from habits and traditions of the domestic majority can result
in anti-EU polarisation, but this does not automatically have to be the
case. It depends on individual cost-benefit calculations of political actors
within a given domestic context. Mainstream parties can refuse more
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liberal-universalist policies or even radicalise, not because of a respec-
tive ideology, but in order to avoid polarisation over—what is interpreted
by large parts of the public as—Europeanisation. Ideology-driven illiber-
alism, in contrast, does not necessarily entail a strict anti-EU course. As a
result, there is no general lack of compliance or increased general anti-EU
programme irrespective of growing illiberalism.
The contributions of the third part of the volume focus on the reac-
tions to illiberal trends and EU-critical politics. All of them devote
special attention to the interplay between actors at the European and
the domestic level. Collectively, the Chapters 9 through 11 illustrate the
various difficulties surrounding the EU’s tools against illiberal backsliding.
Instead of solving the rule of law conflicts at hand, they stirred an ever
harsher dispute. In a more or less ritualised manner, EU actors strongly
criticise the erosion of the rule of law while the Hungarian and the Polish
governments stress the lack of a generally accepted definition of these
terms. Essentially, all these disputes evolve around the diverging cultures,
different political philosophies and different approaches to balance the
(domestic) rule by the people and the (supranational) rule of law. Since
many of the EU’s instruments against illiberal backsliding are based on
regular dialogue (Article 7 procedure, the Rule of law mechanism and
infringement procedures), they currently seem to exacerbate rather than
improve the situation.
In an important contribution, Attila Vincze critically discusses what
he calls the “common misperceptions” in the debate on the rule of law
in Hungary and Poland and also illustrates how illiberal governments
can exploit them to justify their course of action. Orbán, for instance,
can easily accuse the EU for applying double standards as EU actors did
not claim any Article 2 violations when previous Hungarian governments
meddled with political institutions before 2010. Moreover, as Article 2
TEU contains arbitrary and contested terms, some illiberal measures in
ECE are not formally breaching EU law but still fall within the sphere
of different interpretation. As values are declared but not operationalised,
they give—counterintuitively—ground for value relativism. Against this
backdrop, many EU measures to redress backsliding turned out to be ill-
suited. The targeted governments could easily frame them as primarily
political attacks. The Union, Vincze therefore concludes, should focus
on using competences, powers and procedures which are immune to the
Hungarian government’s sophistry.
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To complement this general assessment of the rule of law debate with
an empirical analysis, Lisa H. Anders and Sonja Priebus investigate the
suitability of infringement procedures to enforce the EU’s foundational
values. Their study reveals that rule of law problems were clearly addressed
as the Commission explicitly referred to fundamental democratic prereq-
uisites in most of the cases. The Commission, therefore, seems well aware
that a mere reference to secondary law invites targeted governments to
reject the rule of law relevance of the infringement procedures. Thus, the
conventional view that the procedures lead to a miscategorisation of the
rule of law problems seems unwarranted. Nevertheless, the procedures
did not help to solve or to depoliticise the conflicts. On the contrary, the
relations worsened and the Hungarian government increasingly exploited
the infringement procedures to blame the EU for interfering in domestic
affairs.
In the light of these apparent shortcomings of existing instruments
against illiberal backsliding, Claudia-Y. Matthes focuses on a hitherto
understudied aspect, namely, the idea to complement the EU’s top-
down tool-box with bottom-up approaches including civil society actors.
In Chapter 9, she investigates for the case of Poland how civil society
actors can hinge for the Commission into Polish society and, in doing so,
contribute to safeguarding democracy and rule of law from below. As the
chapter demonstrates, the opportunity structures for liberal civil society
organisations are not too bright, especially since PiS has started to target
them by restricting assembly rights and changing the mode of financing
the NGO sector. Despite these measures, the Polish civil society organisa-
tions managed to provide information on illiberal backsliding and to keep
the topic on the domestic and European agenda.
Taken together, the three contributions show that the EU’s conven-
tional top-down as well as newer bottom-up approaches could not redress
the illiberal trends in Hungary and Poland so far. As the EU’s foun-
dational values are listed in Article 2 TEU but not further specified,
governments can rightly argue that the meaning of the terms is contested
and they often use this argument to frame EU actors’ criticism concerning
the rule of law as political attacks violating the rule of treating all member
states equally. The role of civil society organisations in the struggles
with the EU is also twofold. Actors fighting for liberal values are often
perceived (by a large part of the domestic public) or labelled (by the
national government) as EU-driven. Thus, assisting pro-democratic and
liberal forces can also have unintended negative effects if domestic actors
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point to the support of the EU to refer to the pro-democratic and liberal
forces as “foreign agents” to mobilise against the NGO sector.
The concluding fourth part of the book addresses conceptual questions
and broadens the perspective beyond the Visegrád region. The contribu-
tions discuss various terms and concepts to capture the deterioration of
democracy and the rule of law, and they remind us that illiberal trends
and anti-EU politics are not confined to ECE countries.
In Chapter 12, Luca Tomini and Seda Gürkan focus on the rela-
tion between the decline of democracy and de-Europeanisation. Their
contribution argues that the term “illiberal backsliding” actually does
not capture the de-democratisation processes properly as it implies that
democracies revert to something that existed in the past. Against this
background, the broader term of autocratisation might be more appro-
priate. Based on a comparison of countries with varying degrees of
autocratisation and de-Europeanisation, the contribution furthermore
shows that autocratisation usually precedes de-Europeanisation. Thus,
de-Europeanisation scholars should focus primarily on domestic level
explanatory factors; not only that, but the domestic agents especially
deserve closer inspection as well. This is in line with the volume’s
approach and also corroborates the finding of several chapters that demo-
cratic development cannot be taken for granted even if countries have
oriented themselves towards the EU. Instead, domestic factors are highly
relevant to the practice of democracy and its sustainability.
As Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski aptly describes, long-established democ-
racies too can fall prey to populist politics and attacks on liberal demo-
cratic institutions. Against this backdrop, he reasons that we need a
general approach to theorising backsliding. Drawing on the literature on
democratic transitions and current research on illiberalism, he therefore
develops a three-dimensional heuristic for future research on this topic. It
puts the spotlight on the role of the citizens, types of state capture, the
erosion of liberal democratic practices and their aggregate effects. As the
author highlights, democratic backsliding does not necessarily lead to a
fully fledged authoritarian system but can also result in hybrid regimes.
His heuristic is in line with the outline of this book and also reaffirms the
suitability of a more encompassing analysis of illiberal trends.
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3 Conclusions, Open
Questions and Future Research
What are the main findings of the volume and what are avenues for future
research? Addressing these two questions, this section briefly presents
selected key findings and promising paths for future studies. The structure
follows the outline of the book, starting from societal issues, proceeding
with politics matters, continuing with political reactions to illiberal and
anti-EU politics and finishing with theoretical contextualisation.
Democracy rests on citizens. They need to participate in democratic
decision-making and generally support the political system. In this vein,
every liberal political entity depends on supportive beliefs that it cannot
enforce without giving up the logic of freedom (Böckenförde 1976). The
EU is no exception. As the contributions of the first part of the volume
show, the strong focus on conflicts between the EU and East Central
Europe obscures the fact that the people generally support the EU and
are not more Eurosceptic than people in other member states. At the same
time, the Visegrád governments’ fierce opposition against the European
asylum and migration policy is backed by large parts of the populations
because anti-Muslim attitudes are widespread in the region. Hence, the
appropriate addressees of the policy-conflicts between the EU and ECE
are not only the governments of the respective member states but also
the citizens. To our view, two aspects of the citizens’ perspectives on
illiberalism and the EU deserve special attention in future research.
Firstly, studies should address why people came to support illiberalism
and how personal experiences influence their EU-related imaginations
and attitudes. Thus, we need more research on the micro-foundations of
individual perceptions and cognitive maps of (il)liberal democracy, EU
policies and the EU as a whole. As mentioned in Chapter 1, illiberal
trends are often marked by an increasing mobilisation along the social-
cultural axis of political contestation (Havlík 2019; Vachudova 2019;
Chapters 3 and 8). Many studies therefore highlighted changes in the
distribution of political preferences and the increased importance of an
axis of party competition that spans between libertarian and authori-
tarian sociocultural positions (Kitschelt 2003, p. 6f.) or a new cleavage
between communitarian and cosmopolitan views (e.g. de Wilde et al.
2019). As we know, such phenomena, irrespectively of some similarities,
can have different regional causes (Manow 2019, pp. 38ff.; Bustikova and
Kitschelt 2009). In ECE, both the “cultural counter-revolution” (Krekó
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and Enyedi 2018, p. 45) and the regular rails against the EU intrusion are
at least partly motivated by the desire of citizens to emancipate themselves
from perceived “Western” demands and expectations of how democracy
and politics are done right.
We want to highlight the importance of studies on individual
processes of position-(re)building on democracy and EU issues, and
on how it reflects one’s own experience with transformation and EU
membership. In East Central Europe, most of the citizens have not been
engaged in politics since the early 1990s. There are two main reasons
for that: they had not been socialised to individual autonomous polit-
ical activism in the ancient régime and they faced the high demands
of re-organising their personal life. Just like the political and economic
systems (Offe 1994), citizens faced complex individual transitions. Thus,
popular involvement in democracy (i.e. civic engagement and political
participation beyond voting in elections) remained low (Bernhagen and
Marsh 2007). This, in turn, fostered alienation processes between citizens
and decision-makers. Some of the statements in European public opinion
polls and voting behaviour seem to be inspired by the desire of citizens
to teach decision-makers a lesson they will not forget and to correct
their (perceived) lack of responsiveness. For these reasons, we suggest
that future research on the individual attitudes on (il)liberal democracy,
the EU and EU policies should not only consider the citizens’ present
sociodemographic features2 but also try to trace the long-term effects
of individual transformation and EU enlargement experiences on current
political views. At the same time, it would be interesting to know more
about citizens’ individual weighing up of normative and rationalist moti-
vations regarding the EU. Questions for further investigations could also
be if individual opinions articulated in polls reflect manifest and coherent
individual mindsets or if they are inconsistent and in flux.
Secondly, further empirical research is needed to explore what
particular form of European democracy people prefer. This question
refers to normative attitudes towards democracy (liberal-universalist vs
communitarian-utilitarianist concepts) and its particular functioning in a
multi-level polity. While the Eurobarometer, the European Values Study
2In fact, there is growing and valuable research on these issues (see, for instance,
Kaltwasser and van Hauwaert 2020, who analyse the individual sociodemographic
characteristics of populist citizens).
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and other cross-national polls already provide valuable insights into atti-
tudes towards European integration and other selected issues, it would
be interesting and relevant for the Union’s future to capture the citi-
zens’ preferences towards the particular constitutional structure of the
EU: from unitarian republic up to a decentral Union of nation-states.
Several contributions in this volume inform about the party positions
concerning these aspects. But since most of the citizens are not organ-
ised in parties and voter turnout is rather low, EU- and democracy-related
preferences cannot only be measured simply by looking at party prefer-
ences. Thus, more grass-root sociological research is needed to answer the
questions (see, for promising approaches along these lines, Hurrelmann
et al. 2015).
The contributions in the second part of the volume show in many
ways that domestic political actors often do not follow a uniform illiberal
agenda or a coherent anti-EU strategy. Besides, East Central European
actors do not “make trouble” in all institutional questions or policy
fields. Instead, they were interested in securing national veto capacity or
regaining sovereignty in a limited set of issues. To date, these are the
definition of (national) identity, citizenship, minority rights which all refer
also to migration policy, as well as democracy and rule of law. These issues
are highly politicised but the strong politicisation, also when combined
with explicit anti-EU rhetoric, does not generally lead to non-compliance
with EU-law. Obviously, there are differences between rhetoric and prac-
tice. Against this backdrop, we suggest that future research should include
the following domains:
Firstly, the anti-EU rhetoric—its nuances and changes over time
deserve closer inspection. As recent publications revealed, governments
can simultaneously support the EU as an organisation, openly rail against
its policies (or some of them) by arguing that EU institutions are domi-
nated by liberal-leftist actors or ruled by George Soros and present
themselves as the true Europeans (Mos 2020). It thus seems that we
need a more fine-grained understanding of how politicians (and also the
media) in ECE countries frame the EU and EU policies. It should also
be explored in more detail how far the governments’ anti-EU rhetoric
reflects their responsiveness to attitudes that are widespread among the
population and how far it is a means to activate and manipulate the
citizens’ latent attitudes to get their support. The contributions in this
book provide evidence for both directions of influence, but more infor-
mation to qualify the weight of both would be valuable. As for the
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temporal dimension of politicising EU-related issues, it might also be
discussed if the public contestation of these issues represents, at least to
some extent, a kind of “normalisation” or, to use a less normative term,
a revitalisation of political conflict on EU matters.3 As Chapter 6 and
countless Europeanisation studies have shown, before EU-accession, the
often newly founded political parties did not yet have elaborated posi-
tions on EU issues. Combined with the EU conditionality policy, this
resulted in a technocratic top-down transposition of EU norms that was
not accompanied by a broad domestic political debate. But public debate
and conflicts on the justification of public policies are the main ingredients
of democracy. Democratic choice requires visible alternatives.
Secondly, future studies on the causes and practices of illiberalism and
the strained relations between the EU and East Central Europe should
further explore the relationship between policy-makers and two types
of actors: administrations and courts. To date, the attempts to diminish
the powers of administrations and courts are in most cases explicitly and
implicitly explained with reference to their counter-majoritarian function.
Other potential explanations that would go beyond the mere idea of
power accumulation have received less attention. Future research, there-
fore, should explore if attempts to weaken administrations and courts are
also caused by diverging understandings of democracy and rule of law4
and the intention to revise former governments’ patronage policies or
to block administrative officials’ and judges’ involvement into informal
clientelistic networks. This might also explain why people do not oppose
curtailing the administrations’ room of discretion and support, like in
the Czech Republic, a political course to improve “state efficiency”. In the
pre-accession phase and shortly thereafter, the role of national administra-
tions for implementing EU law and public sector reforms received much
scholarly attention (e.g. Zubek and Goetz 2010; Meyer-Sahling 2009;
Ágh 2002; Dimitrova 2005). Processes within the administrations and
their relationship vis-à-vis the political majorities after 2004, in turn, were
3Pickel (2009) proposes the term “revitalisation” as an alternative to “ormalisation”
in his study on religiosity. The term “consolidation” of democracy also implies political
competition and thus political conflicts, albeit within the “rules of the game” (Linz and
Stepan 1996, p. 5f.; Merkel 1998).
4For historical legacies, see, e.g., Miklóssy (2018), Meyer-Sahling (2009) and Bos and
Pócza (2014).
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covered to a lower degree. Early on, studies demonstrated the poten-
tial of such studies for better understanding domestic political tectonics
(Grzymała-Busse 2003) and also recent analyses have suggested exploring
the role of public administrations in backsliding processes (Bauer and
Becker 2020).
The same is true for courts. In present publications, they are often
almost exclusively referred to as targets of political restrictions. Like
administrations, domestic courts are able to stop illiberal practices.
Besides, they contribute to establishing a European legal framework by
judicial interpretation (e.g. Thym 2017; Blauberger and Kelemen 2016;
Jakab and Kochenov 2017). To do so, they can refer questions of EU
law to the European Court and they can, to a higher or lower extent,
refer to European law in their interpretation. The role of courts as
“engines of integration” has often been described (Alter 2001). Due
to the EU’s “over-constitutionalisation” (Grimm 2015), rights espe-
cially have been “developed exclusively in the inner judicial-legal sphere”
(Schmidt 2017, p. 18). Such dominance of non-majoritarian decision-
making runs the danger of weakening political “voice”. But “without
sufficient backing by societal actors, rights cannot drive societal change”
(Schmidt 2017, p. 18). Possible questions for further reflection there-
fore could be whether it is the courts’ relevance for these aspects that
motivates governments to limit their autonomy or whether there are also
other domestic causes for such measures, e.g. judges’ activism during
transformation (e.g. Pospíšil 2020).5
Part three of the book showed that, so far, the EU’s tools against
illiberal backsliding could not dissuade the targeted governments from
their controversial reforms. Similar to the disputes on the asylum policies
presented above, the conflicts on the EU’s foundational values are increas-
ingly staged and perceived as a clash of cultures. They have become a
symbol of fighting for the right to determine rights while no side is willing
to compromise. Against this background, we suggest further research on
the institutional design of sustainable mechanisms of conflict accommoda-
tion and potential ways for achieving political agreement in constitutional
issues.
5To be clear, such research is not intended to somehow “excuse” illiberal measures or
to identify the attacked institutions as the “true causes” of illiberalism but to explain the
ramified roots of the emergence of illiberalism and why it is supported by parts of the
opposition and citizens.
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Future research should, firstly, investigate how instruments can be
deployed or designed to prevent the impression of double standards. As
the contributions in part three of the book revealed and as also the Euro-
pean Commission (2019) underlines, an even-handed application of EU
law in all member states is crucial to avoid the impression of unequal
treatment of East and West European member states, which can easily
be exploited to rail against the EU’s politically motivated interference in
domestic affairs. Some recent publications go this way by examining, for
instance, how the rule of law conditionality on EU funds—as proposed by
the European Commission 2018—should be organised in order to yield
the envisioned results (Blauberger and van Hüllen 2020; Neuwahl and
Kovacs 2020). So far, most of these studies rely on theoretical approaches
of the literature on EU enlargement and Europeanisation.
A fruitful approach to complement this evolving body of literature
could also be to draw interregional comparisons and to borrow from
neighbouring research areas by studying patterns of conflict accommoda-
tion in heterogeneous federations (e.g. Canada, Brazil, Australia). How
do these cases manage to integrate territorial units by acknowledging
their societal and cultural differences on the one hand and insisting on
stable foundational principles of the interrelationship on the other hand?
Existing multi-level systems, like federations, have established a variety
of frameworks to balance legal unity and diversity and they provide
insights on possible constitutional solutions (e.g. Bednar et al. 1999; Benz
and Broschek 2013; Burgess 2006; Moreno and Colino 2010; Kymlicka
2007). While it is clear that the European Union is not a traditional state
(Schmidt 1999, p. 19), learning from other political entities on an abstract
level is always possible and could potentially provide fresh insights.
Secondly, future research should acknowledge that judicial reasoning
starts from a given norm while democratic reasoning starts from the
people establishing a norm. The vague constitutionalisation of certain EU
norms as a compromise between the will to codify the fundamentals and
the lack of will to agree on what they mean has not proved to be an
equilibrium solution. When EU treaty provisions remain undetermined
because governments cannot agree at the negotiating table, they usually
rely on the European judiciary (Alter 2001; Grimm 2015; Schmidt 2017).
The European Commission is currently also resorting to this strategy. To
clarify the meaning of the EU’s foundational principles, it draws on case
law (European Commission 2014) and refers rule of law-related cases to
the Court (European Commission 2019). This is problematic since the
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selective self-expansion of competences by case law has already damaged
the acceptance of court rulings (for an overview, see De Waele 2010).
Moreover, it becomes questionable if the CJEU’s jurisprudence will be
accepted and complied when the court increasingly decides on politically
sensitive and contested issues (Blauberger and Martinsen 2020).
It seems that the old conflict between the core logic of constitu-
tionalism and the logic of democracy—some theorised ways to reconcile
them (Habermas 2001)—is still clearly visible and increasingly fuelled by
populists claiming to be exclusively dedicated to the will of the people.
Against this background, future theorising should reflect on how to
initiate and uphold a broad constitutional debate on the meaning of the
EU constitutional principles and its multi-level government structure. A
discussion is also needed on how inclusive such a constitutional debate
should and can be. On the one hand, some have criticised the EU’s
constitutional process, which so far has failed to “place the citizen at the
center” (Aziz 2009, p. 282). On the other hand, we know that inclusive-
ness, while it is to be welcomed in normative terms, potentially limits the
scope for agreement.
Around the negotiations of the Convention on the Future of Europe,
a body comprising representatives of member and candidate states (see,
e.g., Wilga 2008), many interesting works on constitutional debates have
been published (e.g. Closa and Fossum 2004; Landfried 2006; Maurer
2003; more general Eriksen et al. 2004). Along with studies of negotia-
tions and deliberative aspects, some also promoted a societal approach to
assess the emergence and role of constitutional and sociocultural norms
(Wiener 2003). These studies should be reviewed in the light of current
developments, continued and developed further by reflecting on how to
enable and strengthen the communication between European citizens of
different member states and their communication with EU officials, e.g.
by deliberative fora beyond day-to-day politics.
More generally, such research also needs to address the following
questions: To what extent should and ought critics be heard? Where to
draw the line between those questions that necessarily have to be the
subject of political dissensus to secure the very logic of democracy and
those constitutional rules that determine the political order’s existence,
equality and freedom and therefore shall remain uncontroversial (Fraenkel
1974, pp. 184ff.)? While dispute is vital for any democracy understood as
the dynamic, temporally bound choice of best political solutions by the
people, the undisputable rules must rest on a basic societal agreement
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(Dahl 1993, p. 133); they are no longer disputed because the struggles
surrounding them were settled by political agreement (and not because
there is an authoritative decision to do so).
The contributions of the fourth part of the book support these
reflections. They remind us to regularly check whether our conceptual
repertoire still adequately covers the subject under study. As highlighted
in the chapters, illiberal trends do not automatically result in fully fledged
autocracies. Yet, some countries investigated in the volume can no longer
be classified as liberal democracies. This brings us back to earlier studies
on regime change in the region and the elephant in the room. As already
indicated, we think that research on the interrelationship between post-
1989 system change and European integration, on their long-term effects
and on their reassessment today, is worth being re-strengthened. The idea
of a quasi-linear development towards liberal democracy also has to be
adjusted to empirical reality (see Buštíková and Guasti 2019).
While illiberal trends are not just East Central European phenomena,
the chapters have shown that their particular form, the arguments
surrounding them and the structure of support vary and are often rooted
in national contexts. Questions to be addressed in future research there-
fore could be if universalist democratic beliefs, proactive bottom-up civic
engagement, public debate, vital parliamentarism and a reflexive divi-
sion of powers actually have ever been as relevant to political practice
as envisioned by the model of liberal democracy (cf. Guasti and Mans-
feldová 2018). As emphasised in Chapter 1, there have been critical
studies on the state of democracy in East Central Europe, but due to the
euphoria about Eastern enlargement, they received little attention (see,
for instance, Greskovits 2007). In the light of current developments, it
seems worthwhile to reassess older evaluations of the state of democ-
racy in the region. Such an endeavour can also contribute to the renewed
academic debate about the set of indicators for measuring the regime type
or modes of gathering data properly (e.g. Coppedge and Altman 2011;
Alexander et al. 2012; Knutsen 2010; Møller and Skaaning 2011) which
also resulted in constructing new indices, like V-Dem. In line with recent
publications, the findings of this volume suggest that those indices should
place greater emphasis on the role of citizens (Mayne and Geissel 2018).
In order to address the links between post-1989 regime change and
European integration and to further investigate their reverberations on
current developments in the region, one should analyse how actors
reassess domestic liberalisation, the EU accession negotiations and the EU
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membership today and how this influences their political action. Illiberal
party programmes in ECE can, inter alia, be attributed to disappointment
with former governments’ decisions or mistakes during transformation.
Illiberal actors might also be motivated to correct past decisions against
the will of the administration, courts and beneficiaries of former decisions.
Favourable privatisation deals or the accumulation of positions in public
administration (Grzymała-Busse 2003), for instance, are not just imagined
agitation, but indisputable facts. Also, as enlargement was “not without
domestic costs”, Grzymała-Busse and Innes had already concluded in
2003 that it “is this perception that “there is no alternative” that also
underpins the rise of anti-EU politicians who substitute populism in
lieu of substantial debate over ideology or policy in the new democra-
cies of East Central Europe. In short, the demands of enlargement have
both constrained responsive and accountable party competition and, as
the character of enlargement became apparent, encouraged populists and
demagogues” (Grzymała-Busse and Innes 2003, p. 64). Recent studies
on the region have already taken up these ideas and advanced them in a
promising way (Krastev and Holmes 2020).
When politicians follow an agenda of renationalisation and speak of
“regaining democracy from corrupt elites” and courts perceived as having
dominated the transformation process (Miklóssy 2018), or when they
publicly argue that they intend to clean the branches of government from
clientelistic and corrupt networks, this refers to a reassessment of former
policies that can perhaps explain why citizens support them irrespectively
of how liberal or illiberal their action is. As studies taking up these ideas
would necessarily go beyond analysing the interplay of political decision-
makers in the executive and legislative arena, they would benefit from the
cooperation of scholars from various disciplines and with area expertise.
4 Outlook
The present chapter summarised the main findings on illiberal trends
and anti-EU politics in East Central Europe. We highlighted selected
key findings and suggested paths for future research. It has become
clear that the instruments to secure liberal democracy and compliance
within the EU require modification. Such modifications should be based
on both conceptual work and area expertise. A deepened understanding
of national specificities will help to understand why certain tools—even
if legally valid—work differently than originally envisaged and to adapt
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them accordingly. Against this backdrop, we underlined the need for
more research on the emergence of illiberal and EU-related attitudes,
programmes and rhetoric and on unresolved transformation and enlarge-
ment conflicts in East Central Europe. On a more general level, a question
for further reflection should also be how much conflict and diversity of
views is necessary for a vibrant (European) democracy and where to draw
the boundaries between disputable and indisputable issues.
As the chapters in this volume have shown, bringing societies back in
and studying political developments from various disciplines and theoret-
ical angles is a promising approach to achieve a comprehensive analysis
of current challenges in Europe. To provide a more realistic impres-
sion of citizens’ position-building, cognitive maps, party-voters linkages
and decision-making processes on EU- and democracy-related topics in
the EU multi-level system, future analyses should also move beyond the
highly politicised conflict issues. The proposed topics for future research
reflect and support the recent pluralisation of European Union Studies
(Kreppel 2012). Broadening the questions and integrating domestic and
area studies will require scholars to link different strands of research to
make the best of their diversity for theory-building.
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